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ABSTRACT
This dissertation analyzes the budget strategy and behavioral patterns of 36
agencies in South Carolina, with the purpose of understanding the condition of equilibrium
and disturbances in South Carolina state’s budgeting process. This analysis will further
use new variables to better our understanding of state’s budgeting process. Research paper
one examines the impact of the relationships among the governor’s recommendations and
agencies’ political environment, type, method of head selection, agency size and agency
age on legislative appropriations. Research paper two is a qualitative analysis of budget
success, strategies and outcomes Finally, research paper three examines the determinants
of higher education funding and the need/ merit-based program. A brief conclusion for each
paper is presented followed by recommendations and suggestion for future research.
Essay 1 examines internal and external factors affecting agency appropriation. The
analysis provides new perspectives on the South Carolina budgeting process. Agencies use
different approach in presenting their budget request to governor and legislators. The
recognition and pattern of differences in gubernatorial recommendation provides evidence
that some agencies are more aggressive in their request than others. There is evidence that
agencies do appeal to legislatures when governor cut their request. In some cases,
legislatures do honor appeals made by agencies when their request are cut by governors.
In most cases of support for long-term budget growth, the legislature appears to be the most
crucial actor.
The governor’s recommendation does not appear to support the idea of budget
expansion in moderately acquisitive agencies. The results confirm that agencies that
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request the largest incremental change in the budget will receive the largest percentage
growth over their current budget, while agencies requesting little or no incremental change
will receive little to no growth in their budget. While this relationship may seem obvious,
it is important confirmation of the “budgeting game” in practice through a research lens.
In South Carolina, strong gubernatorial appointive power is found in conjunction with
weak gubernatorial budget power. The principal feature which makes the South Carolina
governor’s budget powers weak is that the governor does not have sole responsibility for
preparing the budget. therefore, in a weak position to influence the budgetary success
achieved by state agencies.
Essay two examines agency budget strategies and success. One important variable
determining the behavior of participants in the budget process is the adequacy of revenues
as confirmed by one of the state’s budget officials during the qualitative interviews. The
primary concern of professional budget managers during deficit periods is finding
resources to fund programs while at the same time curbing an increase in spending. This
research reveals that agencies have two primary budget goals: one focuses on agency
growth and expansion and the other on agency stability. Agencies interested in expansion
may focus on budget growth, i.e. a large percentage increase in appropriation, while
agencies interested in stability may focus on achieving a larger percentage of the current
request appropriated. In summary, budget success is dictated by agencies using various
approaches that suits their mission and need. Budget official reported that gaining support
from the governor provides an avenue for program expansion, implying that budget
officials are not just concerned about higher appropriation alone.
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Essay three examines South Carolina budgets for higher education and which
factors best predict changes in state appropriations. This study found evidence that state
spending in other priority categories appears to displace funding in higher education.
Several conditions can impact the ways in which states finance post-secondary institutions.
the share of funding that higher education receives is not reduced when all categories of
Medicaid

receive increased funding with some exception: Medicaid recipient as a

percentage of population and statewide Medicaid expenditure are the only categories that
dampen higher education funding as this category increases. Other categories of state
spending on Medicaid as a share of state revenue and the number of Medicaid recipients
indicate an increase in spending for higher education. In contrast to other findings, this
study found a statistical positive relationship between merit/need based scholarship
program. An increase in need-based scholarships to private institutions, Palmetto Fellows
and the LIFE Program are associated with increases in need-based scholarships to public
universities. The assertion that state spend less when revenue increase is not significant,
this study point out that increase in state revenue does increase funding for need/meritbased scholarship program.
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Chapter One: INTRODUCTION
Policy scholars begin their research using a broad lens as they consider how and
under what circumstances government activity affects the lives of citizens. All levels of
government impact the everyday lives of citizens, whether through local trash pickup,
maintenance of state roadways, or federal defense policies. These services provide at the
various levels of governments are dependent on the tax revenue and the budgets that
appropriate this revenue. As Ripley et al. (2007) argue, budgets are both fundamental to
questions of public policy and indications of policy actions in two ways: first, they map the
funding of all activities of an agency (however diverse, frequent or important); and second,
aggregate budgets represent the limits of activity for an agency. Thus, in a sense they define
the achievable goals for the agency.
Understanding how and under what circumstances policy actions are taken depends
at least in part on understanding how and under what circumstances budget decisions are
made (Ripley et al. 2007). Policy scholars who focus on public finance and budget
processes explore a range of critical questions within the broader policy environment. For
example, how an administration formulates policy priorities and what factors influence
these decisions are critical elements for understanding budgeting decisions. The
development of agency budgets is also impacted by various institutional actors.
Moreover, understanding how agencies interact with the legislative environment
and at what stage agencies exert the most influence over the budget process adds clarity to
the nature of the policy process. In addition, we might consider what political conditions
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influence agency program expansion. These environmental factors, which are
usually outside the organization, also affect the organization and its decisions as agencies
within the same or different policy arenas compete with one another for limited resources;
for example, the higher education budget competes with Medicaid and other social welfare
agencies. Multiple factors or forces have been identified as being involved in shaping
public policies, one example being how internal administrative conditions affect the
increase or reduction of an agency’s budget and, presumably, its activities. While the
research reported here cannot address all these questions, it will examine a number of these
issues to improve our understanding of the complicated factors that influence agency
budget priorities, goal setting and processes.
Recently, several factors have contributed to affect state budget process and
decisions made by legislatures. Specifically, Thurmaier & Willoughby (2001) recognized
that sudden change in population growth and market volatility have increasingly burdened
decision makers in state government . The federal government’s abdication of program
responsibility to the state has led to the implementation of a wide range of policies by the
latter. Leloup argues that “As the costs of health care and social programs expanded and
deﬁcits grew, politicians attempted to adopt long-term macro-budgetary strategies to
control ﬁscal balances” (Khan and Hildreth, 2002, p.18).
The changes in budget environment in the 1960s and 1990s has made the budget
strategies and approach used by agencies in the state and federal to change as well. Budget
actors have experienced some difficulties in the budget process. Rubin (1968) suggests that
the internal and external factors affecting budget environments have placed a great effect
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on budgetary decision-making, an analysis that appears to valid when considering the when
considering the whole environment in which budget decision is made Lowery et al (1983).
During the budget process, priorities of agencies are determined through allocation
of resources. Therefore, budget process is important and has implication on budget success.
As the budget process in each state highlights key issues, it demonstrates the dynamics in
state budgeting practices (NASBO, 2008). In addition, while allocating limited resources
among competing interests is inherently difficult, these decisions are also vitally important
to the fiscal health and future sustainability of individual communities within the state.
However, most of the members of community pay little attention to the budget. Addressing
this issue by studying the impact of the budget process on a community will assist
policymakers in effective allocation of resources. Further, public officials’ awareness have
been increased with issues associated with budgetary recommendation and appropriation.
Despite these challenges, there is little research about the state budgetary process
that focuses on decision makers below the level of elected official. Most studies on
budgeting such as Axelrod (1995) and Gosling (1997) have explored the politics and
economics of national budgeting. While scholars have provided evidence to support our
understanding of budgeting at the federal level. There is a need to fill the gap in budgeting
research by investigating budgetary process at the state and local level. This research
intends to address this lack of information concerning the budgetary process and politics
in state government.
An agency budget is a plan or forecast of revenues, expenses, or both for a future
specified time frame, such as a fiscal year. An approved expense budget serves as a
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spending allowance and keeping spending within this plan helps fulfill program
goals and ensures that the agency spends only what it has been appropriated. However,
agency deliberations to determine this budget are a dynamic interaction among many
actors, with the representatives from the legislative and executive sides, agency officials,
stakeholders, and interest groups interacting to develop budget proposals, which are then
formally considered by the state legislature. Smith and Jensen (2017) mentioned in their
analysis of factors important to legislators in budget decision that the budgetary process is

further complicated by differing perceptions about the relative importance of various pieces
of information and differing priority items that legislators base their decisions on, all of
which agency ofﬁcials may or may not be able to impact or control. Smith and Jensen also
mentioned that “despite the efforts of agency ofﬁcials in developing their requests, the
legislative approval of the budget can be unpredictable, and at the end of the process, this
body may approve funding for programs that were never requested or envisioned” (Smith
and Jensen 2017, p. 112).
One of the rationales for government funding of any program is perceived market
failure. For example, providing federal and state funding for air or water pollution
monitoring, clean up and prevention is because of years of market and government failures
that resulted in substantive negative environmental externalities. As such in order to
reconcile past damage and prevent future damage public monies are allocated to
programming and prevention of air and water pollution. The transfer of funds from one
level of government to another that is primarily responsible for providing services is
referred to as intergovernmental grants. The presence of externalities (negative or positive)
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could call for more centralization but these externalities in one way can be
addressed using intergovernmental grants. There are arguments as to the necessity for
government intervention when the markets fails. Market failure may be due to externalities
or presence of information asymmetry. The main feature of public goods are nonrivalry
and non-excludability. The non rivalry means that good use by one person does not affect
its use by others, and non excludability means its individuals cannot be excluded from its
use or could benefit from without paying (Whicker et al. 2002).
Scholars in the domain of budgeting argue that agency budget determination is
fundamental to a broader understanding of public policy that explains why some agencies
experience an increase, decrease, or stable budgets over time. For example, in some states
the heads of several executive branch agencies are elected officials, a situation which may
weaken the governor’s ability to exercise the same degree of budgetary control over them
agencies as can be exercised over agencies with appointed heads. Sharkansky, (1968,
1969), for example, found that agencies are more likely to have their recommendations
altered by the legislature in states with many elected officials, South Carolina and Georgia
being two examples of states with a number of agencies with elected heads. More
specifically, currently, South Carolina has nine agencies with elected heads, the
Department of Education and Department of Agriculture being two of the most important.
Agencies involved in the budgetary process are political actors operating in a given
political environment. While some aspects of the environment are uniform for all agencies,
many are unique to each agency. For example, some operate in a more supportive executive
environment than others, which is, in part, influenced by political party within state
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legislatures. Previous research on budgeting at the state and federal levels has found
that understanding agency budget requests throughout the different stages in the budgeting
process is important (LeLoup and Moreland, 1978). As a result, the initial focus of this
research centers on budget strategy throughout the entire budget process, specifically the
links between the goals of the agencies and their perceptions of the actions that will be
effective in obtaining the required funding in their political environment (Wildavsky 1968).
The research questions will be examined at the individual agency level and
subsequently aggregated across agency type and mission, and then aggregated across broad
agency. To better understand the agency budgeting environment, this research will address
the following key questions: 1) How do variations in the structural, economic and political
environment affect budget determination and how do these dimensions combine to affect
one another and 2) How do organizational external, structural and internal factors impact
budget strategies used by agencies. Succinctly, the primary research questions focus on
why some agencies see their budget’s grow and others do not, and the role of the governor
and the legislature in agency budget support and approval.
Paper one will use Ripley’s budgeting incremental budget model (2007), or
conceptual framework, to examine various aspects of incremental budgeting in 36 South
Carolina state government agencies. By examining the state budgetary process and the
relationship between agency, governor and legislature, this paper will assess the
implications of incremental budgeting in the agencies budget process. This research will
examine

agency budget success, budget size, agency assertiveness, legislative and

gubernatorial support. Secondly, it examines agencies by classifying them into agency
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type, method of agency head selection and policy area of influence and/or focus.
Finally, this paper will analyze the environmental factors affecting agency budget request,
the governor recommendation and the state legislative appropriation
Much of the research on the output of public policy has focused upon the budgetary
process, most examining the interactions between agencies and Congress with respect to
various budgetary decisions (Wildavsky, 1974; Fenno, 1966; Lindblom, 1959). After
analyzing the budgetary outputs of various public organizations, many researchers have
concluded that an incremental process of mutual adjustment exists between Congress and
Executive Branch agencies. However, this conclusion about budgetary theory does not
include the entire range of relevant phenomena.
While the incremental theory of budgeting allows for potential variations in
agencies, administrators, and circumstances, it does not take into account the variations in
agency strategies. Examining stable patterns of requests to Congress, incrementalism posits
the general behavioral characteristic of agency moderation but provides relatively little
information on the budgetary roles of the legislative and executive branches and the
departments. In relation to states, the primary responsibility of the executive budget office
is to support the governor assume the budget cutting role of guardianship. However, the
budgetary role of departments is less clearly specified in the theory. The question becomes
if these departments should allow agencies to ask the governor for as much as revenue as
they want, or should they play an active role in reducing requests or reshaping estimates.
The lack of data has limited the development of generalizations on the budgeting behavior
of either agencies or the governor’s office. An increasing number of studies have
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challenged this incremental theory of budgeting on methodological, substantive,
and normative grounds.
This research will argue that alternative strategies are followed by agencies; that
further differentiation of agency mission into distributive, redistributive, regulatory and
market-oriented is necessary to understand the behavior of the agency, the governor and
the legislators; and that agency mission, state government structure and agency strategies
have different impacts on budgetary outcomes. In doing so, these findings may pose an
additional challenge to incrementalism, which theorizes that the budgeting environment is
outside of the budget process. To address this issue, Rubin (1968) “suggested an expanded
model of the budgetary process that includes budget participants and environmental
influences” (Ryu et al. 2008, p. 24).
The close relationship that exists between governing and budgeting suggests that
whether an agency is headed by an elected official has implications on the budgeting
process (Wildavsky, 1992). In some states, for example Georgia and South Carolina,
several heads of executive agencies are elected officials. This practice, however, may
weaken the governor’s ability to exercise the same degree of budgetary control over them
as over agencies with appointed heads. Sharkansky (1968, 1969), for example, found that
agencies are more likely to have their recommendations altered by the legislature in those
states with many elected executive branch officials.
Previous research has not examined whether the effects of the method for selecting
agency head, agency type (cabinet or executive), agency mission or other characteristics of
state political culture influence how legislatures treat agency requests and gubernatorial
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recommendations. In addition, we do not know from this previous research if the
method of agency head selection itself or some other characteristic of the state political
culture accounts for how legislatures treat agency requests and gubernatorial
recommendations. Perhaps a better indication of the impact of the method of agency head
selection on gubernatorial influence over budget requests and appropriations can be
obtained from a comparison of the budgetary experiences of agencies within the same state
which have their heads selected by different methods, thereby controlling for the effect of
political culture.
Even though agencies with elected heads have the potential for greater
independence from the governor than those with appointed heads, they may nevertheless
choose not to deal directly with the legislature in budgetary matters. Independence from
the governor is a double-edged sword: Although direct access to the legislature might
enhance the likelihood of agency budget success, it may also increase agency vulnerability
to legislative influence over programs and priorities. On the other hand, agencies with
elected heads may find the political relationship with the governor more of an asset than a
liability in their budgetary dealings with the legislature. For this reason, this research
hypothesizes that within a state with strong gubernatorial budget powers, gubernatorial
recommendations rather than agency requests will be the more important determinant of
legislative appropriations irrespective of whether the head is appointed or elected
(Thompson, 1987).

An important difference between this research and previous budget studies is the
availability of data in South Carolina related to agency requests, the executive’s
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recommendation and legislative appropriations. Unlike previous studies, this
research will examine the responses of the governor and legislature to the agency’s initial
budget request to frame a clearer picture of the budgeting process.
Following the lead of Sharkansky (1968), two indicators of gubernatorial and
legislative influence over state agency budget requests are used in the analysis: short-term
success and success in budget expansion. This is to determine the success of each agency
in receiving its appropriations from the legislature in the previous budget period based on
two reasons: to determine if certain agencies were successful in the budget process, while
others were not; and to determine whether the executive or the legislature base current
decisions for each agency on decisions from the preceding budget review. Short-term
success is a measure of an agency’s success in receiving approval from the legislature in a
given fiscal year. Success in expansion measures an agency’s success in receiving approval
from the legislature for an increase in its current budget.
Another distinction between this research and previous budget studies for example,
Davis, Dempster, and Wildavsky, 1974) lies in observations about government structure.
Previous studies have researched budgetary process at the national level. At the national
level, for example, the difference in federal budget has continued to occur occurred over a
period of time, which makes the budgetary relationships between the presidency and
Congress to be relatively easy to analyze. The same cannot be said generally of state and
local budgeting. To investigate this hypothesis, this study will use the original budget
requests for 36 state agencies in South Carolina over a 28-year period. In addition to these
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original requests, the South Carolina Archive has records on the governor’s budget requests
and the final legislative appropriation for each agency.
The second aspect reported this first paper will explore the question to what extent,
if any, structures and environments of state budget actors affect their budget behaviors and
budget success. A key issue in this area of research is whether budget behaviors and budget
success are significantly altered, as some suggest, by the influence of the governor and the
legislature (Thompson 1987). Using the data from the same 36 agencies in South Carolina
from 1990-2018, this aspect of this study examines how agency size, agency age, partisan
strength in the electorate, expenditure, budget request, budget size, status of governor’s
party, governors, economic conditions, and previous appropriation relate to agency
appropriation. The results reveal explanatory power in the models and support the concept
of a life cycle of agencies: while agencies are younger, their appropriations increase, a
relationship that reverses as agencies become older and their policy actions begin to
decrease. Moderate size/age agencies experience stability in their appropriations and
recommendations from the governor.
In attempting to analyze organizational life, sociological theorists have focused on
a variety of factors including growth, adaptiveness, innovation, change, stability,
effectiveness, and survival, among others. However, various researchers define and use the
same terms differently, meaning it is often difficult to organize, much less evaluate, much
of the organizational literature. Two major classic models of organization structure by
(Burns and Stalker, 1961) are the mechanistic and the organic, and both determine the
environments of the organizations. The mechanistic form emphasizes structure and
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hierarchy for control, authority, and communication to achieve goals and accomplish tasks,
while the organic relies on individuals with specialized knowledge and recognizes unique
and individual capabilities.
Organizations are viewed as possessing characteristic ways of responding to
environmental pressures. The Burns and Stalker (1961) models are illustrative of this
research in that they present two broad types of organizations. Their research and that of
others support the view that organizations either exhibit a tendency toward stability,
rigidity, and limited growth or one toward expansion, rapid growth, and adaptiveness.
These environmental factors, which are usually outside the organization, are seen as
affecting the organization and its decisions. The factors or forces that have been identified
as involved in shaping public policies are numerous.
Budgetary incrementalism argues that three institutional actor agencies, the
executive budget offices, and legislative committees dominate budget outcomes. The main
actors in budgetary decision at the federal level are: the president, congress and agencies
while at the state level, the main actors in budgetary process are the governor, legislators
and agencies (Wildavsky et al. 1966). Ryu et al. (2008) also found that internal and external
factors affecting are more important to gain a complete understanding of budgetary
process.
The third paper investigates the state’s higher education appropriation in detail,
comparing its levels to both the governor’s recommendations and legislative appropriation
levels by examining the various institutional, economic, demographic, cultural, political,
and fiscal factors. More specifically, it begins with two basic questions: 1) Why is there
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variation in public higher education funding in South Carolina and 2) How does
spending for higher education relate to state level budget expenditures? e budget literature
argues that examining budget competition is important for understanding the tradeoffs in
state higher education appropriation. The variations in legislator and governor support have
implications for tuition, low income students, and public higher education standards. As
such, this research will examine the dynamics of budget competition to provide insight into
the variations in state support for research institution, public universities in the state of
South Carolina.
“Hovey (1999) argued that higher education spending is used as a “balance wheel
in state finance.” When state finances are strong, higher education benefits
“disproportionately”. However, when a state experiences financial problem, legislators see
higher education as a place where they can cut budgets to assist other state priorities since
these institutions are viewed, probably correctly, as having greater fiscal flexibility and the
ability to tap other resources such as tuition not available to other state programs” (Buhler
2014, p. 12).
Hovey (1999) “addresses the future financing of higher education, focusing
primarily on the states and presenting state-by-state data on important trends” (Hovey
1999, p.1). He assesses the health state’s revenue and expenditure in the context of other
state competing priorities and how these priorities affect funding for higher education.
Hovey finds that most states expenditure will grow more than revenue which will lead to
funding cut for higher education. However, during favorable budget environment,
lawmakers have been in support of funding major changes in higher education request. In
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contrast, McLendon et al (2009) concluded that state appropriation for higher education
remains an issue in united state educational system. The author noted that demographic and
economic factors combined with higher education climate are certain conditions
influencing funding for higher education.
While other scholars (McLendon et al 2009; Tandberg, 2009) have advocated for
governance structure in higher education system, Delaney and Doyle (2011) found that the
governance structure may have negative impact on higher education funding. was not
statistically significant. This view is different from other scholars who advocated for
centralization to be a factor to increase funding for higher education.
While these literatures have identified some variables and factors that could affect
funding for higher education. Weerts et al (2006) noted two important areas needing
additional research. “First, the majority of studies are anchored in economic and political
conceptual frameworks, thus limiting our theoretical understanding of this issue. They
suggest that future studies should investigate this topic through other disciplinary lenses to
provide new perspectives to inform our understanding of it. Second, past studies have
typically relied on state-level finance data (i.e., share of higher education budgets) as the
primary unit of analysis. Consequently, little is known about how state support for higher
education may vary among sectors (research universities, regional comprehensive
institutions, community colleges) and even at institutions themselves” (Weerts et al 2008,
p.4).
The final part of this dissertation employs a qualitative approach to assess the link
between agency mission, budget strategy and budget success. In defining agency budget
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success and discussing their definitions, agency budget officials provide useful insights
into the strengths and limitations of specific measures of budget success and, in some cases,
the tactics used in achieving it. Using a qualitative approach, this chapter aims to explore
the following:
Agency budget success from an administrator’s perspective
The primary resource constraints
How public support helps agencies with budget success.
Who has power with the state budget and how do they use it to achieve their
ends?
This dissertation attempts to address ongoing budgeting questions through several
lenses. Its results will enable future state level researchers and practitioners gain insight
into how agency characteristics may play a role in the success and/or failure of the
budgeting process. This chapter will highlight on agency budget strategies and behavior of
budget officials in the budget process. It extends the budget strategy studies of previous
scholars that have describe, explain and possibly predict in some situations various factors
that affect agency outcome in the budget process. The budget policy research area has been
dominated by other lines of inquiry, and this dissertation seeks to expand that with a focus
on the agency and legislative processes being employed to arrive at budget policy.
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Chapter Two: INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL
FACTORS AFFECTING AGENCY
APPROPRIATION
2.1

Introduction
Historically, theories of incrementalism, which explain the strategies and behavior

of the participants as well as the observed patterns of budgetary stability, have argued that
successive limited comparisons of policies are more feasible and rational than
comprehensive analysis in governmental decision-making (Lindblom 1959). The
incremental model developed by Charles Lindblom breaks down the decision-making
process into small steps using various combinations of experience and intuition. Wildavsky
in his book, The Politics of the Budgetary Process, examined the relationship between
agencies, Congress and appropriations committee decisions. Wildavsky assumes that
budget reviewers only base their decision on last year appropriation. (Wildavsky, 1964).
Agency assertiveness, the primary focus of the research reported here, is the
tendency for agencies to use strategy of expansion/budget growth in their programs and
funding (LeLoup et al. 1978) and, thus, to request budget increases effectively and
aggressively. As a result, agencies that employ such a strategy may have a different
outcome in their budget success. While assertiveness may be a function of the orientation
of the agency, it is also recognized that assertive behavior in budgeting is constrained by
numerous external factors (LeLoup et al. 1978). In addition, while assertiveness can be a
good budget strategy, all agencies are not equally free to request budget increases.
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As agency assertiveness is an underdeveloped area of study in the budgeting
literature, this paper explores and extends this field by focusing on budget strategy.
Research suggests that the internal and external factors of budget actors best describe the
strategic behavior of an agency or its appropriate reviewing agent over a certain period
(Ryu et al. 2008). More specifically, institutional actors, institutional rules, and the personal
characteristics of an actor can influence the budget outcome or the process itself (Ryu et
al. 2008).
While the budget process and the budget environment constrain decisions that
budget actors make, the incremental theory contends that the environment surrounding
budgeting is not part of budget process (Rubin 1989). Rubin emphasized that if the
environment is viewed as part of this process, we may expect it to influence the budget
outcome. This contention has encouraged researchers to link changing environmental
conditions, the budget process and the budget outcome. However, (Rubin (2008) found that
governors and legislatures still play major roles in the state budget process.
There is a need to understand the factors that affect budgeting at the state level,
more importantly, how well the current literature describes the realities of the budget
process at this level. This study joins other scholars of budgeting at the state level to
investigate the influence of institutional budget actors and the exogenous budget
environment on the budget outcome, specifically focusing on the State of South Carolina.
It examines the relationship between budget assertiveness and budget success for
fiscal years 1990 – 2018 using the incremental model to study the relationship between
agency request, governor recommendation and legislative appropriation. This study is of
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importance at the state level to identify the elements of incremental budgeting in
state of South Carolina governments Also, to identify state features that affect the budging
process and outcomes. Previous research have not examined whether the effects of the
method for selecting agency head, agency type (cabinet or executive), agency mission or
other characteristics of state political culture influence how legislatures treat agency
requests and gubernatorial recommendations. In addition, we do not know from this
previous research if the method of agency head selection itself or some other characteristic
of the state political culture accounts for how legislatures treat agency requests and
gubernatorial recommendations.
Perhaps a better indication of the impact of the method of agency head selection on
gubernatorial influence over budget requests and appropriations can be obtained from a
comparison of the budgetary experiences of agencies within the same state which have
their heads selected by different methods, thereby controlling for the effect of political
culture. The study explores the research question why some agencies boldly ask for large
increases and others timidly propose cuts. Further, it examines the relationships between
agency assertiveness and the internal and external factors of the agency. Overall, the goal
of this analysis is to better understand the effect of these relationships on budget outcome
or growth rate of the agency.
Incrementalism posits that the dominant agency strategy is one of moderation,
asking for a budget increase but not a large one. Previous research (Leloup 1978) has used
requests in the President’s budget to indicate agency behavior. While availability of data
has been a major problem, many of the conclusions were based on the crucial assumption
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that final requests reflect an agency’s goals and actions. This study suggests that
the annual appropriations process, when viewed as a whole, is considerably more stable
than its component stages. To identify an agency’s strategies and define the roles of the
reviewing bodies, it is necessary to examine the early stages of the budgetary process. This
research will begin to do so at a state level by asking questions related to initial agency
requests and the level of assertiveness in seeking new funds, the consequences of alternate
strategies, and under what conditions agencies request large increases. These and other
questions that have seen limited study form the core of this research.

2.2

Contributions to Knowledge
Wildavsky (1964) provides evidence that budgeting includes more than the formal

submission of information and easily reached decisions. He also identifies many
administrative and legislative tactics that budget actors employ. However, there is no
rigorous examination of what types of actors are likely to have what degree of budgetary
success. One reason for this omission may be that Wildavsky does not compare the
behavior of multiple agencies in a systematic fashion, giving the impression that
administrators uniformly seek to get everything they can from appropriations subcommittees in terms of money and autonomy. Yet this is not necessarily the case. This
research will provide evidence on which types of actors are likely to take what types of
action and with what degree of success.
The recognition and verification of variations in the budget strategies of different
agencies are important contributions to the current view of budgeting and politics. In
addition, the discovery of differences in agency strategies could
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suggest the likelihood of differences in the posture that legislative committees
assume vis-a-vis different administrators. This dissertation begins to explore the potentially
subjective nature of budget strategies suggested by Wildavsky and other scholars using a
measurable framework. As mentioned earlier, this research will systematically compare the
budgeting behavior of different state level administrative units or agencies.
The use of time series data allows this study to examine the changing environmental
conditions of the budget process and clarify the extant theory of agency-level budget
outcome. According to Rubin (2008) the lack of empirical studies testing explanatory
theories can be attributed to the difficulty in obtaining data that connect behavior of budget
actors with the fiscal information of the agency.
Finally, this research highlights state agency budget strategies, an area which has
received limited research attention and, as a result, the theory of incrementalism has been
the predominate theory applied to explain this process. This study will extend the budget
strategy studies of other scholars that identified several factors that affect agency strategy
and budget success but will go further by examining additional factors and interactions.
Specifically, this research explores the potential impact of various agency missions and the
importance of agency budget strategies in relation to budget requests. Extending the public
policy literature, and specifically the public budgeting research, in this way provides an
important lens into a wide range of potential state and state agency characteristics. The
both qualitative and quantitative frameworks and analysis presented here will benefit future
researchers for years to come.
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2.3

Research Questions
The state budget process resembles both federal and local government budgeting,

but in details, it is not identical (Wildavsky 1964). The primary research question explores
why some agencies boldly ask for large increases and others timidly propose cuts.
Primary Research Question 1: What are the patterns of assertiveness/moderation in
initial agency requests?
1a.

How does budget size affect the level of support from the governor and
legislators?

1b. How does agency assertiveness affect the level of support from the
governor and legislators?
Primary Research Question 2: Is there a relationship between the governor’s
recommendations and the legislature’s appropriations?
2a.

Does the legislature rely on the governor’s budget for appropriation?

2b. Is the relationship between the governor’s recommendations and the
legislature’s appropriations more direct than the relationship between the
agency’s request for an increment and the legislature’s appropriation?
Primary Research Question 3: What are the structural and environmental factors
affecting agency appropriation
3a.

How does an agency’s political environment affect agency outcomes?

3b. How does agency type affect the level of support from the governor and
the legislature?
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3c.

How does the method of agency head selection affect agency
appropriation?

3d. What are the determinants for agency appropriation?

2.4

3e.

What is the effect of agency age on agency budget outcome?

3f.

What is the effect of agency size on agency budget outcome?

Literature Review
The budgeting literature in general provides empirical evidence on the behavior,

role, and strategies of individual agencies, governors and legislators. Much of the previous
literature has been limited to non-systematic case analyses (Russett 1970) and has engaged
in little, if any, quantitative analysis, with incrementalist studies being the most influential
works on budgeting over the last two decades (Leloup 1978). In “The Science of Muddling
Through,” Lindblom suggests that in governmental decision-making, successive limited
comparison of policies is more feasible and rational than comprehensive (Leloup 1978, p.
489). According to Wildavsky “budgeting is incremental, not comprehensive”
(Wildavsky1964).
In Sharkansky’s study of agency request and gubernatorial recommendation
(1968), Sharkansky (1968) assessed the agency increment, assertiveness and how
legislative and gubernatorial support affect budget outcome of agencies both in the longand short-term budget success. Shakansky argued that assertiveness is a perquisite for
agency budget expansion. importance of both the assertiveness of the agency and the
support from the state governor for short- and long-term agency expansion.. Legislators do
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accept agency’s request and use heuristics as a cue in aiding their calculation when making
budget
decisions. The lack of resource has been mentioned as an important reason as to
why legislators use incremental methods in budgetary decision. Shakansky concluded that
for agency to have success both in the short and long term, Governor recommendation is
more important than agency assertiveness.
The incrementalism school of thought sees time and information as the two most
important factors for legislators and governors who make final decisions on budgets. These
factors are especially important in deciding whether an agency’s budget is perceived as
comprehensive. The strategy used by agency can also be classified as politically satisficing;
generating a satisfactory outcome but one that may or may not be optimal.
Leloup (1978) showed that the dominance of incremental theory has been
detrimental to an overall understanding of the dynamics and processes of budgeting. Under
the incremental theory of budgeting, the focus has been on the stability of budgeting at the
local, state and national level. Theoretical developments in incremental budgeting have
been concerned with explaining why changes in the final appropriation or the entire budget
process are minimal. However, many scholars have argued that budgeting is more complex
than incremental theories explain; the findings of incrementalism concerning the budgetary
process have left scholars to conclude that agencies have little opportunity for discretion
and initiative in budgeting and in other areas of the policy process. The research over the
past 53 years has concluded that the single most important determinant of an agency’s
budget is the previous year’s level of funding (Wildsaky 1976).
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The incremental process of has been used to explain the decision-making process
and budgetary outcome of agencies (Moreland, 1975). The primary strategy is to ask for a
budget increase, but only a modest one. While agencies do not expect their requests
to be completely denied, it is assumed there is a clear budget strategy in which an
extravagant increment in what agency ask for may lead to reduction in their appropriation.
The expectation of agencies by the appropriation committee is to request for more
since the dominant rule that is used to calculate agency requests is for agency to deviate
from using moderate strategy. The behavior of budget reviewers summarize the process,
with the results supporting the theory of incrementalism: as Moreland (1975) summarizes,
the main similarity of the budgetary process is the stability in the rules used by the
participants. However, Moreland’s (1975) research did not examine the causes that
surrounds the special circumstances, even though he highlights their existence. For
example, Moreland confirms that the internal structure of agency correlate with greater
appropriations.
Dempster and Wildavsky’s (1974) research incorporates a variety of environmental
variables into models of incrementalism represents an extension and an improvement of
earlier work. Environmental factors are coded as binary variables in their models, and this
explains elements of environment on budget process and budget outcome. Shull and Shaw
(1999) found that competition between president and congress affect appropriation
outcomes. Their results confirm that the partisan composition of Congress and the
presidency, the status of president’s party, and division in Congress have impact on agency
budget success.
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Past research indicates that budget behavior concerning the general fund have been
consistent, but agencies still embark of assertive strategy. Thompson (1987) mentioned
that, there are cases when legislators appropriate more than governor
recommendation and also in some cases legislators follow the lead of governor in their
appropriation.. State political factors have been recognized to play part in gubernatorial
and legislative appropriation. Lack of resource and legislative professionalism have been
also identified as to why state follow an incremental approach in budgeting (Thompson’s,
1987; Shakansky, 1973).
Strategy in the budgeting process is important. Axelrod (1995) mentioned that
agencies use different strategies in their budget request. Leloup and Moreland (1978) used
a more robust empirical analysis to conclude that agency strategies play a part in
determining the budget success. He concluded that assertiveness is a perquisite for an
agency attempting. Assertiveness is an important factor that distinguish between agency
that receive large or small increase in appropriation. Sharkansky found a positive
relationship between the governor’s recommendation and success in short-term and budget
expansion. Shakansky concluded that governor’s recommendation is an important factor
in agency budget outcome.
Sharkansky (1969, 1968), found that agencies are more likely to have their budget
recommendations altered by the legislature in states with a large number of elected
executive branch officials. This fact is important because it may then control the power of
the governor to some extent in these states. However, it is not known if the method for
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selecting the head of an agency itself or some other characteristic of the state political
culture influences the manner in which legislatures treat agency requests and gubernatorial
recommendations. This issue could be explored by examining the budgetary
experience of agencies within the same state which have their heads selected by different
methods.
There are questions and challenges to incrementalism approach when analyzing
budgeting process. Incrementalism assumption is based on the economy being stable.
Incrementalism theorist argued that it is a useful theoretical lens in that economic and
policy environment as it could describe the steady agency growth; however overall, it was
less effective in describing external factors that affect budgeting process and environment.
Willoughby and Finn (1996) described and classified the budgeting behavior of
legislative analysts from nine southern states and then compared their decision orientations
with executive analysts from the same states, finding that budget decision-making followed
patterns that reﬂected different budget cues. More specifically, they found five budget
decision making types or orientations based on their research.
Ripley et al., 1973 challenged the lncrementalism approach to budgetary policymaking. This research assumes an opposite view of the incrementalism theorist who a that
budgeting is not comprehensive but stable. Ripley et al. (1973) synthesized early
theoretical works and developed a conceptual framework based on four major fields of
research. suggests that policy-making is one method used by a government in responding
to environmental events, defining policy response in terms of three elements: a policy
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statement, a policy action, and a policy result. A policy statement is defined by its content:
an explicit articulation of the goals of subsequent government activity. The intent of the
activity may change over time and the condition that elicited this statement of intent
may also change over time. Policy actions
are those activities or sets of activities articulated or implied by the policy
statement. Necessarily, these actions are determined by the statement of intent. Both the
statement of intent and the activities undertaken to implement the policy statement are
influenced by intervening environmental and governmental conditions. The policy result,
or policy outcome as it is sometimes called, is what happens in the environment and in the
government as a result of governmental activity. The activities of the government are
presumed to have an effect on the condition that originally prompted the activity. Whether
a distinguishable impact was achieved with the desired consequences can, in principle, be
discerned.
March and Simon (1958) as well as Blau et al. (1966) suggested that hierarchical
complexity may affect how the organizational mission is accomplished. Ripley et al. (1973)
investigated the effects of relationship between

hierarchical complexity and

appropriations, their study found that, appropriations increases when the complexity of an
agency decreases. Fenno (1966) also found that Congress is sensitive to administrative
staff arrangements. Blau (1970) suggest that the size of an organization affects how the
organization is arranged and the larger the organization, the more differentiated the
administration. The findings of Ripley et al. (1973) also support Blau’s (1970) assumption
that, as the size of an agency increases the appropriations also increase.
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2.4.1 Principal agent theory and budgeting
Public budgeting involves relationships among the actors or the participants during
the process, specifically among agency, governor and legislators. Bureau or agencies are
the agents and legislature and the governor are the principals. In this relationship, the
legislative arm enter an agreement with the agents to serve the public, and the primary
focus for all involved is the budget (Forrester, 2002).
The Principal-Agent model has been used to describe the relationship among the
activities of the congress, the presidency and the United States departments or agencies
(Wood & Waterman 1994). According to Wood and Waterman (1994), information and
hierarchical relationship are two factors affecting the relationship between agent and
principals. In other words, those who make claims on governmental resources are agents
and those who allocate and ration the resources are principals. In this relationship, the
principal contracts with agents to provide services to the public, and the main focus for all
those involved is the contract (i.e., the budget) itself (Khan & Hildreth 2002, p. 124).
“From the principal-agent perspective, the information managed by both is focused
on advancing their own self-interest or maximizing their own utilities. The information is
exchanged so that both sets of participants might adapt to a dynamic, yet resourceconstrained environment” (Khan & Hildreth 2002, p. 124). A major limitation in the
budgetary and political environment is the imperfect information provided by both the
principals and agents or, worse, the asymmetric information held by either of them. Where
there is an asymmetry of information, it is expected that the consequent budgetary solution
will be suboptimal, with unexpected results. With insufficient or biased information, the
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decision makers cannot estimate the effects of their decisions with a high degree of
certainty. Asymmetry information create an imbalance of power between the agent and
principal and this could make the agreement made to go awry. Budget success also depend
on quality of information shared between the agency and legislative arm otherwise it will
be dictated by political trade off . The Principal-Agent model can be used to enhance our
understanding of the relationships between actors in the budget decision making process.
Applying the Principal-Agent theory and using it as a framework to explore the budgeting
process may provide an additional lens for understanding the complexities of the budget
process.

2.4.2 The role of information in the budget process
The use of an incremental budgeting process and the asymmetric information
included in it are two primary challenges faced by policymakers interested in making
evidence-based budget decisions. When agencies develop budget requests for decision
makers, agencies could potentially exploit their relationship with other budget participants
due to information asymmetry. One way to reduce this asymmetry in the budget process is
for all participants to have a knowledgeable understanding of the process. The lack of
information about which programs are effective and those providing clear benefits may
result in decision makers asking for an across the board reduction (VanLandingham et al
2016), leading to suboptimal budgeting decisions.
I believe there is a need to understand budget justification and use evidence as a
guide in budget development. Justification is required to distinguish knowledge from
merely guessing about should be done; a justified budget is one supported by evidence and
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with reasons that ensure tax payers’ dollars will be well spent. From an agency perspective,
a well-developed justification is key to its budget request. According to VanLandingham et
al. (2016), one of the issues with the budget rules and processes is that agencies are required
to justify the amount of funding requested rather than the results their program hope to
achieve. With regard to the budgeting process, decision makers can choose between line
item, performance-based or zero-based budgeting as a guide for their decisions.
Performance-based budgeting requires the agency to justify funds and establish
performance metrics while zero-based budgeting does not use an incremental method,
requiring agencies to defend their entire budget.
Another key challenge in the budgeting process is the fact that those who are
supposed to review and approve the budget generally have less information and knowledge
of agency needs and the budgeting process in general. According to Rubin (1980), the
complexity within the budget process affects the actors in receiving the necessary
information to inform their decision. This lack of information inhibits the budget actors’ in
making decision during budget process. Wildavsky (1968) also support other non
incrementalist scholars that decision makers in the budget process have few resources.
Much of the existing literature on government budgeting suggests the importance of
incremental decision rules. Wildavsky et al. (1968) concluded in their research of federal
budgeting that officials who review agency requests focus on the increment and not budget
size.
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2.4.3 Relationship between incrementalism budgeting and punctuated equilibrium
“V. O. Key (1940) described budgeting as the process of deciding whether to
allocate more resources to activity X than activity Y. As such, he considered budgets as a
process for deciding who gets what and how much. In other words, public budgeting is a
reflection of priorities and constraints—what gets put on the agenda and what does not
(Khan & Hildreth 2002, p. 202)”. The question then becomes what has the potential to shift
the priorities addressed on the agenda. Punctuation equilibrium theory attempts to explain
how priorities might change on a government agenda. While this theory may not explain
frequent small changes, it may be able to explain the infrequent large ones.
Baumgartner and Jones (1993) developed the concept of punctuation equilibrium,
stating the effect of incremental changes that occurs in budget process. The theory states
that a policy will continue to be in a state a equilibrium until it is disturbed by external
condition and later the policy will go back to original condition. The rational choice theorist
believes that changes in budgeting occurs incrementally because of limited computational
capability of decision-makers. During a time of instability in the official agenda, there is
a window of opportunity for creating substantial change, the explanation for why this
theory is called punctuated equilibria (Jordan 2002).
Informed by an internship with the South Carolina Department of Administration.
, my research argues that incrementalism remains the standard approach to budgeting. This
research remains focused on understanding and examining incremental changes as they are
considered the common changes in budget activity. The intellectual origin of incremental
decision-making is in the work of Lindblom (1959, 1979). Lindblom believes that rather
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than evaluating all possible outcomes, decision-makers in actuality list only those
which occur to them, relying heavily on their past experiences. Decision-makers select the
first alternative that seems minimally acceptable, and analysis is limited. Many possible
outcomes and alternative potential policies or decisions are not considered, and affected
values are ignored.
Baumgartner and Jones (1993) also found that incremental changes are present in
budget process but other underlying factors affecting budget must be accounted and taken
into consideration. Punctuated equilibrium acknowledges that this model includes both
incremental and punctuated changes. True (1995) applied the punctuation equilibrium
model focusing on controllable and uncontrollable aspect of national budgeting. True
hypothesize that if the effect of budget responsiveness is to policy change then, this effect
should be noticeable in changing budget authority. The study finds that budget changes are
associated with major interventions but the most influential factors affecting budget change
is the domestic and political factors. The study argues that non incremental change could
occur in the budgeting process due to changes in priority of what the government intends
to do. True (1995) concludes that budget authority is a significant factor for associating
policy shift and budget changes because budget authority explains policy changes more
than expenditure.
The benefit of applying punctuated equilibrium in relation to budgeting allow us to
understand whether the effect of external shock causes policy to shift and what is the
difference between policy shift and equilibrium state of economy. It is impotent to
understand how radical change of events affects budget process and outcome. Applying
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this lens to budgeting, these points in the equilibria process reveal a shift in
spending priorities. The model of punctuation equilibrium is useful for understanding the
state budgeting process; however, it is important to acknowledge that incrementalism also
characterizes the budgeting process and recognizes the limitations of the cognitive capacity
of decision makers.
Theoretically, bounded rationality could also be used to explain why policy makers
may prioritize incrementalism when reviewing budgets. The bounded rationality theory
argues that humans have limited computational capacity for processing information. Due
to the limited computational capacity of human being, the capability of the legislators to
process all aspect of budget issues is limited. Bounded rationality recognized the
imperfection and limited capability in human’s knowledge. The bounded rationality
paradigm, first proposed by Simon (1957), acknowledges the limitations of processing
information from human’s perspective (Simon 1972).
The theory of bounded rationality argues that budget decision makers do not have
complete information to make an informed decision. Even though when the information is
present, sometimes it is not accurate and complete. Limited computational capability and
lack of time are the factors that inhibit the lawmakers in analyzing all aspect of budgetary
process completely. Therefore, decision makers use cues and one of such is a concept
called heuristics which helps in decision making. The bounded rationality paradigm is
important because it emphasizes cognitive constraints and the use of decision heuristics to
help mitigate them.
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2.4.4 Revenue and expenditure as a component of budget
At the most basic level, a budget is made up of revenues (taxes and fees) and
expenditures; however, government budgets face the tension of having to balance the two.
Budgeting rules across states impact the tension and/or constraints related to the budgeting
process. “A budget is effectively a spending plan based on the expected revenue and the
priorities for the quantity and quality of services to be provided or transferred to the public”
(Ulbrich 2004, page 204). Therefore, all governments, both at the state and federal level,
need to consider the revenue and expenditure side of budget. The budget development
process involves three key elements: a revenue plan, an expenditure forecast and a
procedure for dealing with the difference between revenue and expenditure.
The federal government (and some states) find themselves with excessive of debt
as their rules allow for this occurrence. The Congressional Budget Office predicts that the
federal budget deficit will exceed $693 billion for the fiscal year 2019. (CBO The
Economic Outlook for 2019). States have their own budgeting rules and processes, and in
South Carolina the budget is legally required to balance, meaning it cannot be negative.
The first component that drives the budget process is the revenue available in any
year. The primary source of revenue for the Federal Government is income and social
security taxes, while for state and local governments, it is sales and property tax,
respectively. While the CBO provides revenue forecasts for the Federal Government, the
Revenue for Fiscal Affairs (RFA) serves in this capacity for the State of South Carolina.
Predictions from the CBO and the RFA impact the dialogue about the tax structure, new
and expanded expenditure programs and the future of the Social Security program. In
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addition, revenue forecasts play an important role in determining economic policy,
although some critics have argued that revenue forecasts at the federal level have not been
exceptionally accurate (Ulbrich 2003).
The expenditure side of the budget addresses both ongoing and proposed new
programs. Revenue forecasts are based on anticipated economic conditions, which are then
incorporated into the decision-making process. All economic forecasts are applied to the
existing tax base and analyzed according to income elasticity relationships. These forecasts
also reflect any changes in the tax structure including both tax rates and expenditure. A key
question that has not been explored is if surpluses and/or deficits continue, how will
budgetary behavior and norms adjust? South Carolina’s call for a reduction of three percent
(3%) of an agency’s total appropriation results in two possible outcomes: First, increased
revenue could lead to increased state expenditures (one could argue that state or federal
expenditure must be in line with available revenue, and, therefore, expenditure must follow
revenue); and second, as revenue decrease and/or expenditures are reduced , budget
deficits will shrink.
Second component that drives the budget process is the changes in government
expenditure that change the revenue: one could also argue that disturbances to the economy
and other external conditions that affect budgeting lead to an increase in government
spending and may or may not result in an increase in revenues (taxation). Simply put, an
increase in government expenditure does not translate to an increase in revenue.
Government budget deficits may have a significant impact on the economy as deficits can
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result in a reduction in national savings and economic growth. It can be argued that
a deficit reduction strategy could increase economic growth.

2.5

Methodology
The analytical approach used in this paper focused on applying time-series (or

longitudinal) models to examine budgeting outcomes over time. Time -series models are
suitable because of both the nature of the hypotheses and the methodological advantages
of this approach. This study did not assume that the variables affecting an agency remain
stable over time, but rather that they vary systematically with such environmental
conditions as social and economic conditions. Cross-sectional analysis is not appropriate
for this type of data as it holds environmental variables constant as opposed to allowing for
a dynamic modeling process over time. For this reason, time-series analysis allows for a
more robust examination of the effects of various environmental conditions on the
budgeting process.
In addition to permitting a study of environmental effects, time-series analysis can
help to separate systematic error from random error in the prediction equations (Coleman,
1968; Heise, 1970). It allows for measurement of the proper time lags between variables
(Bohrnstedt, 1969) and provides information on the directionality of effects between
variables (Bohrnstedt, 1969; Heise, 1970). According to Campbell and Stanley (1963), a
longitudinal design can be used as a quasi-experimental design, which is subject to fewer
problems than a static group comparison. This advantage is especially important if one
wants to study the results of policy actions when it is not possible to set up an experimental
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design. Longitudinal information can also be used in relating historical analysis to
quantitative studies.
Time series analysis (Panel data) require that a number of measures must be used
to characterize normality, correlation and overall best model fit. This study used a number
of diagnostic tests to test for these issues, and the time-fixed effects tests were examined
for their significance. The time-fixed effects test is a joint test to see if the dummies for all
years are equal to 0 and if they are then, no time fixed effects are needed. The Hausman
test was used to test for the appropriateness of a fixed or random effects model. Testing for
cross-sectional dependence/contemporaneous correlation was completed using the Pasaran
cross-sectional dependence (CD) test to test whether the residuals are correlated across
entities. Cross-sectional dependence can lead to bias in tests results (also called
contemporaneous correlation), and, therefore, a critical examination of the residuals is
necessary. See the appendix for all diagnostic results.
Finally, it is critical to determine the potential bias in model estimation and results.
Models of this type often experience serial correlation, heteroscedasticity and auto
correlation, all of which can bias the estimated parameters. Baltagi (2001) suggests the
use of the FGLS model that is robust to auto correlation and cross-sectional to estimate the
parameters of models similar to the one used in this research.

Finally, Baltagi (2001)

argues that with cross-sectional, time series data, there is the possibility of serial correlation
between error terms across the period of analysis. Since serial correlation is likely to bias
the estimated parameters, a test for serial correlation was also performed.
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While researchers can create a systematic sample for finite time segments (such as
every year for a 20-year period), cyclic phenomena may introduce systematic bias in the
sample. Events unique to the time segment sampled may also have a biasing effect.
However, it is impossible to create a probability sample of the universe across time since
much data are reported only annually and sometimes never. This situation, however,
primarily affects the external validity of the study. In relation to the research reported here,
this study cannot generalize about all U.S. state agencies for all time, but it can be used to
draw inferences about the agencies under study for the period involved.
Based on Sharkansky (1968), two indicators of gubernatorial and legislative
influence over state agency budget requests are used in the analysis: short-term success and
success in budget expansion. Short-term success is a measure of an agency's success in
receiving approval from the legislature for a given fiscal year. Success in expansion
measures an agency's success in receiving approval from the legislature for an increase in
its current budget. Consistent with Sharkansky's (Sharkansky, I. 1968) methodology, this
research includesonly agencies with general fund appropriations of at least $500,000.
After using the $500,000 selection criteria, other agencies were also dropped from
the study because of a lack of data for the entire period, 1990-2018, selected for the study.
For theoretical interest and validation, agencies are classified into four different agency
mission types: distributive, redistributive, market emulators, and regulatory. This provides
for an additional theoretical framework to understand and compare the relationship
between agency mission and budgeting processes.
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This research defines budget success as the relationship between the amount of
money an agency requests and the amount it receives through appropriations measured as
a percentage. The data used were collected from the annual state appropriations document.
This research examined both short-term success and expansion variables from the
legislative and governor’s perspectives.
This study uses an ordinary linear regression equation: This study uses an ordinary
linear regression equation:
𝑌1 = 𝑎 + 𝑏1𝑥 + 𝑏2𝑥2 + 𝑏3𝑥3 + 𝑏4𝑥4 + e
𝑌2 = 𝑎 + 𝑏1𝑥 + 𝑏2𝑥2 + 𝑏3𝑥3 + 𝑏4𝑥4 + e
With the dependent variables defined as:
a or Alpha: is a constant; equals the value of Y when the value of X=0
e: is the error term; the error in predicting the value of Y, given the value of X
Y1: Legislative appropriation as a percentage of the agency’s request (shortterm success)
Y2: Legislative appropriation as a percentage of the agency’s expenditure
(success in budget expansion)
This research utilizes two dependent variables to model budget success from two
distinct but important lenses. First, short term budget success can be simply measured by
reviewing what an agency requests in total from the legislature and the determine what
percentage of that request is actually appropriated. In this case, if an agency requests
$1,000,000 and it is appropriated $500,000 but another agency with the same request
received $800,000; we can assume that one agency has been more successful than the other.
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On the other hand, the second dependent variable which is called success in budget
expansion is simply measured by reviewing what an agency expenditure is in total and then
determine what percentage of agency expenditure is actually appropriated. Thus, it simply
measures the increment of growth (growth in agency expenditure) enjoyed by each unit. In
this case, if an agency expenditure is $1,000,000 and it is appropriated $500,000 but
another agency with the same expenditure received $800,000; we can assume that the
former agency has enjoyed 50% increment of growth in expenditure and the later agency
has enjoyed 80% increment of growth in expenditure.
The independent variables for the analysis of agency budgets are
X1: agency request plus current expenditure (budget size)
X2: agency request as a percentage of current expenditures (agency
acquisitiveness)
X3: the governor’s recommendation for each agency as a percentage of agency
request (short-term support)
X4: the governor’s recommendation for each agency as a percentage of current
agency expenditures (support for budget expansion)
The model incorporates three basic components in the budget process: the agency
as the initiator of requests; the governor as the first reviewer of the agency’s request who
provides recommendations to the legislature; and the legislature as the authority that
defines each agency's appropriation. The variables included in the first component (
agency) are budget size which is defined agency request for the coming budget period plus
current expenditure and agency acquisitiveness which is defined as agency request for the
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coming budget period as a percentage of current expenditures. In the second
component, the variables included are governor short-term support which is defined as the
governor's recommendation for each agency as a percentage of agency request and
governor support for budget expansion which is defined as the governor's recommendation
for each agency as a percentage of current agency expenditures.
And lastly, in the third component, the variables included are legislative short-term
success which is defined as the percentage of the agency's request for the coming budget
period appropriated by the legislature and legislative success in budget expansion which is
defined as the percentage of agency current expenditures appropriated by the legislature
for the coming budget period.
The model is dual in nature, with the first phase focusing on the percentage of an
agency's request that is approved by the governor and appropriated by the legislature. As
such phase one specifically models short-term budget success because it is concerned with
agency success in the current legislative session. Given the focus on agency success in the
current legislative session, these variables are identified as short-term budget success. The
second phase focuses on the percentage of current expenditures that the governor
recommends, and the legislature appropriates for the coming budget period. Phase two of
this analysis models success in budget expansion because it is concerned with increases in
budget over time.
In the second part of this study thirty-six South Carolina state government agencies
are used as units of analysis to determine whether a relationship exists between the
internal/external structure of state agencies and their appropriations. It is anticipated that
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agency similarities and differences may be masked in statistical analysis where
agencies are combined. To address this concern, this research classifies agencies according
to a well-defined topology as a control to determine if agencies with common
characteristics behave in a similar manner.
Agency Maturity: This indicator was selected to measure two of the dimensions of
maturity mentioned earlier, agency age and size. Agency age is defined as the number of
years since the agency's creation. Agency size is defined as the number of employees in an
agency, specifically, the number of full-time employee (FTE) positions. Data for these
variables originated from the South Carolina Department of Administration. There is
considerable agreement that as agencies mature, they become more complex, stable,
experienced, and better able to cope with their environment (Blau and Scott, 1962). The
age of the agencies was considered important since it is hypothesized that older agencies
resist the efforts of change-oriented personnel due to a traditional or status quo-oriented
culture which emphasizes conservatism with regard to programs and practice (Downs,
1967 and Ripley et al. 1973). The list of agencies are described in tables below.
Table 2.1. List of More Mature Agencies by Age Category
Age Category

Agency Name

More Mature

WORKERS’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION

More Mature

WIL LOU GRAY OPPORTUNITY SCHOOL

More Mature

VOCATIONAL REHABILITATION

More Mature

STATE LIBRARY

More Mature

SCHOOL FOR THE DEAF AND THE BLIND

More Mature

MUSEUM COMMISSION
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More Mature

FORESTRY COMMISSION

More Mature

EDUCATIONAL TELEVISION COMMISSION

More Mature

DEPT OF REVENUE

More Mature

DEPT OF PROBATION,PAROLE & PARDON

More Mature

DEPT OF PARKS,RECREATION & TOURISM

More Mature

DEPT OF MENTAL HEALTH

More Mature

DEPT OF LABOR, LICENSING & REGULATION

More Mature

DEPT OF JUVENILE JUSTICE

More Mature

DEPT OF HEALTH & ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL

More Mature

DEPT OF AGRICULTURE

More Mature

DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE

More Mature

DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION

More Mature

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS

More Mature

DEPARTMENT OF ARCHIVES AND HISTORY

More Mature

CONSUMER AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT

More Mature

COMMISSION ON HUMAN AFFAIRS

More Mature

COMMISSION FOR THE BLIND

More Mature

ARTS COMMISSION

Table 2.2. List of Less Mature Agencies by Age Category
Age Category

Agency Name

Less Mature

SOCIAL SERVICES

Less Mature

DEPT OF PUBLIC SAFETY

Less Mature

DEPT OF NATURAL RESOURCES

Less Mature

DEPT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SVCS

Less Mature

DEPT OF ALCOHOL & OTHER DRUG ABUSE SVCS

Less Mature

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

Less Mature

ST BD FOR TECHNICAL & COMPREHENSIVE ED

Less Mature

SEA GRANT CONSORTIUM
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Age Category

Agency Name

Less Mature

HIGHER EDUCATION TUITION GRANTS

Table 2.3. List of Agencies by Acquisitiveness Category (Moderate Agencies)
Agency Name
WORKERS’ COMPENSATION COMMISSION

moderate

STATE LIBRARY

moderate

ST BD FOR TECHNICAL & COMPREHENSIVE ED

moderate

SOCIAL SERVICES

moderate

SEA GRANT CONSORTIUM

moderate

DEPT OF REVENUE

moderate

DEPT OF PUBLIC SAFETY

moderate

DEPT OF PROBATION,PAROLE & PARDON

moderate

DEPT OF LABOR, LICENSING & REGULATION

moderate

DEPT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SVCS

moderate

DEPT OF ALCOHOL & OTHER DRUG ABUSE SVCS

moderate

COMMISSION ON HUMAN AFFAIRS

moderate

Table 2.4. List of Agencies by Acquisitiveness Category (Low)
Agency Name
VOCATIONAL REHABILITATION

low

DEPT OF MENTAL HEALTH

low

DEPT OF JUVENILE JUSTICE

low

DEPT OF HEALTH & ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL

low

DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE

low

DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION

low

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS

low

DEPARTMENT OF ARCHIVES AND HISTORY

low
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Agency Name
CONSUMER AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT

low

Table 2.5. List of Agencies by Acquisitiveness Category (High)
Agency Name
SCHOOL FOR THE DEAF AND THE BLIND

high

MUSEUM COMMISSION

high

HIGHER EDUCATION TUITION GRANTS

high

FORESTRY COMMISSION

high

EDUCATIONAL TELEVISION COMMISSION

high

DEPT OF PROBATION, PAROLE & PARDON

high

DEPT OF PARKS, RECREATION & TOURISM

high

DEPT OF NATURAL RESOURCES

high

DEPT OF AGRICULTURE

high

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS

high

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

high

COMMISSION FOR THE BLIND

high

ARTS COMMISSION

high

Other researchers have demonstrated that small agencies tend to have more
substantial changes in their year over year budgets possibly due to more aggressive
behavior in the appropriations process (LeLoup, 1975 and Ripley et al. 1973). For this
reason, a young/old typology was developed based on the age of the agency. Young
agencies were operationalized as agencies in existence 25 years or less and old agencies as
25 years and older as of 1990. Twenty-five years was selected as an appropriate cut-off
based on previous research conducted by Ripley et al. (1975).
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A second typology representing size was the creation of a dichotomous variable
based on an agency’s total number of employees. Thus, agencies were separated into
small/large agencies on the basis of whether the average number of employees for the years
1990-2018 was above or below 500. Five hundred employees was selected as the threshold
based on a similar approach used by Shull (1975b) in an examination of eight agencies in
the federal government.
The dimensions of agency type of interest in this study included the cabinet and the
executive department. The types of agency spending, which are hypothesized to potentially
impact agency budget outcomes, can also be categorized as Education, Conservation,
Social Rehabilitation, Regulatory, Correctional, Health and Public Safety.
Party Strength: Researchers assert that partisanship in society and the government
is important for explaining public policy outcomes (Downs, 1957; Dye, l 966; Rossiter,
1960; Campbell et al., 1960, Sundquist, (1968). There are a range of variables that can be
used to measure partisanship, with this analysis using partisan strength in the electorate.
Key (1966) demonstrated that voters make choices based on their individual policy
preferences, while both Key (1966) and Scammon and Wattenberg (1970) found the
number of votes for a party's candidate for President is related to voter acceptance or
rejection of the policies proposed and/or pursued by the candidate’s party.
The effect of the political environment on agency budgeting outcomes is another
critical area for examination using an independent variable. Several variables were tested
to control for the political environment: the governor’s party affiliation, the status of the
governor’s party in the legislature, and the party in control of the legislature. Other
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independent variables included per capita income, population, total state revenue, state
total expenditure, and state total appropriation.
Some research indicates that the effect of agency type and of agency head selection
will also impact agency budgeting outcomes. The dimensions of agency head selection of
interest in this study were: Governor appoints board which names the executive director
for agency; Governor appoints board with legislative approval and board names the
executive director for agency; Governor hires directors for fixed terms with Senate
approval; Governor appoints agency director with Senate approval; Governor and
legislators appoint board members who name executive director for the agency; Legislature
elects judges and board members; Board membership ex officio and Governor hires
director for a fixed term. These seven dimensions of methods of agency heads selection
were further grouped (these were the two groups used in the analysis) into elected and
appointed agencies. able to cope with their environment (Blau and Scott, 1962).
The techniques used to answer each research question are described below:
Research Question 1: What are the patterns of assertiveness/moderation in initial
agency requests: Descriptive statistics (Table showing percentage changes in agency
request) was used to show the distribution of the agency requests to the governor
and legislature as a percentage change from the previous year's appropriation.
Research Question 1a. To answer Research Question 1a, how does budget size affect
the level of support from the governor and legislators?
The impact of agency budget size was analyzed by first examining the correlation
and regression coefficients between agency budget size and legislative appropriations. A
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description or study of the nature of the relationship between variables is a
regression analysis, while an investigation of the relative strength of such a relationship is
a correlation analysis. Two pairs of models were developed. The first model analyzes the
short-term relationships between budget size and governor recommendation/ legislative
appropriation for all categories of agency assertiveness. The second model analyzes the
budget expansion (success in budget expansion) relationships between budget size and
governor recommendation/both legislative appropriation for all categories of agency
assertiveness.
Research question 1b: How does agency assertiveness affect the level of support
from the governor and legislators?
The impact of agency assertiveness was analyzed by first examining the correlation
and then the regression coefficients between agency assertiveness and governor
recommendation/legislative appropriations. Two pairs of models were developed. The first
model analyzes the short-term relationships between agency assertiveness and governor
recommendation/ legislative appropriation for all categories of agency assertiveness. The
second model analyzes the budget expansion (success in budget expansion) relationships
between assertiveness and governor recommendation/both legislative appropriation for all
categories of agency assertiveness (High, medium and low assertive agencies).
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Primary Research Question 2. Is there a relationship between the governor's
recommendations and the legislature's appropriations?
2a: Does the legislature rely on the governor’s budget for appropriation?
Research question 2a: The relationship between the governor's recommendations
and the legislature's appropriations was analyzed by first examining the correlation and
then the regression coefficients between and governor recommendation and legislative
appropriations. Two pairs of models were developed. The first model analyzes the shortterm relationships between governor recommendation and legislative appropriation for all
categories of agency assertiveness. The second model analyzes the budget expansion
(success in budget expansion) relationships between
governor recommendation and legislative appropriation for all categories of agency
assertiveness (High, medium and low assertive agencies).
2b: Is the relationship between the governor's recommendations and the
legislature’s appropriations more direct than the relationship between the agency's
request for an increment and the legislature's appropriation?
Three separate regression models was were used to answer research question 2b.
Model 1. Relationship between agency request and legislative appropriation: Y=a+b1x+e
Y = Legislative Appropriation
b= Agency request
a or Alpha, a constant; equals the value of Y when the value of X=0
e is the error term; the error in predicting the value of Y, given the value of X
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Model 2. Relationship between agency request and Governor recommendation:
Y=a+b1x+e
Y = Governor recommendation
b= Agency request
a or Alpha, a constant; equals the value of Y when the value of X=0
e is the error term; the error in predicting the value of Y, given the value of X
Model 3. Relationship between legislative appropriation and Governor recommendation:
Y=a+b1x+e
Y = Governor recommendation
b= Agency request
a or Alpha, a constant; equals the value of Y when the value of X=0
e is the error term; the error in predicting the value of Y, given the value of X
Primary Research Question 3: What are the structural and environmental factors
affecting agency appropriation
3a. How does an agency’s political environment affect agency outcomes?
The relationship between the Agency request, governor's recommendations and the
legislature's appropriations was analyzed by first examining the regression coefficients
between and governor recommendation and legislative appropriations while controlling for
status of governor’s party and legislative control. Two pairs of models were developed.
The first model analyzes the short-term relationships between governor recommendation
and legislative appropriation for both status of governor’s party and legislative control. The
second model analyzes the budget expansion (success in budget expansion) relationships
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between governor recommendation and legislative appropriation for status of
governor’s party and legislative control.
3b. How does agency type affect the level of support from the governor and the
legislature?
The relationship between the Agency request, governor's recommendations and the
legislature's appropriations was analyzed by first examining the regression coefficients
between and governor recommendation and legislative appropriations while controlling for
cabinet and executive departments. Two pairs of models were developed. The first model
analyzes the short-term relationships between governor recommendation and legislative
appropriation for both status of governor’s party and legislative control. The second model
analyzes the budget expansion (success in budget expansion) relationships between
governor recommendation and legislative appropriation for cabinet and executive
departments.
3c. How does the method of agency head selection affect agency appropriation?
The relationship between the Agency request, governor's recommendations and the
legislature's appropriations was analyzed by first examining the regression coefficients
between and governor recommendation and legislative appropriations while controlling for
both elected and appointed agencies. The first model analyzes the (short-term success)
relationships between governor recommendation and legislative appropriation for both
elected and appointed agencies. The second model analyzes the (budget expansion)
relationships between governor recommendation and legislative appropriation for both
elected and appointed agencies.
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3d. What are the determinants for agency appropriation?
The determinants of agency appropriations was analyzed by examining the
regression coefficients between legislative appropriation, Log Budget size, Log Request,
Log Governor, Recommendation, Expenditure, Governors Party, Legislative Control, State
total expenditure and State revenue
3e. What is the effect of agency age on agency budget outcome?
The relationship between the Agency request, governor's recommendations and the
legislature's appropriations was analyzed by first examining the regression coefficients
between and governor recommendation and legislative appropriations while more and less
mature agencies. Two pairs of models were developed. The first model analyzes the shortterm relationships between governor recommendation and legislative appropriation for
both elected and appointed agencies. The second model analyzes the budget expansion
(success in budget expansion) relationships between governor recommendation and
legislative appropriation for both more and less mature agencies.
3f. What is the effect of agency size on agency budget outcome?
The relationship between the Agency request, governor's recommendations and the
legislature's appropriations was analyzed by examining the regression coefficients between
and governor recommendation and legislative appropriations while controlling for large
and small agencies. Two pairs of models were developed. The first model analyzes the
short-term relationships between governor recommendation and legislative appropriation
for both for large and small agencies. The second model analyzes the budget expansion
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(success in budget expansion) relationships between governor recommendation and
legislative appropriation for both large and small agencies

2.6

Results and Findings
This section presents the research findings on the relationship among agencies’

budget requests, the governor’s support and legislative appropriations. This relationship
was examined over a 28 years period from 1990 to 2018. The Incrementalism budget model
was used to test data from the State of South Carolina and assess the implications for
budgeting based on South Carolina’s s political characteristics, the style and strength of
individual governors, and the traits of individual agencies.

Table 2.6. The Descriptive Characteristics of the Agency (Aggregate Level) and
Classification Model
Variable

Standard
error

Observation

Mean

Year

1,044

2004

8.3

1990

2018

Appropriation

1,013

1.12

3.3

277289

2.98

Expenditure

984

1.11

3.3

277289

2.8

Request

801

2.5

1.01

-1.6

2.15

Governor
Recommendation

914

1.15

3.5

0

2.9

Agency Type

1,044

1.6

.47

1

2

Spend Policy
Area

1,044

3.5

2.03

1

8

Agency Name

1,044

18.3

10.39

1

36

Personal Income

972

1.17

4.1

5.6

1.96

Personal
Income/Capital

972

27148

7062.1

16018

39517

Population

972

4263037

443676

3570404

5024369

State Revenue

972

5.35

1.13

3.3

7.5
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Min

Max

Variable

Observation

Mean

Standard
error

Min

Max

State
Expenditure

828

5.5

9.44

3.9

7.64

State
Appropriation

864

5.68

1.04

3.9

7.95

Status of
Governor’s Party

1.,044

1.4

.49

1

2

Legislative
Control

1,044

1.72

.44

1

2

Governor Party

1,044

1.86

.34

1

2

Age Category

870

1.2

.40

1

2

Size Category

928

1.74

.43

1

2
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Figure 2.1. Agencies by Total Appropriation from 1990–2018
The raw appropriations values for the thirty-six agencies over time can be seen in
Figure 2.1. This figure illustrates the wide variation in agency appropriation patterns over
time. The agencies with the largest increase in appropriations are Education, Corrections
and Health and Human Services, while the Commission on Human Affairs, Sea Grant
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Consortium and Consumer Affairs Department received the smallest appropriations
over time. Two of the three agencies, Corrections and Health and Human Services, with
the largest appropriations are cabinet agencies, while Education, which is the agency with
the largest appropriation, is an executive agency. Both cabinet agencies and the executive
department include multiple agencies that are high acquisitive. All three agencies with the
smallest total appropriation are executive department agencies. The Department of
Corrections is the only large cabinet agency in the high acquisitive category, with most of
the agencies in this category being small. The Department of Juvenile Justice is a large
cabinet agency, but it is considered a low acquisitive agency, while public safety and social
services are large cabinet agencies with moderate acquisitiveness. The Department of
Commerce and the Department of Parks and Recreation are small cabinet agencies but are
considered high acquisitive agencies. The Departments of Education, Mental Health and
DHEC are large executive department agencies but are classified as low acquisitive
agencies.
Sharkansky (1968) argued that agencies act differently and follow different
budgetary strategies to achieve their goals, with some following a strategy of assertiveness
rather than moderation. His argument is contrary to what the incrementalism theory posits.
Incrementalism theory argues that there is a stable pattern of requests and the general
behavioral characteristic of an agency is to request moderately. Incrementalism provides
relatively little information on the budgetary roles of the cabinet agencies and the executive
department. Overall, this classification is important because it helps to describe the
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assertive behavior that may be manifested by agencies during all phases of the
budget process.

Figure 2.2. Agency Appropriation by
Acquisitiveness Categories
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Figure 2.2 provides descriptive evidence that the budget success of an agency varies
by agency acquisitiveness. Low acquisitive agencies have a total appropriation of
$73,098,863,128; moderately acquisitive agencies have a total appropriation of
$29,216,336,183, and high acquisitive agencies have a total appropriation of
$4,159,960,091s. Low acquisitive agencies have a total appropriation of $73,098,863,128;
moderately acquisitive agencies have a total appropriation of $29,216,336,183, and high
acquisitive agencies have a total appropriation of $4,159,960,091.
Agencies in the low acquisitive category ask for small increases over their requests.
LeLoup (1978) confirmed that when agencies ask for small, non-incremental increases,
Congress is likely to appropriate a higher proportion of their request in the Short-term, but
in the Long-term the agencies are likely to end up with a smaller increase in total funding
than they normally would have received had they not followed the traditional incremental
strategy of moderation.

Table 2.7. Agency Percentage Changes in the Budget Process

Agency Name

Avg.
Acquisitiveness

Avg.
Governor
Long-term

Avg.
Governor
Short-term

Avg.
Legislative
Long-term

Avg. Legislative
Short-term

WORKERS’
COMPENSATION
COMMISSION

0.340536447

0.993648604

31.55897394

0.994422131

34.07929967

WILLOUGRAY
OPPORTUNITY
SCHOOL

0.221474916

0.99991272

32.04451578

1.044393386

30.57797214

VOCATIONAL
REHABILITATION

0.129123644

0.97647156

14.6128804

0.981732539

15.07059588

STATE LIBRARY

0.352784091

0.978103481

9.649494314

1.047480096

9.6176611
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Agency Name
STBD FOR TECHNICAL
& COMPREHENSIVE
ED

Avg.
Acquisitiveness

Avg.
Governor
Long-term

Avg.
Governor
Short-term

Avg.
Legislative
Long-term

Avg. Legislative
Short-term

0.455345162

0.978017585

4.771818485

1.017409307

4.989297019

0.24318124

1.05408718

6.980396565

1.020383481

7.0425796

SEA GRANT
CONSORTIUM

0.342677646

0.953435039

7.958719386

1.008711183

7.159407957

SCHOOL FOR THE
DEAF AND THE BLIND

0.448623448

0.958602061

38.4118277

1.021330346

34.89352023

0.46353415

0.946911925

10.43120153

0.992810925

11.94041293

HIGHER EDUCATION
TUITION GRANTS

0.313398509

1.029860058

11.14354757

1.0166491

13.74058427

FORESTRY
COMMISSION

0.481258542

0.971292423

8.6037045

1.009404665

8.658649404

DEPT OF REVENUE

0.310817476

0.970549144

22.46776208

1.029675648

22.97344975

DEPT OF PUBLIC
SAFETY

0.319833044

1.039016244

10.45851531

1.015395527

11.32640747

DEPTOF PROBATION,
PAROLE & PARDON

0.281899436

1.104429392

6.654867095

1.0447943

6.236569136

DEPTOF PARKS,
RECREATION &
TOURISM

1.188612471

0.930524219

2.076900745

1.596739357

2.763825057

DEPTOFNATURAL
RESOURCES

0.429479405

1.001638521

9.48333004

1.024026282

8.980884662

DEPT OF MENTAL
HEALTH

0.153052967

0.96559853

8.878872286

1.014533625

9.836761864

DEPTOFLABOR,
LICENSING &
REGULATION

0.246776711

1.161469996

26.83479705

0.97861723

25.89307222

DEPT OF JUVENILE
JUSTICE

0.110402052

0.949283117

6.209247335

1.046829243

8.59922685

DEPT OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SVCS

0.360406931

1.360495667

8.00345752

1.338889122

7.03474382

DEPT OF HEALTH &
ENVIRONMENTAL
CONTROL

0.13785056

0.961810352

13.38442033

1.018824411

13.91913504

SOCIAL SERVICES

MUSEUM
COMMISSION
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Avg.
Acquisitiveness

Agency Name

Avg.
Governor
Long-term

Avg.
Governor
Short-term

Avg.
Legislative
Long-term

Avg. Legislative
Short-term

DEPT OF DISABILITIES
& SPECIAL NEEDS

0.114974168

1.001196917

13.66623573

1.046219796

13.94814418

DEPT OF ALCOHOL &
ALCOHOL & ANOTHER
DRUG ABUSE SVCS

0.371299192

0.952289456

8.566978363

1.006421025

10.66759622

DEPT OF
AGRICULTURE

0.672858635

0.897015937

6.921784483

1.038347822

7.644918655

DEPARTMENTOF
INSURANCE

0.077246243

0.856948877

26.56481057

1.009870207

28.39108488

DEPARTMENTOF
EDUCATION

0.172802121

1.039287804

9.580392182

1.038531268

9.149605542

DEPARTMENTOF
CORRECTIONS

0.1449001

1.006119927

17.82643289

1.033137496

17.14085424

DEPARTMENTOF
COMMERCE

0.586665356

1.28438459

9.681878767

1.271201305

8.861915994

DEPARTMENTOF
ARCHIVES AND
HISTORY

0.199148119

0.959489174

18.77209925

0.989177536

18.58205167

CONSUMERAFFAIRS
DEPARTMENT

0.194052632

0.970261332

21.53247277

1.004101104

8.083442718

COMMISSION ON
HUMAN AFFAIRS

0.252556238

0.956868777

7.17911517

1.018301329

7.201939238

COMMISSION ON
HIGHER EDUCATION

1.353329168

1.07907023

14.83410471

1.177312736

14.88218371

COMMISSION FOR THE
BLIND

0.381051792

0.904092338

4.667791375

1.011202479

4.678837677

CLEMSON
UNIVERSITY—PUBLIC
SERVICE ACTIVITIES

0.273339072

0.927520946

9.193100288

1.003330493

9.638540636

0.5643986

0.97213699

64.08706628

1.008017739

46.69037198

ARTS COMMISSION

Table 2.2 provides the results of Research Question 1: What are the patterns of
assertiveness/moderation in initial agency requests? The key research question focuses
on how moderate South Carolina state agencies are in their agency budget requests. These
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results highlight the percentage change in agency budget requests at each stage of the
process. Table 2.7 shows the distribution of agency requests to the governor and legislature
as a percentage change from the governor’s recommendation and the previous year’s
appropriation, respectively. The results also reflect variation in agency requests, with the
mean value of a 36 percent increase for all agencies’ requests.
Overall, the pattern of requests has remained consistent; however, there are some
interesting variations. For example, agencies request significantly increase on an average
over the time period ranging from 7 to 56 percent. The average request is 7.9%, the
maximum request is 25.71% and the minimum request is 1.785%. Governors also trim
requests with substantial variation, ranging from 38.41% as a high to a low of 2.08%, on
average, per year. Typically, legislatures do not appropriate the same amount the governor
recommends, but they often come very close to the governor’s appropriation
recommendation. For example, Legislative appropriation is on average .01% to 2.5% more
than the governor’s recommendation; however, legislatures also cut a governor’s
recommendation from .01% to 17 % of the time over the period studied here. In the shortterm budget, the difference between the governor’s recommendation and legislative
appropriation is .052%, meaning that the legislature, on average over the time period,
appropriates .052% more than the governor’s recommendation. In the long-term budget,
the difference between the governor’s recommendation and legislative appropriation is
.065% meaning that the governor recommends .065% more than legislative appropriation.
Previous results report that a governor’s recommendation is the prerequisite for legislative
appropriation. This research highlights a different set of possibilities for the relationship
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between the governor and the legislature. Over the time period of this study, 19902018, agencies apparently were more acquisitive than previous research suggests, with
agencies requesting on average a 7 to 56 percent increase over current expenditures.
Results support the idea that legislatures deviate from gubernatorial recommendations. In
21 of the 36 agencies, the legislature appropriated a larger amount than the governor's
recommendation. However, the results have not been tested to determine if the deviation is
significant.
The results in Tables 2.8, 2.9, 2.10, 2.11 and 2.12 provide evidence related to
Research Questions 1a and 1b. To answer Research Question 1a, how does budget size
affect the level of support from the governor and legislators? The results indicate that the
larger the budget, the more likely the agency will receive support from the Governor and
the Legislators. The model confirms Hypothesis 1 that for high acquisitive agencies, the
relationships between the budget size of each agency’s request and the appropriations of
the legislature for both long-term and short-term budget success is strong. For low
acquisitive and moderate agencies, there are no statistically significant (see Tables 2.8 and
2.9 for P. Values) term relationships between the budget size of each agency’s request and
the appropriations of the legislature. This hypothesis assumes budget reviewers focus on
the increments requested plus the size of request, which includes both new increments and
the agency’s current base appropriation. This hypothesis supports the argument that budget
analysts do not always focus on the increments requested but also take into consideration
the size of the budget request in proportion to new requests and the agency’s base. Table
2.8 and 2.9 presents the regression coefficients between agency budget size and the
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governor’s long-term success and short-term support. These results indicate that the
legislatures considers the budget size and increments of high acquisitive agencies in
determining his budget appropriation.
Table 2.8. Coefficient of Regression Between Measures of Short-term Support in the
State Legislature and Independence Variables, by Agency Assertiveness Categories
Assertiveness
Categories
High

Moderate

Low

Budget
Increment

Budget Size

Governor
Short-term support

Agency
Assertiveness

-1.70E-08

4.05E-09

0.0144841

0.1420876

(0.001)

(0.045)

(0.000)

(0.000)

-4.73E-10

6.61E-12

0.7401357

-0.9934193

0.258

0.923

0.000

0.000

-2.12E-10

1.33E-10

0.81

-0.4297997

0.490

0.319

0.000

0.000

Table 2.9. Coefficient of Regression Between Measures of Long-term Support in the
State Legislature and Independence Variables, by Agency Assertiveness Categories
Assertiveness
Categories

Budget
Request
Increment

Budget Size

High

-1.11E-08

3.34E-09

0.2518461

0.1470725

0.000

0.005

0.000

0.000

6.44E-11

2.44E-12

0.0582454

0.0300588

0.69

0.927

0.005

0.554

-2.38E-10

9.66E-11

0.2055995

0.1039421

0.206

0.255

0.000

0.020

Moderate

Low
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Governor
Long-term Support

Agency
Assertiveness

Table 2.10. Coefficient of Simple Correlation Between Measures of Short-term Support
in The State Legislature and Independence Variables, by Agency Assertiveness
Categories
Assertiveness
Categories
High
Moderate
Low

Budget
Request
Increment

Budget Size

Governor
Short-term Support

Agency
Assertiveness

-0.6211

-0.3304

0.9809

-0.3615

-0.229

-0.0856

0.9393

-0.7735

-0.2267

-0.1134

0.9491

-0.7525

Table 2.11. Coefficient of Simple Correlation Between Measures of Long-term Support
in The State Legislature and Independence Variables, by Agency Assertiveness
Categories
Budget
Request
Increment

Budget Size

Governor
Long-term Support

0.2837

0.1122

0.2648

0.7769

Moderate

0.088

0.0782

0.1992

0.0483

Low

0.092

0.0678

0.3396

0.1731

Assertiveness
Categories
High

Agency
Assertiveness

Table 2.12. Coefficient of Simple Correlation Between Measures of Gubernatorial
Support and Independence Variables, by Agency Assertiveness Categories
Correlation Coefficient between
Gov Long-term Success and
Agency
Assertiveness
Categories

Budget
Request Budget
Increment
Size

Correlation Coefficient between
Gov Short-term Success and

Agency
Assertiveness

Budget
Request
Increment

Budget
Agency
Size
Assertiveness

High

0.0760

0.0822

0.0054

-0.6169

-0.2677

-0.9891

Moderate

0.0770

0.0397

-0.0614

-0.1968

-0.0898

-0.9418

Low

0.1820

0.0276

0.0848

-0.1783

-0.1502

-0.9487
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Research question 1b: How does agency assertiveness affect the level of support
from the governor and legislators?
The higher the level of Governor/legislative support, the more likely the agencies
will get support from the Governor and Legislators. Tables 2.8 and 2.11 provide regression
and correlation results for short-term budget success. These models indicate negative
relationships among the percentage of the budget increment that an agency requests, the
percentage of the request that the governor recommends, and legislative appropriation.
These results confirm the incrementalism explanation that those agencies which seek the
largest increments will suffer the greatest cuts to their requests, while those requesting little
or no incremental change to their base will suffer few if any cuts to their requests.
There is also evidence that successful budget expansion leads to positive
relationships among the percentage increment that the agency requests and the percentage
growth that the governor recommends, as well as the percentage growth of legislative
appropriation. It is only by requesting budgetary growth that an agency receives an increase
in its budget even though this increase is generally below the initial request. The
Governor’s recommendation does not appear to support budget expansion in moderately
acquisitive agencies. This result is true for other categories of assertiveness. The results
confirm that agencies that request the largest incremental change in their budgets will
receive the largest percentage growth over their current budget, while agencies requesting
little or no incremental change will receive little to no growth in their budget. While this
relationship may seem obvious, it is important confirmation of the “budgeting game” in
practice through a research lens.
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Research Question 2: Are there relationships between the governor’s
recommendations and the legislature’s appropriations?
The results in Tables 2.8, 2.9, 2.10 and 2.11 confirm strong positive relationships
between the measures of the governor’s recommendations and legislative appropriations
in the Short-term. These results provide evidence that the relationship between a governor’s
recommendations and legislative appropriations impact agency support for expansion in
different ways.
Research Question 2a: Does the legislature rely on the governor’s budget for
appropriation?
As the level of governor support increases, the legislative appropriation tends to
increase. This study provide further evidence of the reliance of the legislature on the
recommendations of the executive in the Short-term. This relationship may be true because
the legislator’s experience or staff assistance is limited and/or because he perceives that the
executive should provide leadership in the budgetary process.
The correlation (Tables 2.8 and 2.11) between governor and legislative
appropriation was examined both in the short and Long-term. The results indicate a
significant correlation between a Governor’s recommendation and legislative
appropriation only in short-term support for agencies. This study found similar results for
the correlates of governor and legislative approval of budget expansion. Based on these,
this study finds support that a governor’s support appears to contribute to short-term agency
budget success. Correlations between legislative and gubernatorial short-term support are
significant across all agencies, but correlations between the governor’s and legislative’s
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appropriation in the Long-term is significant only for 22 of the 36 agencies. Agency
acquisitiveness and the governor’s short-term support is significant for 19 of the 36
agencies. The magnitude of the correlations between legislative and gubernatorial shortterm support is greater, on average, than those between support in long/Short-term and
acquisitiveness for most agencies. However, in terms of long-term budgeting support, the
results from the model highlight the importance of agency acquisitiveness over
gubernatorial support.
Research question 2b: Are the relationships between the governor’s
recommendations and the legislature’s appropriations more direct than the
relationships between the agency’s request for an increment and the legislature’s
appropriation?
Are the relationships between the governor's recommendations and the legislature's
appropriations more direct than the relationships between the agency's request for an
increment and the legislature's appropriation? Tables in appendix 1, 2 and 3 lists the
regression results related to Research Question 2b. These results show that 2 agencies were
best described by Model I (Legislative dominance), 9 agencies by Model II (Gubernatorial
independence), and 13 agencies by Model III (legislature and governor in combination).
one might expect to find the majority of agencies be best described by Model 1
emphasizing the importance of legislative independence due to the response by budget
officials stating that South Carolina is a legislative dominant state. The findings of this
analysis reveal that the relationships between the governor's recommendations and the
legislature's appropriations more direct than the relationships between the agency's request
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and the legislature's appropriation. This finding may be interpreted to support
executive-legislative reliance which have been confirmed in by (Sharkansky, 1968).
Table 2.13. Effect of Acquisitiveness Categories on Governor/Legislative Long-term and
Short-term Support for Appropriation After Controlling for Partisanship
Value

Standard
Error

t-value

0.688502 Acquisitiveness

0.05096

0.127043

-0.40116

minority

< 0.0001 Acquisitiveness

0.68037

0.035449

19.1929

Governor Long-term

majority

0.884855 Acquisitiveness

0.01385

0.095605 0.144905

Governor Long-term

minority

0.88577 Acquisitiveness

0.00413

0.028723 0.143794

Legislative Short-term

majority

0.387956 Acquisitiveness

87.3111

101.03

-0.86421

Legislative Short-term

minority 0.0505868 Acquisitiveness

2.93221

1.49375

-1.96299

Governor Short-term

majority

0.512118 Acquisitiveness

-60.658

92.4517 0.656104

Governor Short-term

minority

0.067739 Acquisitiveness

2.79402

1.52336

Dependent Variable

Column

p-value

Legislative Long-term

majority

Legislative Long-term

Independent
Variable

-1.83411

Research Question 3a: How does the agency’s political environment affect agency
outcomes?
The findings in Table 2.13 provide a contradictory hypothesis to the idea that the
governor’s recommendations have less influence over legislative appropriations if the
governor’s legislative party constitutes the minority. Previous research conducted by
Sharkansky (1969) has found that the most appropriate model and hypothesis is that
legislatures generally adhere closely to the governor’s recommendations. However,
controlling for partisanship was not included in earlier models; however, it has proven to
be important. This study confirms the partisanship hypothesis that the relationship between
the governor and legislative appropriations depend on the majority-minority status of the
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governor’s party. The results in Table 2.14 confirm that the relationship between
agency acquisitiveness and legislative/governor recommendation is significant when the
status of the governor’s party is in the minority. Legislative support for expansion is also
significant only when the status of the governor’s party is in the minority. “The partisanship
hypothesis states that the governor’s recommendations will have less influence over
legislative appropriations if the governors legislative party constitutes a minority. In
instances where the legislative majority does not share the governor’s party affiliation, the
legislature should regard the governor’s budget recommendations with some suspicion
Sharkansky and Turnbull (1969). Since these legislatures already exhibit some
independence, it can be predicted that they will not shift to a closer legislativegubernatorial relationship, when the governor’s party is a legislative minority” (Moncrief
& Thompson 1980, p. 336).
Table 2.14. Relationship Between Legislative / Governor Short-term and Long-term
Support While Controlling for legislative Control and Status of Governor’s Party
Panes
Row

Column

Line
p-value

Coefficients
Term

Value

Standard
Error

t-value

p-value

Legislative
Long-term

majority, R

< 0.0001 Governor
Long-term

0.365978

0.0425106

8.60911

< 0.0001

Legislative
Long-term

majority, R

0.2597 Governor
Short-term

-8.01E-06

7.10E-06

-1.12867

0.2597

Legislative
Long-term

minority, D

< 0.0001 Governor
Long-term

0.943551

0.0214678

43.9519

< 0.0001

Legislative
Long-term

minority, D

0.774133 Governor
Short-term

0.0003369

0.001172

-0.287481

0.774133

Legislative
Long-term

minority, R

0.515139 Governor
Long-term

0.394823

0.605033

0.652564

0.515139

Legislative
Long-term

minority, R

0.315779 Governor
Short-term

0.0200477

0.0198995

-1.00745

0.315779

69

Panes
Row

Column

Line
p-value

Coefficients
Term

Value

Standard
Error

t-value

p-value

Legislative
Short-term

majority, R

0.970648 Governor
Long-term

-7.79203

211.639

0.0368176

0.970648

Legislative
Short-term

majority, R

< 0.0001 Governor
Short-term

0.858026

0.0003431

2500.84

< 0.0001

Legislative
Short-term

minority, D

0.773779 Governor
Long-term

-1.59577

5.54195

-0.287944

0.773779

Legislative
Short-term

minority, D

< 0.0001 Governor
Short-term

1.00563

0.0084216

119.411

< 0.0001

Legislative
Short-term

minority, R

0.6413 Governor
Long-term

-1.34333

2.876

-0.467085

0.6413

Legislative
Short-term

minority, R

< 0.0001 Governor
Short-term

0.933743

0.0149493

62.4608

< 0.0001

Research question 3b: In a cabinet agency, the Governor appoints agency directors with
Senate approval whereas in some executive departments, the Governor appoints a board
which names the executive director for an agency. In addition, in other executive
departments, the Governor appoints a board with legislative approval and the board
names the executive director for the agency.
The results in Tables 2.13 and 2.14 show that the majority-minority status of the
governor’s party and the party with legislative control are important influences on the
budget process. When the legislative control is in the hands of the Democrats and the status
of the governor’s party is in the minority, a one unit increase in the governor’s budget
recommendation increases agency appropriations by 1.00563 percentage point. Short-term
and long-term success of agency appropriations are higher when legislative control is
Democratic rather than Republican. While there is insufficient evidence to claim that state
Democrats are spenders and Republicans are more conservative in their spending, the
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results of the model indicate a relationship that provides some support for this idea.
Most importantly, this study provides evidence suggesting that partisanship is an important
consideration in the agency-gubernatorial-legislative budgetary relationship. Table 14
further provides evidence for Research Questions 2a: (Does the legislator rely on the
governor’s budget for appropriation) and 3: The effect of an agency’s political environment
affects agency outcomes. This study finds that, in general, legislatures take a varied
approach to whether they follow the governor’s lead: sometimes they do and sometimes
they do not.
Table 2.15. Legislative Support for Short-term Success and Long-term Budget Growth
Independent
Variable

Column

p-value

Coefficient Standard
Value
Error

t-value

p-value

Acquisitiveness Cabinet Agency,
Legislative Long-term

< 0.0001

0.813446

0.072631

11.1997

< 0.0001

Acquisitiveness Cabinet Agency,
Legislative Short-term

0.323845

-2.05318

2.07675

-0.98866

0.323845

Acquisitiveness Executive Department,
Legislative Long-term

0.873753

0.0057631

0.036252

0.158976

0.873753

Acquisitiveness Executive Department,
Legislative Short-term

0.44485

-51.9797

67.9788

-0.76465

0.44485

Governor
Long-term

Cabinet Agency,
Legislative Long-term

< 0.0001

0.702434

0.115187

6.09822

< 0.0001

Governor
Long-term

Cabinet Agency,
Legislative Short-term

0.654042

-2.15475

4.80164

-0.44875

0.654042

Governor
Long-term

Executive Department,
Legislative Long-term

< 0.0001

0.47987

0.039418

12.174

< 0.0001

Governor
Long-term

Executive Department,
Legislative Short-term

0.952429

-16.2159

271.671

-0.05969

0.952429

Governor
Short-term

Cabinet Agency,
Legislative Long-term

0.75589 -0.0006205

0.001994

-0.31126

0.75589

Governor
Short-term

Cabinet Agency,
Legislative Short-term

0.007718

130.165

< 0.0001

< 0.0001
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1.00461

Independent
Variable

Coefficient Standard
Value
Error

Column

p-value

Governor
Short-term

Executive Department,
Legislative Long-term

0.247276

-7.98E-06

Governor
Short-term

Executive Department,
Legislative Short-term

< 0.0001

0.858005

t-value

p-value

6.89E-06

-1.15847

0.247276

0.0003

2862.1

< 0.0001

The results presented in Tables 2.14 and 2.15 support the hypothesis that
gubernatorial recommendations rather than agency requests are the important determinants
of legislative appropriations irrespective of the type of agency. A comparison of the relative
effect on the dependent variable (legislative appropriations) of each of the independent
variables (agency requests and gubernatorial recommendations) indicates the
gubernatorial-legislative path is the more important one in the case of both types of
agencies. Where agency heads are cabinet members, the gubernatorial-legislative path
coefficient is 1.00461 and where the agency is an executive department, it is .85. Both are
statistically significant. A comparison of the relative effect on the dependent variable of
each of the independent variables in the case of legislative long-term support for
appropriation as seen in Table 2.14 also indicates the gubernatorial-legislative path to be
the more important for both types of agencies. Where the agency is cabinet level, the
gubernatorial-legislative path coefficient is .70 and where the agency is an executive
department, it is .47. Both are statistically significant.
The agency-legislative coefficients are significant in the case of legislative longterm support for cabinet agencies. These suggest that cabinet agencies may be somewhat
more cooperative with legislators on budgetary matters than with the executive department.
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The results in Table 2.14 show that the gubernatorial-legislative path is more
important than the agency- legislative path.
Research Question 3c: How does the method of agency head selection affect agency
appropriation?
Tables 2.13, 2.14 and 2.15 provide evidence that agencies with elected heads do not
appear to fare any better than agencies with appointed heads in their ability to acquire
funding from the Governor. Shakansky (1963) suggested that elected officials have
privilege over appointed official budget process. However, it is particularly important to
note that agencies with appointed heads appear do not fare better than those with elected
heads in their ability to acquire funding from the legislature when they were unable to
obtain from the governor.
Table 2.16 provides no evidence to support a conclusion that cabinet agencies are
more successful than executive department agencies in circumventing the governor and
dealing directly with the legislature on budgetary matters
Table 2.16. Governor’s Support for Short-term Success and Long-term Budget Growth
Independent
Variable

Dependent Variable

p-value

Coefficient

Standard
Error

t-value

Log Acquisitiveness Cabinet Agency, Log
Governor Short-term

< 0.0001

-0.977989

0.0284565

-34.3678

Log Acquisitiveness Cabinet Agency,
Log Governor Long-term

0.220836

0.0320044

0.0260669

1.22778

Log Acquisitiveness Executive Department,
Log Governor Short-term

< 0.0001

-1.00061

0.0078438

-127.567

Log Acquisitiveness Executive Department,
Log Governor Long-term

0.962093

-0.0003571

0.0075091

-0.04755
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Table 2.17. Governor’s Support for Short-term Success and Long-term Budget Growth
(Agencies with elected vs appointed heads)
Elected Agencies
Panes
Row

Column

Line
p-value

Coefficients
Term

Value

Standard
Error

t-value

Log Acquisitiveness Log Governor
Short-term

< 0.0001 Log Acquisitiveness

-1.01453

0.0478238 -21.2138

Log Acquisitiveness Log Governor
Long-term

0.764303 Log Acquisitiveness

-0.0145268

0.0478238 -0.30376

-0.99086

0.0121406 -81.6151

Intercept

-0.0114485

0.0272247 -0.42052

0.251439 Log Acquisitiveness

0.0128796

Appointed Agencies
Log Acquisitiveness Log Governor
Short-term

Log Acquisitiveness Log Governor
Long-term

< 0.0001 Log Acquisitiveness

0.0112188

1.14804

Table 2.18. Legislative Support for Short-term Success and Long-term Budget Growth
(Agencies with elected vs appointed heads)
Appointed Agency
Row

Column

p-value

Term

Value

Standard
Error

Log Acquisitiveness Log Legislative < 0.0001 Log
0.0289423 0.0069988
Long-term
Acquisitiveness
intercept

0.0602018

Log Acquisitiveness Log Legislative < 0.0001 Log
-0.985406
Short-term
Acquisitiveness
intercept

0.015486

t-value
4.13533
3.8875

0.01182 -83.3676

0.0579056 0.0261537

2.21405

Elected Agency
Row

Column

p-value

Term

Value

Standard
Error

t-value

Log Acquisitiveness Log Legislative 0.795425 Log
0.0081549 0.0310358 0.262758
Long-term
Acquisitiveness
intercept

0.0209648

0.056357 0.372001

Log Acquisitiveness Log Legislative < 0.0001 Log
-0.991845 0.0310358 -31.9581
Short-term
Acquisitiveness
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Research question 3d: What are the determinants of agency appropriation?
Table 2.19 presents the results for the determinants of appropriation. Contrary to
expectation, when total state revenues increase, legislative appropriations and
gubernatorial recommendations for agencies also increase. This result is not significant. In
addition, when agency expenditures increase, legislative appropriations and gubernatorial
recommendations for agencies increase. This result is not significant. As expected, as
agency

budget

size

increases,

legislative

appropriations

and

gubernatorial

recommendations for the agency increase. Also, as expected, when population increases,
legislative appropriations and gubernatorial recommendations for the agency increase. As
expected, when the governor is a Democrat or legislative control of the House is
Democratic, the governor’s recommendation or legislative appropriation increases. As
expected, when the governor’s party controls the house, the governor’s recommendations
and the legislative appropriations increase.

Table 2.19. Determinants of Agency Appropriation
Independent variable

Coefficient

p-value

Log Budget size

0.444

0.000

Log Request

0.026

0.000

Log Governor Recommendation

0.28

0.000

Expenditure

2.07

0.050

Governors Party

0.89

0.000

Legislative Control

0.86

0.003

State total expenditure

1.44

0.018

-1.19

0.078

State revenue

75

The next two research questions examine the effect of agency age and size on
appropriation.
Table 2.20. Effect of Assertiveness Category/Size on Governor/Legislative Short- and
Long-term Support for Agency
Acquisitiveness
Categories
Size2

Rank of
Governor
Long-term

Rank of
Governor
Short-term

Rank of
Legislative
Long-term

Rank of
Legislative
Short-term

High

Small

7

4

7

5

High

moderate

2

1

2

1

High

Large

6

8

6

8

Low

Small

5

5

4

Low

Large

1

2

1

2

Moderate

Small

4

6

4

3

Moderate

moderate

8

7

8

7

Moderate

Large

3

5

3

6

Research Questions 3e and 3f: Effect of age and size on agency budget outcome.
The results in Tables 2.20 and 2.21 indicate moderate size agencies that requested
a large increase over previous years largely benefited from the governor’s short-term
support while large agencies that requested high levels of appropriations benefited the least
in terms of the governor’s short-term support. For long-term support of the governor, large
agencies are likely to benefit the least, while moderately sized agencies that make modest
requests are also likely to experience limited support from the governor for agency
expansion. For both the legislative short-term and support for agency expansion, large
agencies requesting minimal levels of appropriation benefit the most. The governor and the
legislators respond to all acquisitiveness categories in their long-term support for agency
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expansion. However, governors and legislators respond to small agencies
differently in their short-term support. Older agencies that are moderate in size are more
acquisitive than older agencies that are large and small in size, while younger agencies that
are large in size are more acquisitive than moderate and small agencies. Further, large older
agencies have higher total appropriations than their moderate and small counterparts. Large
young cabinet agencies receive larger budget recommendations from the governor than
large older agencies. However, in executive departments, large older agencies receive a
bigger budget recommendation from the governor than moderate and small agencies that
are older.
Table 2.21. Effect of Agency Size and Age on Appropriation
Age Categories

Size2

Older

small

Older

moderate

Older

Appropriation

Acquisitiveness

862,161,784

58.5786676

2,113,960,091

77.1888801

large

75,584,666,409

58.7333032

younger

small

262,171,118

9.2824798

younger

moderate

360,200,000

10.5599764

younger

large

22,672,000,000

20.5674399

Table 2.22. Effect of Agency Request Level and Agency Size on Assertiveness and
Long-term Support
Request Level
Categories

Size2

Acquisitiveness

Sum of Governor
Long-term

High

Small

14.9462009

43.4714658

High

Moderate

52.3815608

106.1818064

High

Large

26.8132592

71.0415496

Low

Small

23.1231637

95.627218
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Low

Moderate

Low

Large

11.550205

25.253603

34.5241601

161.668315

When examining the maturity of agencies, those that are large in size have the
largest total appropriation. More mature small agencies have the lowest total appropriation.
These results strongly support the idea that appropriation varies significantly by the size
and age of the agency. More mature small agencies are the most acquisitive but receive the
least in terms of total appropriations. In terms of agency growth, more mature small
agencies benefit from gubernatorial and legislative appropriation for both long- and shortterm support. This finding is contrary to the incremental budgeting assumption that the
acquisitiveness agency suffers budget cuts in the Short-term but benefits in the long term.
Given this discrepancy, this research moves the literature forward by providing more depth
to our understanding of the variation in budgeting approaches and relationships.
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Figure 2.3. Effect of
Agency Size and Age on
Appropriation

79

Table 2.23. A Linear Trend Model Computed for a More Mature Agency Using
Appropriation Given Budget Size and Request
Dependent
Variable

Independent
Variable

Row

Term

App

Request

App

Mag Budget size

Coefficients
Value

Standard
Error

t-value

p-value

4.57644

0.312596

14.6401

< 0.0001

-9.34E+07

3.90E+07

-2.3952

0.016986

Table 2.24. A Linear Trend Model Computed for a Less Mature Agency Using
Appropriation Given Budget Size and Request
Dependent
Variable

Independent
Variable

Coefficients
Term

App

Request

Request

App

Mag Budget
size

Mag Budget
size

Coefficients
Value

Standard
Error

0.574581

0.214281

-4.50E+07

3.44E+07

t-value

p-value

2.68144 0.008842
-1.30827

0.19324

Tables 2.23 and 2.24 above present the results for Research Question 8: The effect
of agency age on budget outcome. As agencies become older, they get richer in terms of
both appropriations and expenditures, a finding that is expected. The simple interpretation
is that agencies generally see an increase in budgets over time. In addition, the range of
agency actions may also grow with age. During the period of this study, total state
appropriations were gradually growing.
Considering only age, as agencies get older, they also get smaller in terms of overall
budget size, supporting the idea that as agencies age, their activities may decrease because
of decreasing budget size. The less mature an agency is, the less likely there will be changes
in its appropriation and when there are, they are generally increasing in budget size. In
contrast, the more mature an agency is the more likely the changes in its appropriations
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reflect a decline in budgetary activity. As agencies age, the magnitude of change in
their appropriations decreases.
This finding supports the notion that age brings relative budget stability to an
agency and a more mature agency’s requests are a better predictor of appropriation than
budget size. Additionally, as Democratic strength in the legislative branch increases,
legislatures respond to requests from large agencies with large budgets more strongly than
the governor’s recommendation. However, legislatures support the governor’s
recommendation for moderately sized, large budget agencies. A one unit increase in the
requests from small agencies with large budgets leads to a higher appropriation than from
large agencies with a large budget. In comparison, small, large budget agencies receive
relatively more appropriations than large agencies with large budgets.
Large budget, small agencies have higher appropriation growth under Democratic
legislatures, perhaps because some agencies are ignored when Republican legislative
strength is relatively high and vice versa when Democratic strength is relatively high. The
implication of this analysis is that there are agency orientations that are more Democratic
or Republican and the success of their appropriation request depends on the distribution of
partisan strength. If this hypothesis holds, it gives merit to the idea that there are very real
and meaningful policy differences between the parties at least as it applies to budget
appropriations.
Agencies with large existing budgets experience a decreasing rate of change in
appropriations, while agencies with smaller budges experience an increasing rate of change
in appropriations. Moreover, large budget agencies also have a higher magnitude of
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declining appropriations compared to low budget agencies. At a theoretical level, these
results provide evidence that a simple incrementalism view of appropriations (that is, one
year’s appropriations can be almost totally explained by the previous year’s appropriations)
is not significantly explanatory; other factors can and do combine to impact agency
appropriations. In addition, agency appropriations vary significantly from agency to
agency.

2.7

Conclusion
The analysis provides new perspectives on the South Carolina budgeting process.

Agencies do act differently in making their request to the governor and legislatures and
each agency follow their strategy based on the mission, size and type of the agency. The
findings suggest legislature do increase agency fund that are reduced in the governor’s
recommendation. In most cases of support for long-term budget growth, the legislature
appears to be the most crucial actor. The classification in this study is important because it
helps to describe the assertive behavior that may be manifested by agencies during all
phases of the budget process.
Overall the pattern of requests each year, ranges from 7 to 56 percent. Governors
also trim requests with substantial variation, ranging from 38.41 to 2.08 percent on average
per year, and legislatures trim requests (ranging from 38.41 to 2.08 percent on average per
year) most of the time. Typically, legislatures do not appropriate the same amount the
governor recommends, but often they appropriate approximately what the governor
recommends.
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The governor’s recommendation does not appear to support the idea of budget
expansion in moderately acquisitive agencies. This result is also true for other categories
of assertiveness. The results confirm that agencies that request the largest incremental
change in the budget will receive the largest percentage growth over their current budget,
while agencies requesting little or no incremental change will receive little to no growth in
their budget. While this relationship may seem obvious, it is important confirmation of the
“budgeting game” in practice through a research lens.
Agency acquisitiveness and the governor’s short-term support is significant in 19
of the 36 agencies studied here. The magnitude of the correlations between the legislative
and gubernatorial short-term support is greater, on average, than those between support in
long/Short-term and acquisitiveness in most agencies. However, in terms of long-term
budgeting support, the results from the model highlight the importance of agency
acquisitiveness over gubernatorial support.
The agency-legislative coefficients are significant in the case of legislative longterm support for cabinet agencies, suggesting that these agencies may be somewhat more
cooperative with legislators on budgetary matters than with the executive branch. The
results suggest that the gubernatorial- legislative path is more important than the agencylegislative path.
This study provides no evidence to support that cabinet agencies are more
successful than executive department agencies in circumventing the governor and dealing
directly with the legislature on budgetary matters.
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In South Carolina, strong gubernatorial appointive power is found in conjunction
with weak gubernatorial budget power. The principal feature which makes the South
Carolina governor’s budget powers weak is that he does not have sole responsibility for
preparing the budget. Legislative budget control has also been enhanced in South Carolina
by the establishment of the Revenue and Fiscal Affairs (RFA), which prepares the budget.
South Carolina legislators have information provided by the RFA and agency budgets are
reviewed by RFA staff. As a result, the legislators are believed to be better informed about
agency requests and are, therefore, in a stronger position to influence the budgetary success
achieved by state agencies. The Board of Economic Advisors (BEA), which is part of the
RFA which is controlled by legislature, provides estimates of the Net New Revenue
available for the upcoming fiscal year to the Executive Budget Office. The BEA sends
updated information to the Governor’s Office and the Executive Budget Office via a memo.
One agency director who was interviewed said that the “legislative arm in South
Carolina has greater control over the budget process than the Governor’s Office.” The
Governor’s Office makes recommendations, but the legislators approve the final budget.
The governor’s recommendations are published in the Executive Budget Book.
Other factors that challenge the incremental perspective on budgeting have been
suggested. However, they are scattered throughout the literature on policy and budgeting
and have not been systematically integrated into a potentially competing paradigm. Further
research could use the categories of variables (Agency categories, Spending policy
categories, Agency head appointment categories) in this research to test scenarios of state
budget in other states. For theoretical interest, agencies should be chosen to include four
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different agency missions: distributive, redistributive, Market emulators and regulatory.
This allows us to discuss and compare the four agency missions as separate and distinct.
Limitations of this research also includes the confinement of the study to a sample
consisting of a single state with 36 agencies and a span of budget years from 1990 to 2018.
Future research should include more agencies and increase the time period to cover periods
when legislative control of the house includes both democrat and republican.
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Chapter Three: QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS OF
AGENCY BUDGET STRATEGIES AND SUCCESS
3.1

Introduction
This and other research show that agency budget requests are a function of the

orientation of the agency. However, agency budget requesting behavior is also constrained
by numerous external factors. As an example, requests for large budget increases pays off
but not all agencies are free to make these requests. Agency requesting for large increase
is a function of several factors: Presidential Support/Governor support, legislative
Congressional Support. support/, the values, attitudes, and orientation of agency
administrators, the extent of external support for the agency and its programs, economic
conditions and the environmental constraints (LeLoup and Moreland, 1978).
Whicker et al, (2002) mentioned “three factors that have not been examined, these
factors are “agency mission, beneﬁt/cost structure, and public attitudes. Each of these three
factors—agency mission, beneﬁt/cost structure, and public attitudes —either directly or
indirectly impacts agency budget strategy. Agency mission deﬁnes beneﬁt/cost structures
for the organization, which, in turn, impacts public support for the agency and its programs.
Public support then impacts agency budget strategies (Khan and Hildreth 2002)”.
According to Wildavsky, Budgeting is incremental, not comprehensive. This notion
about budget assumes there is stability across the budget process. The incremental theory
of budgeting have been challenged in terms of analytical and interpretive choices. As this
theory assumes that the stages of appropriation are stable, LeLoup and Moreland (1978)
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revealed that there is a variation in stages of appropriation and agencies have several
strategies in requesting for appropriation.
The main objective of this research study is to explore the relationship between
agency officials, governor’s recommendation and legislative appropriation. This success
could potentially be achieved through understanding agency/governor relationship and the
factors that contribute to the success of that relationship. This chapter aims to understand
the to agency budget success from administrator’s perspective, to understand the financial
problem in state budget: what are the resource constraints, to understand how public
support help agencies in their budget success and lastly to understand the strategic
problems in state budget: who has power and how do the use it to achieve their purpose.
While analysts have traditionally assumed that budget success is not onedimensional, they have not considered whether their measures of it are relevant in the “real
world” of state budgeting. Two measures of budget success have been used, jointly or
individually. Following the lead of Sharkansky (1968), two indicators of gubernatorial and
legislative influence over state agency budget requests are used in the analysis: short-term
success and success in budget expansion. Short-term success is a measure of an agency’s
success in receiving approval from the legislature in a given fiscal year. Success in
expansion measures an agency’s success in receiving approval from the legislature for an
increase in its current budget. Based on these measures of budget success, we can then infer
what outcomes agency budget officials seek to achieve. Doing so could make the study of
state budgeting more relevant for practitioners as well provide suggestions for facilitating
their success in the budget process.
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Bureaucrats tend to maximize their activities and agency programs. Tullock further
contends that it is a rule of thumb for bureaucrats to find possibilities to expand program
and activities of the agency. This is not an unfair assessment because every bureaucrat will
benefit in terms of power, influence, and public respect when there is expansion. Tullock
cautioned that, the proposition is not true of all bureaucrats and it is only confined to
modern day bureaucrats. One strategy mentioned by Tullock to in order to improve the size
of bureaucracy is to do a good job and for public to desire the interest to want more from
the government. Niskanen (1973), also support this in his budget maximizing model that
agency official will attempt to increaser their budget size in order to have more influence
thus increasing its salary and prestige. Legislators do demand that agency to provide
services and agency also seek budget to supply service to the public. The more services
supplied, the more the agency expands. Size of the agency and scope of agency work
contribute to agency survival.
The development of agency budgets is also impacted by various institutional actors.
Moreover, understanding how agencies interact with the legislative environment and at
what stage agencies exert the most influence over the budget process adds clarity to the
nature of the policy process. In addition, we might consider what political conditions
influence agency program expansion. These environmental factors, which are usually
outside the organization, also affect the organization and its decisions as agencies within
the same or different policy arenas compete with one another for limited resources; for
example, the higher education budget competes with Medicaid and other social welfare
agencies. Multiple factors or forces have been identified as being involved in shaping
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public policies, one example being how internal administrative conditions affect the
increase or reduction of an agency's budget and, presumably, its activities. While the
research reported here cannot address all these questions, it will examine a number of these
issues to improve our understanding of the complicated factors that influence agency
budget priorities, goal setting and processes.
In defining agency budget success and discussing their measures, agency budget
officials provided useful insights into the strengths and limitations of specific measures of
budget success and, in some cases, the tactics used to achieve it. Agency budget success is
an important concept because it deals with what administrative officials want to accomplish
during the budget process and provides insights into their budget roles.
Agencies use different approach in presenting their budget request to governor and
legislators. The recognition and pattern of differences in gubernatorial recommendation
provides evidence that some agencies are more aggressive in their request than others.
There is evidence that agencies do appeal to legislatures when governor cut their request.
In some cases, legislatures do honor appeals made by agencies when their request are cut
by governors.
Agencies involved in the budgetary process are political actors operating in a given
political environment. While some aspects of the environment are uniform for all agencies,
many are unique to each agency. For example, some operate in a more supportive executive
environment than others, which is, in part, influenced by political party within state
legislatures. Previous research on budgeting at the state and federal levels has found that
understanding agency budget requests throughout the different stages in the budgeting
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process is important (LeLoup and Moreland, 1978). As a result, the initial focus of
this research centers on budget strategy throughout the entire budget process, specifically
the links between the goals of the agencies and their perceptions of the actions that will be
effective in obtaining the required funding in their political environment (Wildavsky 1968).
The chapter employs a qualitative approach to assess the link between agency
mission, budget strategy and budget success. In defining agency budget success and
discussing their definitions, agency budget officials provide useful insights into the
strengths and limitations of specific measures of budget success and, in some cases, the
tactics used in achieving it. Using a qualitative approach, this chapter aims to explore
Agency budget success from an administrator’s perspective, the primary resource
constraints, how public support helps agencies with budget success, and who has power
with the state budget and how do they use it to achieve their ends?
This chapter attempts to address ongoing budgeting questions through several
lenses. Its results will enable future state level researchers and practitioners gain insight
into how agency characteristics may play a role in the success and/or failure of the
budgeting process. The budget policy research area has been dominated by other lines of
inquiry, and this dissertation seeks to expand that with a focus on the agency and legislative
processes being employed to arrive at budget policy.
The study reported here extends this research using data obtained for 18 budget
officials ( in 15 state agencies) to explore fiscally dependent agencies and how mission
and strategy affect budget relations between an agency, governor and state legislature.
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3.2

Agency Mission: Inductive Theory
The mission of an agency determines the primary focus of the agency which is

associated with a unique cost structure. The cost structure of agency may be concentrated
or disperse (Whicker et al. 2002). In addition, the mission defines the agency’s policies.
Lowi (1964) classified policies into three : distributive, redistributive, and regulatory.
Whicker et al. (2002) applies Lowi’s (1964) policy typologies to develop a policy
classiﬁcation of public agencies of distributive, redistributive, and regulatory and adds a
fourth, market emulators. These classifications are defined below:
Distributive Policy Agency: These agencies provide government service widely
used by the state, for example, general public education, broad health care focused on
primarily on disease control, defense and transportation. This type of policy applies
economic incentive to reward some group and deny other groups.
Redistributive Policy Agency: These types of policies the transfer of payment and
service delivery from one segment of population to the other. hat shifts income from one
segment to another, usually providing income for the less fortunate. Examples include
welfare, social services and health care targeted for low income populations.
Regulatory Policy Agency: These agencies use positive incentives such as tax relief
and negative incentives such as fines to modify the behavior of regulated industries,
examples being DHEC and financial regulation institutions.
Market emulators: Whicker et al. (2002) added another type of agency called
market emulators. These agencies exhibit the characteristics of private industries. “These
agencies produce marketable goods with clearly identifiable unit costs that can be sold to

91

individuals in a market exchange,” for example parks, recreational museums, and
institutions of higher education.

3.3

Benefit, Cost Structure and Public Support
Concentrated benefits means that the policy is particularly for certain group or

rather the benefits accrue to just a few actors. These actors may be low income or wealthy
class of the population. The dispersed costs, on the other hand, means that the policy is
financed by taxpayer’s money.
The benefit, cost structure and public support are influenced by the type of agency
(Whicker et al. 2002) Because distributive agencies face policy that the benefits that are

dispersed and costs are borne by a large segment of the population. On the other hand,
redistributive agencies face policies that the beneﬁts are spread among certain segment of
the population and costs are borne by large segment of the population . Regulatory
agencies faced dispersed beneﬁts and concentrated cost. The benefits of programs
instituted by regulatory agencies are enjoyed by all segment of the population while cost
are borne by small segment of population. Market emulators have concentrated beneﬁts
and costs whereby the same segment of the population bears the benefit and cost.

3.4

Methodology
The problem addressed in this study was to identify the factors affecting budget

strategies and the success of budget officials in South Carolina state agencies. To explore
this issue, the factors affecting the strategies and success of budget officials were the focus
of this study. The findings of this study will provide an understanding of the behaviors of

92

budget officials in the budget process, for example, we will be able to answer the
question of what administrative officials want to accomplish during the budget process and
provide insights into their budget roles.
This section begins with an overview of the research design and the selection
criteria used in this dissertation.

3.4.1 Research design
This chapter qualitatively identify the factors affecting the strategies of budget
officials. More specifically, it addressed the need to focus on understanding budget
strategy, budget request, and budget success in addition to improving the budgeting
process, the gaps in the literature identified in Chapter 2. Examining these factors could
potentially result in an improved budget process and its outcomes. Interview was conducted
and data were analyzed for budget officials in the state of South Carolina. The questions
for the interview were based on variables that were thought to impact budget strategies.
The following questions were posed to agency budget officials.
Question 1:
1a.
Question 2:

How would you describe agency budget success?
Is the primary source of your funding state revenues?
Describe the importance of maintaining a good relationship with
legislators?

2a.
Question 3:
3a.

Do you feel comfortable discussing your needs with the legislators?
Does your agency have a strategy for recessionary budget environments?
How do you protect yourself from deep cuts that may threaten the agency?
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Question 4:

Describe the importance of maintaining a good relationship with the
governor?

Question 5:
5a.

Who are your primary beneficiaries?
How does their support help in your budget success?

5b. Do you perceive hostility from other non-beneficiary groups?
Question 6:

What are the most important variables to consider when your agency is
preparing its budget?

Question 7:
7a.

Are there specific groups that resist or block the growth of your programs?
How do you overcome resistance to funding?

The data used for this research were obtained from two sources, budget data from
the South Carolina Governor’s Budget Report, FY 1990-2018, and interviews conducted
with key budget actors, specifically agency budget officials, the director of the Executive
Budget Office (EBO)and E.B.O budget analysts. Budget officials from 15 agencies in
South Carolina agreed to be interviewed. The interview format consisted of open-ended
questions designed to produce non-structured responses; agency officers and budget
analysts were asked similar but distinct questions.
Addition to the recording device, notes were also captured during the session. Each
of the budget officials was assured their responses would be kept confidential; My
dissertation chair, Dr. Lori, assisted in conducting interviews with the first 3 budget
officers, and I conducted the remaining interviews myself between March 2018 and
September 2018. Interviews lasted a maximum of 60 minutes, with the average being 50
minutes.
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Although the agencies used in this study varied, the issues regarding problems with
budgets were similar but a qualitative methodology was suitable for this research exploring
and comparing the potential factors affecting budget strategy and budget success. The
primary limitation of this qualitative study is the small number of agencies from which to
draw conclusions about distributive, redistributive, and regulatory policy areas. The 15
agencies alone cannot explain the entire universe of factors explaining differences in
factors determining appropriation for state agencies. Thus, an important limitation is that
the findings from the qualitative study may not be fully generalizable across agencies in
other state states. The list of agencies interview are in the table 3.1 below.
Table 3.1. List of Agencies Interviewed

Agency

Policy Area

Number of
People
Interviewed

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS

Regulatory

2

DEPT OF JUVENILE JUSTICE

Regulatory

1

AGRICULTURE DEPARTMENT

Market Oriented /Distributive

1

PARKS RECREATION & TOURISM

Market Oriented

1

DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE

Regulatory

1

DEPARTMENT OF ADMINISTRATION

Distributive

2

STATE LIBRARY

Distributive

1

DEPT OF HEAL TH & HUMAN SERVICE

Distributive/Redistributive

1

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND
ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL

Regulatory

1

DEPARTMENT OF MENTAL HEALTH

Distributive/Redistributive

1

DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY

Regulatory

1

DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES

Redistributive

2

EDUCATION OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE

Regulatory

1

TREASURY DEPARTMENT

Regulatory

1
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Agency

Policy Area

Number of
People
Interviewed

DEPARTMENT OF ARCHIVES AND
HISTORY

Distributive

1

3.5

Data Analysis
Based on the information obtained from the responses to the interview questions, I

drew conclusions and made recommendations. To ensure their accuracy, I took notes during
the process and recorded the interviews if the participants agreed. If they did not, the
interview occurred but was not recorded.

3.6

Results and Findings

3.6.1 How do budget officials define agency budget success?
Some officials responded that increase in appropriations does not always mean
budget success. Increase in appropriation could be as a result of legislative mandate, capital
project, or agency restructuring. In these cases, a large increase was not viewed as a
success. Budget success also means obtaining short/long term support both from governor
and legislators or secure appropriation more than the current operating levels. One
respondent defined success as meeting the strategic goals of the agencies.
Some officials responded that “Success is considered if recommendation for a
certain program gets funded. Success is regarded as when more agency recommendations
receive funding or attention. Success is drawing attention to certain issues or able to make
changes to proviso.” Success could also be defined when budget changes that need to be
made are made. For example, budget changes that would positively improve student
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outcome are the most important. Other respondents defined success as being given
maintenance of current operations budgets with flexibility and no holdback of funds during
the year.
Agency budget success includes flexibility in the use of appropriations and
obtaining appropriation authority; more specifically, to the respondents flexibility includes
(1) avoiding restrictive language in the appropriations act; (2) appropriation authority
allowing the agency to carry forward unexpended or unencumbered appropriations into the
following year; or (3) having open-ended authority to write grants and use the funds
secured from the grants without having state funds cut.
The majority of the respondents defined budget success as the following:
▪

To some department officials, budget success means the ability to secure funds
quickly in an emergency situation.

▪

Budget success is the ability to obtain adequate funding in the long and short
term.

▪

Budget success is the ability to secure recurring funds.

▪

Success is defined as the overall response, I. e. if other participants in the budget
process agreed to all funding requested. Also, success means if the strategic plan
goals is met.

▪

Budget success is being able to secure the resources needed to carry out the
mission and objectives of your agency
Budget officials mentioned that the “percentage increase in appropriations depends

too much on the fiscal condition of state funds and revenue increases. Since these factors
are beyond the control of the agency officials, their success should not be judged on how
large a percent increase in appropriations they were able to obtain for their agency.”
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Obtaining an increase in appropriations may depend on other factors partially or entirely
beyond the control of an agency, such as whether its workload is increasing or decreasing
or whether there is a court order mandating a program change.
Some agency directors, according to the respondents, were only trying to get
enough of an increase to continue existing programs at their current level of operations
with very little program improvement, for example the Department of Insurance, while
others are seeking program expansion.

3.6.2 What is the relationship between agency, governor and legislators?
Governor Support: Respondents from the Department of Mental Health and
Education Oversight Committee mentioned that having an advocate in the governor’s and
executive budget offices is invaluable for an agency that desires to expand its activities,
mentioning specifically that general support may be expressed by the governor in his public
statements, news conferences, and State of the State Address, as well as during the
budgetary process. One budget official responded that obtaining support from the governor
provides an avenue for program expansion, implying that budget officials are not
concerned about higher appropriation alone. This finding is consistent with Abney and
Lauth’s (1989) results from their survey of state executive budget officers.
The disadvantage of a strong relationship with the governor may mean that his or
her support could increase the level of assertiveness of an agency in the budgetary process.
One respondent, a member of the Education Oversight Committee, mentioned that the
legislature is the driver for some agencies, adding that the impact of a relationship with the
governor depends on if the he or she is popular. This respondent emphasized the importance
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of being part of the conversation. Respondent says that, it does not matter if an
agency is executive department or cabinet agency, meeting with the governor to discuss
recommendation is important. It takes effort, time and persistence. Agency director needs
to be proactive. “It’s a poor excuse to say you don’t know how to get to the Governor”.
Thus. agency directors need to meet with a dedicated member in the governor’s office who
carries the message.
Another respondent from the Juvenile Justice Department mentioned that
maintaining a good relationship with the governor and the executive budget staff depends
on the type of agency. For a cabinet agency, its relationship with the governor is more
critical than for an executive agency. For executive departments, on the other hand, the
relationship with the legislature is more critical.

3.6.3 Relations with the legislature
Maintaining a good relationship with the legislature and its budget staff was
important to most of the agency budget officers interviewed. The key to good legislative
relations, according to many of the respondents, was the credibility of the agency director.
One official responded that “always asking for what is needed will help to maintain
credibility”. Respondent further mentioned that the “ability to persuade the appropriation
committee and secure funding for the agency means success.” To maintain a good
relationship with budget officials, honesty is crucial, according to one respondent. Further,
officials responded that the attitude “the sky is falling” should be avoided with legislators.
Once a legislator realizes that the dire consequences predicted did not occur after the
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agency request was refused, its credibility could be at stake because of the realization that
the consequences were exaggerated.
The job of agency officials is to sell their budgets to the appropriations committee
and legislature. Therefore, it is important to convince them that every item requested is
absolutely necessary. For example, when the budget official from the Education Oversight
Committee, was asked about inflating the budget, he responded only items needed for
operation are requested and he “will not add an item above the amount needed to maintain
the current level of operations unless this item is essential.”
Legislative Support: Budget officials mentioned that agencies work hard to build
supportive coalitions in the legislative branch and to maintain good relationships with their
authorizing committees and appropriations sub-committees. Knowing they have support
from the legislature makes agencies feel secure in asking for increases. One respondent
from the Department of Juvenile Justice emphasized the importance of the relationship
with the legislators, mentioning that they are important stakeholders and must be given
priority. Another respondent described his agency’s relationship with the legislature as
“crucial because some interest group who are not beneficiary of the agency may want to
get rid of an agency program,” adding “ their agency provided accountability service for
the legislator and governor and some interest group don’t like to be accountable” Overall,
all respondents except for the budget official from the Mental Health Department agreed
that South Carolina is a legislative dominant state.
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3.6.4 Why do legislators deviate from governor’s recommendations?
Wildavsky (1969) mentioned that the financial policy of the governor is the most
important variable since it determines the extent to which he is able to use his formal
powers and relative position vis-a- vis the legislature and administration. This ability
depends on the course of action he chooses to pursue, his formal powers, the structure of
his administration and the party composition in the legislature. Budget officials responded
that, prior to the creation of the Executive Budget Office in 2013, the governor’s control
of the budget process was minimal. However, the establishment of the Executive Budget
Office empowered the governor to review departmental estimates, to propose a plan of item
vetoes and to control expenditure. The South Carolina governor has line item veto which
allows him or her to increase or reduce a specific item without having to reject an entire
appropriation. Party composition is a strong determinant whether this veto is overturned;
if the governor’s party is in the minority, there is a high probability that the item veto will
be overturned. Based on the literature, Sharkansky (1968) concluded that agencies must
secure the consent of the governor to obtain the funding requested. Without it, the
probability of achieving budget success low.
According to Wildavsky’s theory of the budget process, a limited tenure imposes
additional restrictions on the governor’s power. For example, a governor with only one
term in office has not had sufficient time to acquaint himself with the budget, to determine
the way he wants to direct it and to convince the administration and legislators to
implement his proposal. Further a governor with limited tenure is not likely to initiate, for
example, a tax hike because he would not be able to reap the benefits. His term would have
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before the additional revenue was realized to allow for an increase in spending.
When asked about the impact of a governor’s tenure on budget requests, one budget official
responded that politics is part of the budget process.
When revenue grows faster than expenditures, the governor’s options expand,
meaning he has more possibilities to choose from: He may become an advocate of lower
taxation, or he may join the rank of those arguing for an expansion of state services. One
budget official responded that the governors who know how to use social media are the
ones successful in the 21st century. This respondent added that a “governor should have
goals. A clear goal will make a governor. A governor who can articulate their goals. A
governor has a good plan. A governor who knows how to relate X and Y.”
One budget official responded that status of governor’s party in the legislature has
no impact, stating that the difference between Democrats and Republicans is small. This
respondent further added that both parties are fighting for the growth and development of
the state. Most respondent agreed that the success of the governor who wants to increase
spending is less certain since it depends on legislative approval. Shakansky (1976)
emphasized that the governor’s formal power is crucial in the budget process. The results
from the study reported here found that the governor cannot rely on his personal power
alone because he does not have the authority to appropriate. Future studies should explore
if the governor faces resistance from the opposition party when his party does not control
the legislature and if when the governor’s party controls the legislature and there is a high
level of party discipline, his chance of success is high.
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The principal feature which makes the South Carolina governor’s budget powers
weak is that the Governor does not have the sole responsibility for preparing the budget.
Legislative budget control has also been enhanced in South Carolina by the establishment
of budget preparation by Revenue and Fiscal Affairs (RFA). One explanation for why South
Carolina is a legislative dominant state could be that South Carolina legislators have
information provided by RFA and agency budget is reviewed by RFA staff. As a result, the
Legislators are believed to be better informed about agency requests and therefore in a
stronger position to influence the degree of budgetary success achieved by state agencies.

3.6.5 Financial problems in state budgets: What are the resource constraints?
Economic conditions and the governor’s decisions on overall budget totals may
mean a surplus or a deficit year. These factors are formally communicated to the agencies
through the EBO guidelines for preparing their requests. Budget officials responded that
the factors affecting appropriation are informally communicated in a variety of ways and
agencies usually have a good idea of what is expected of them. Some budget officials
mentioned that the needs of the agency may necessitate that it ignores formal and informal
guidelines if it believes it can make a strong case for its requests. There two types of budget
syndromes: one, revenue grows faster than expenditures, and a surplus is accumulated,
meaning budget officers are less concerned about cutting requests and finding money to
fund spending than deciding whether to spend extra monies and if so, how and where. In
the second, spending outstrips revenue, and little is left at the budget officer’s discretion.
In this situation, the budgetary process revolves around revenue rather that expenditure,
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and budget officers are concerned with curbing spending and with finding resources to fund
current programs.
Budget officials responded that the most important variable determining the
behavior of participants is the adequacy of revenues. Spending agencies will have nothing
to gain or lose internally; hence, their strategies will be directed toward sources outside
state government. The legislature, though advocating higher spending, will engage in
constant disputes with the governor over revenues. When money comes in faster than it
goes out, as often happens, more options become available. The governor stands to gain
the most in this situation since he can use his formal powers effectively either to initiate or
to prevent additional spending.
The spending agencies and the legislature can and will probably advocate higher
spending; however, implementation depends on the governor’s consent. Again, the
conservative saving-oriented governor has the last word. The development of strategies
becomes important for spending agencies since there is something at stake in the budgetary
process. Most of their efforts will be directed toward the governor for though only the
legislature can appropriate monies, appropriation without gubernatorial support has little
material value. As one budget official explains, “budget development involves revenue
plan, expenditure forecast and a procedure for dealing with the gaps that exist between
revenue and expenditure.”
The Official from the Executive Budget Office reported that the first element in
developing a budget is to determine how much revenue will be available. The primary
source of revenue for a state is sales tax and for a local government is property tax. The
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predictions from the Revenue and fiscal affairs does not only affect the current budget but
also the dialogue about the tax structure, new and expanded expenditure program and
future of social security program. Revenue forecast plays an important role in making
economic policy.
There are two scenarios that budget official gave to explain the relationship between
revenue and expenditure. First, raising revenue could lead to increased expenditures: one
could argue (even though this is not always the case but there are situations when this
argument may be applicable) that expenditure must follow revenue. Thus, if revenue is
raised, then government increases spending. Hence, cutting revenue can reduce budget
deficits. Equally as important as this, the state’s financial condition determines who is the
central figure in the state. It can be argued that a state surplus increases the governor’s
power because of the perception that this is a political win on the governor’s part. When
the budget is not balanced, the governor has the incentive to do nothing because all options
are perceived as unpopular. A deficit means the governor must balance the budget either
by raising taxes or cutting spending, neither of which is likely to satisfy the public.
More important than other considerations, the financial condition determines who
is the central figure. A surplus increases the governor’s power because he wins the
initiative. When the budget is not balanced, the governor has the incentive to do nothing
because all options open to him are unpopular. A deficit means the governor must balance
the budget either by raising taxes or cutting spending, neither of which is likely to satisfy
the public. Over appropriation is also possible and frequently practiced. Agency budget
officials mentioned that there are instances where they are appropriated more than what
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they requested. Over appropriation can also result because of actions by the legislature
because the governor bears the burden of balancing the budget.

3.7

Conclusion
Budget official reported that gaining support from the governor provides an avenue

for program expansion, implying that budget officials are not just concerned about higher
appropriation alone. The disadvantage of a strong relationship with the governor may mean
his support for an agency could increase the level of assertiveness of an agency in the
budgetary process. This finding is consistent with Abney and Lauth’s (1989) results from
their survey of state executive budget officers.
According to Wildasky’s theory of the budget process, a limited tenure imposes
additional restrictions on the governor’s power. For example, a governor with only one
term in office has not had sufficient time to acquaint himself with the budget, to determine
the way he wants to direct it and to convince the administration and legislators to
implement his proposal. Further a governor with limited tenure is not likely to initiate, for
example, a tax hike because he would not be able to reap the benefits. His term would have
ended before the additional revenue was realized to allow for an increase in spending.
When asked about the impact of a governor’s tenure on budget requests, one budget official
responded that politics is part of the budget process.
When revenue grows faster than expenditures, the governor’s options expand,
meaning he has more possibilities to choose from: He may become an advocate of lower
taxation, or he may join the rank of those arguing for an expansion of state services. One
budget official responded that the governors who know how to use social media are the

106

ones successful in the 21st century. This respondent added that a “governor should
have goals. A clear goal will make a good governor. A governor who can articulate their
goals. A governor has a good plan. A governor who knows how to relate X and Y.”
Legislative budget control has also been enhanced in South Carolina by the
establishment of budget preparation responsibility from the Revenue and Fiscal Affairs
(RFA) Agency. South Carolina legislators have information provided by RFA and agency
budgets are reviewed by RFA staff. As a result, the Legislators are arguably more informed
about agency requests and therefore in a stronger position to influence the degree of
budgetary success achieved by state agencies.
Future research could use the variables and classifications identified in this research
to test scenarios of state budgets in other states. For example, the assertiveness categories
and agency typologies developed in this study are important because they help to describe
the assertive behavior that may be manifested by agencies during all stages of the budget
process. Future research could extend the findings from this research with more in-depth
analyses from individual states or comparisons of states. Such analyses should assess the
impact of partisan conflict, election outcome and year, the soft skills of governors, and the
nature of executive-legislative relations in budget matters.
Future research could also examine how state spending on Medicaid or other areas,
like Corrections, impact the budget success of other agencies and programs. Research on
the nature of agency budget tradeoffs will allow researchers to examine if agency success
with long- or short-term budget expansion is associated with resource competition.
Similarly, an examination of whether elected agency officials budget requests are more
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likely to receive approval that non-elected officials is important for future scholars.
In conclusion, there are many avenues for future research that could provide scholars with
a stronger understanding of public budgeting processes but also about broader policy and
political relationships across states.
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Chapter Four: FACTORS AFFECTING HIGHER
EDUCATION BUDGET
4.1

Introduction
Economic hardships and political factors have been found to describe the decline

in state spending for higher education. In addition, the changing relationship between states
and public higher education have also led to decline in support for higher education.
Above all, the economy is a key determinant of state spending for higher education (Weerts
& Ronca 2006).
The use of financial aid programs has been suggested to be a key tool in addressing
the issues of education affordability, access, and equity and college completion. A
promising financial aid program in place will assure prospective student that going to
college is an option that is available and certain. Financial aid program should be designed
in such a way that would increase awareness of prospective student (Laderman & Carlson,
2018). Recently among researchers, there have been a significant amount of attention on
decline in state higher education appropriation
State and federal government do assist higher education by providing subsides in
form of student aid. Higher education have the privilege to increase tuition and these have
made it easy for lawmakers to cut higher education budget when they are faced with other
state competing factors. The budget literature argues that understanding budget
competition is of critical importance for understanding state higher education
appropriations. State spending on higher education have not expanded compared to other
areas of state investment such as Medicaid. (Weerts, & Ronca, 2006). Reserchers have also
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suggested that one of the reasons that higher education appropriation shrinks could
be as a result of budget trade offs by state lawmakers (Tandberg, 2010; Koshal, & Koshal
2000). Public institutions do have other means of generation income when faced with
reduction in their appropriation. This makes higher education as an attractive target for
budget cut because of its ability to source revenue through other means.
Volatility in state spending for higher education has been found to exhibit the
characteristics of balance wheel model. Higher education funding is reduced compared to
other state spending categories when the condition of state economy is unfavorable but
receives more funding when budgeting environment is favorable (Delaney and Doyle
2007). Furthermore, their study controlled for economic, political, and higher education
factors and still found evidence of “balance wheel functional form of funding for higher
education”.
Rizzo (2006) “emphasized that public universities are accustomed to their state
funding being at the mercy of economic cycles. In bad budget times, higher education
typically bears a disproportionate burden of state funding cuts, with the full expectation
that it will be compensated during a recovery” (Rizzo 2006, p.1). (Rizzo) 2006 further
emphasized that, in relative terms, higher education funding has not fluctuated with the
business cycle. In summary the result of Rizzo work showed that, after controlling for
political, economic, demographic, and higher education infrastructure, volatility in
budgeting for higher education still shows pattern of —the balance wheel
Overall, Increase in K 12 expenditure has affected funding for higher education.
Higher education effort to increase has resulted in funding cut by most states. Budget
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reduction, increase in student enrolment, and other state political support have
impacted the ability of higher education to provide quality and equitable education
Hovey (1999) “addresses the future financing of higher education, focusing
primarily on the states and presenting state-by-state data on important trends” (Hovey
1999, p.1). He assesses the health state’s revenue and expenditure in the context of other
state competing priorities and how these priorities affect funding for higher education.
Hovey finds that most states expenditure will grow more than revenue which will lead to
funding cut for higher education. However, during favorable budget environment,
lawmakers have been in support of funding major changes in higher education request.
The environmental factors affecting state budget process for higher education
includes economic, political, and demographic factors. These factors explains, the variation
in states appropriation for higher education among the states, but the factors did not explain
all the differences that occur in state appropriation for higher education among states
(Glenny 1979). The main actors in the budget process are the governors, agencies,
legislatures and higher education climate. Research suggests that the internal and external
factors of budget actors best describe the strategy and behavior of budget reviewers over
a certain period (Ryu et al. 2008). More specifically, institutional actors, institutional rules,
and the personal characteristics of an actor can influence the budget outcome or the process
itself (Ryu et al. 2008). Gleny (1972) has referred these actors to be the "anonymous leaders
of higher education".
This paper investigates the state’s higher education appropriation in detail,
comparing its levels to both the governor’s recommendations and legislative appropriation
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levels by examining the economic, political, demographic, higher institution
environment cultural and fiscal factors. More specifically, it begins with two basic
questions: 1) Why is there variation in public higher education funding in South Carolina
and 2) How does spending for higher education relate to state level budget expenditures?
Budget literature argues that examining budget competition is important for understanding
the tradeoffs in state higher education appropriation. The variations in legislator and
governor support have implications for tuition, low income students, and public higher
education standards. As such, this research will examine the dynamics of budget
competition to provide insight into the variations in state spending for research and public
institution in the state of South Carolina.
Table 4.1. State Fiscal Support for Higher Education
State
Alabama

FY14

FY17

FY18

FY19

1,444,764,352

1,557,047,574

1,588,026,154

1,645,894,944

Alaska

399,052,668

352,480,709

343,870,898

343,486,475

Arizona

897,579,300

860,387,400

875,132,900

902,095,800

Arkansas

1,001,496,233

974,615,738

978,568,798

1,012,705,646

California

10,765,415,955

13,562,573,000

14,489,452,000

15,439,058,000

677,086,916

866,808,182

887,037,491

993,825,292

1,026,156,341

1,152,055,154

1,071,282,616

1,115,487,119

227,606,200

234,722,700

237,069,500

237,443,800

Florida

3,925,291,451

4,537,335,070

5,037,744,203

5,323,619,860

Georgia

2,790,040,144

3,210,406,736

3,443,626,402

3,622,236,182

Hawaii

530,388,306

667,478,019

716,718,368

777,647,851

Idaho

374,642,100

460,323,000

478,997,900

502,954,900

4,295,926,531

4,535,178,335

4,129,826,231

4,315,738,835

Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware

Illinois
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State
Indiana

FY14

FY17

FY18

FY19

1,663,061,249

1,745,379,182

1,773,727,687

1,779,141,830

Iowa

823,333,019

829,402,839

804,642,010

815,518,230

Kansas

771,121,325

769,175,109

772,091,220

801,527,217

Kentucky

1,194,587,857

1,170,767,200

1,173,159,100

1,144,995,600

Louisiana

1,125,250,832

1,083,387,063

1,159,690,661

1,163,071,254

271,864,121

299,740,529

302,551,904

305,883,736

Maryland

1,721,006,820

1,983,512,996

1,997,863,397

2,066,976,438

Massachusetts

1,342,072,529

1,544,319,564

1,564,337,918

1,606,272,299

Michigan

1,669,524,700

1,877,039,600

1,917,024,500

1,954,421,700

Minnesota

1,394,503,000

1,543,313,000

1,653,249,000

1,630,558,000

Mississippi

973,846,876

1,013,678,408

900,155,014

904,710,576

Missouri

954,236,519

1,011,797,327

988,536,584

998,983,910

Montana

226,961,354

252,366,788

243,920,115

244,454,061

Nebraska

688,183,035

753,553,849

745,710,158

762,533,014

Nevada

485,640,591

570,958,220

622,021,005

655,333,247

New Hampshire

109,000,000

125,200,059

127,935,617

128,543,198

1,990,469,000

2,083,569,000

2,065,933,000

2,155,024,000

856,215,012

854,808,000

836,246,000

855,931,200

New York

5,306,812,959

5,735,095,034

5,918,513,522

6,045,266,911

North Carolina

3,617,627,709

3,982,126,724

4,086,567,077

4,283,647,083

409,693,640

419,650,340

358,491,256

358,491,256

Ohio

2,104,931,061

2,303,647,976

2,300,904,761

2,299,505,863

Oklahoma

1,053,566,920

863,204,515

824,226,487

832,707,167

631,121,950

816,722,620

851,699,382

884,722,988

Pennsylvania

1,644,692,000

1,693,108,000

1,713,363,000

1,756,295,000

Rhode Island

167,567,862

188,739,813

199,553,587

208,435,318

South Carolina

909,110,205

1,094,964,380

1,097,979,545

1,057,670,049

South Dakota

207,837,626

238,612,300

234,058,232

238,879,017

Maine

New Jersey
New Mexico

North Dakota

Oregon
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State

FY14

FY17

FY18

FY19

Tennessee

1,587,786,604

1,732,289,377

1,844,857,699

1,923,836,726

Texas

6,948,653,093

7,614,429,799

7,493,114,733

7,577,802,811

798,346,200

978,663,600

1,025,936,100

1,113,971,200

Vermont

92,686,200

93,158,125

95,533,067

95,494,089

Virginia

1,780,468,378

2,051,845,077

2,013,572,522

2,120,330,179

Washington

1,570,807,000

1,878,116,000

1,906,810,000

2,037,367,000

516,276,320

484,109,151

470,910,031

489,388,995

Wisconsin

1,114,018,800

1,473,947,300

1,509,157,200

1,573,280,133

Wyoming

352,669,707

382,164,128

373,759,707

384,799,235

77,430,998,570

86,507,974,609

88,245,156,259

91,487,965,234

Utah

West Virginia

Total, 50 states

Source: Grapevine Data 2020

The aim of this study is to address the limitations in the above literature by focusing
on a single state, South Carolina in this case, and exploring the variation across research
universities and regional comprehensive institutions by using a time-series, or longitudinal
analysis. This is a methodology suitable for this research because of both the nature of the
hypotheses and the methodological advantages of this approach. This study analyzes a 28year, time-series panel of budget data from 1990 to 2018. The data consists Total state
revenue (in thousands), Total state expenditure (in thousands), Higher-education
appropriations, Primary- and secondary-education expenditure (in thousands) and FTE
Enrollment (Full-time enrollment).
The variations in legislator and governor support, and budget competition factors
for higher education appropriations, have implications for the cost and quality of higher
education, along with accessibility issues for lower-income Americans (Weerts, & Ronca,
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2006). This research will address this limitation by examining some of the potential
differences of other states’ spending priorities. to help understand variations in state
spending for higher education using data from South Carolina.

4.2

Research Questions
The literature outlined previously provides the beginning for understanding the

factors that affect appropriations for higher education in the state of South Carolina. The
methodology used in this study was designed to identify which of these factors are most
influential factors in explaining the differences in support for research and public fouryear institution in the state of South Carolina between 1990 and 2018. Utilizing descriptive
statistics this study examined higher education appropriation, finding variations within and
across these years for different higher education sectors. In addition, there are variations in
the governor’s recommendations and legislative appropriations, and there is an overall
decline in South Carolina higher education appropriations.
This study will examine the differences in state funding of merit/need-based
scholarship, and higher education allocations for the period 1990 to 2018. Further, it will
investigate if there is budget competition between spending on merit/need-based funding
and appropriation. Several factors have been found to explain the nationwide decline in
state support for public colleges and universities. Some of these factors have been grouped
into political, economic, and demographic factors, each playing a role in state
appropriation.
Based on the factors identified from a study of the literature, fiscal (budget)
competition for state higher education budgets is a factor deserving additional examination
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in the research. A better understanding of the differences in higher education
funding and other state spending priorities will increase our understanding of the variations
in state funding for higher education. Additionally, the variations in legislative and
gubernatorial support for higher education appropriation impact tuition, accessibility to
disadvantaged Americans, and the quality of public higher education. While descriptive
statistics show both variation and a decline in state support for higher education, the reasons
and the potential causes for variations within and across years are much less understood;
investigating these is the focus of this research.
More specifically, the research questions are as follows:
Primary Research Question 1: How does state spending on Medicaid and other areas
(K-12 Education, Corrections, Public Safety and Human and Health Services) of state
spending affect higher education funding?
1A. Is an increase in state spending on Medicaid and other areas negatively
associated with state funding of higher education?
Primary Research Question 2: What explains variation in state funding for higher
education in a state?
2A. Are differences in state funding for higher education in a state explained
by competing factors in the state budget?
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Primary Research Question 3: What are the budget determinants for merit-based and
need-based scholarships?

4.3

Literature Review
Rational decision-making theory assume that human beings use cues such as

heuristics to aid their calculations when choosing between effective choices that will attain
efficient outcome (Ghanti, 2019). These individuals make decisions based on available
information to maximize their advantage and achieve a reasonable outcome. Economic
scholars believe that the elements of rational choice theory can be used to solve policy
problems. However, behavioral economist argue against rational theory that due to limited
computational capacity, human beings are unable to entirely make absolute decision when
they are faced with certain problems. Bounded rationality theory argues that the best
decisions are made when alternative choices are evaluated (Cyert & March 1963).
Rational decision-making is appropriate for analyzing determinants of state
appropriations for higher education because of empirical predictions from various choice
of problems (objectives and constraints) that the lawmakers face when making decision on
expenditure and revenue. The choice to appropriate fund for higher education depends on
various factors such as economic, political and social factors. Weerts (2008) made it clear
that state culture and political factors are important factors in explaining and describing
state spending for research institution. The environmental factors affecting state budget
process for higher education includes political, economic, and demographic factors. These
factors explains, the variation in states appropriation for higher education among the states,
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but the factors did not explain all the differences that occur in state appropriation for higher
education among states.
Dar (2012) studied the political patterns of higher education policy. The result
provide evidence that is consistent with report of other scholars that politics play a major
factor in funding of higher education. Due to multidimensional variables and the nature of
higher education policy, the manner in which politics play role is conditional. Furthermore,
Dar concluded that state spending in other priority areas competes with higher education
appropriation.
Tandberg ( 2010, 2009) also reveal that the environmental factors affecting state
spending for higher education includes: political, economic and demographic factors. The
legislature and governor are the ultimate players in the budget creation process and these
actors determine appropriation for higher education. The variations in constitutional power
among states does not allow researchers to make general assumption about the power of
governors across states. However, (Weerts & Ronca, 2006) argues that the governor's role
in higher education has become extremely important in the last two decades.
The political culture of state has been found to affect budget actors in the budgeting
process. Relationship have also been found between state’s residence value for education
and how the lawmakers value education. McLendon et al. (2009)examined the nature of
political factors affecting funding for higher education. Their analysis emphasized that
political influences play a critical role in higher education budget. Political factors include
gubernatorial influence, legislative influence, and the influence of various interest groups
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and citizens. The analysis concluded that legislative professionalism is related to
funding higher education. The higher the greater analytical ability the state acquire, the
more the legislature will invest in higher education.
Several studies have examined the impact of scholarships and other types of
financial aid on the relationship to state appropriations.(Dynarsk et. al 2000). Dynarski and
Cornwell (2000), Mustard and Sridhar (2001) found that the HOPE scholarship program
increased enrollment rates, while other studies have examined the effect of the Georgia
HOPE scholarship on high school achievement (Henry and Rubenstein 2000.
To provide a better understanding of how economic factors affect higher education
funding. Economic variables impacting education funding include fiscal condition of state,
taxes, state revenue and expenditure. In a study conducted by Delaney and Doyle (2011),
changes in state per capita personal income were found to be positively associated with
changes in state appropriation for higher education. The study also included in state GDP
to reflect the overall size of the economy, but no significant relationships were found
between changes in state GDP and changes in state appropriations for higher education in
any of the model.
There have been mixed findings on the influence of per capita income on state
appropriations for higher education. The difference occurs in the type of independent
variable that is used to predict appropriation for higher education. For example, Fabricant
(1952) found that per capita income within a state was the main determinant of the level of
the state government's expenditures while Coughlin and Erekson (1986) found that per
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capita income within a state had no significant effect on state aid per student at
major research institutions.
Titus (2009) study the relationship between tuition and appropriation in community
colleges and public four-year university. The result concluded that changes in tuition at
community college and public four-year institution influenced each other. The findings of
Titus study also reveal a relationship between tuition and decline in education assistance
at public four-year colleges and universities. A delay in response of policy makers to
respond to education policy could mean increase in tuition public universities. Deming and
Walters (2017) study also found that state appropriations for education is related to tuition
rates.
Tuition policies and student financial aid programs have been used as a tool to
address the issue of higher education affordability. (Titus 2009)research have shown that
there is a relationship between increase in number of scholarships awarded a degree
completion rate. Availability of scholarship programs means the out of pocket expenses by
folks who come from low income households would be reduced. Reduction in tuition could
encourage more low income to attend college and at the same time complete their degree
on time. Other studies(Perna & Titus, 2004; Titus, 2006 ) suggest that state need-based
aid graduation from four-year colleges positively influences enrollment in private higher
education institutions. In contrast, Rizzo (2006) study revealed that, non-need financial
aid is positively related to per capita higher education appropriations.
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Tandberg (2009) provide evidence of the critical role of politics play on state fiscal
policy in relation to higher education. The study indicates that lobbying matters and it
provide a great benefit for higher education if they can exert more effort. Tandberg study
also reveals that the higher education appropriations process is related to politics or other
budgetary forces. Tandberg further cleared that higher education is susceptible to political
influences. Furthermore, the study suggest that there is implication of higher education
choosing to be (rewarded) or not involved (loose) in

state political and budgetary

processes.
Levy and Zumeta (2011) found evidence to support the relationship that exist
between state funding for higher education and economic factors. The decline in economy
has been found to exert pressure on other state spending areas such as Medicaid and public
safety (Levy and Zumeta 2011). Heck et al. (2014) and Toutkoushian et al. (1998) found
a relationship to exist between decrease in unemployment rates and higher spending on
higher education. In contrast, (McLendon et al. 2009; Tandberg 2010) found a negative
relationship between increase in unemployment rate and higher education funding.
Delaney (2011), suggest that the health of state economy explains the level of
support for higher education. educational attainment levels. Layzell & Lyddon (1990)
suggest that higher unemployment growth in a state or decreases in state tax revenue
explains why lawmakers use reduction in higher education funding as a trade off when
state is experiencing budget deficit.
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Higher education research scholars who focus on Higher education finance and
budget processes explore a range of critical questions within the broader policy
environment. For example, how lawmakers formulates policy priorities for higher
education

and what factors influence these decisions are critical elements for

understanding budgeting decisions for higher education. The development of education
budgets is also impacted by various institutional actors.
Moreover, understanding how higher education

interact with the legislative

environment and at what stage agencies exert the most influence over the budget process
adds clarity to the nature of the policy process. In addition, we might consider what political
conditions influence expansion of higher education appropriation. These environmental
factors, which are usually outside the higher education environment , also affect post
secondary schools and its decisions as universities within the same or different policy
arenas compete with one another for limited resources; for example, the higher education
budget competes with Medicaid and other social welfare agencies.
Multiple factors or forces have been identified as being involved in shaping public
policies, one example being how internal administrative conditions affect the increase or
reduction of higher education budget and, presumably, its activities. While the research
reported here cannot address all these questions, it will examine a number of these issues
to improve our understanding of the complicated factors that influence higher education
budget priorities, goal setting and processes.
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Recently, several factors have contributed to affect state budget process and
decisions made by legislatures. Specifically, Thurmaier & Willoughby (2001) recognized
that sudden change in population growth and market volatility have increasingly burdened
decision makers in state government . The federal government’s abdication of program
responsibility to the state has led to the implementation of a wide range of policies by the
latter. Increase in state expenditure as a result of Medicaid program mandated by federal
government have let state to use strategies to balance the condition of state finance. One of
such strategy is called the balance wheel where by state spending such as education will be
reduced when state experience fiscal deficit and vice versa.
The changes in budget environment in the 1960s and 1990s has made the budget
strategies and approach used by agencies in the state and federal to change as well. Budget
actors have experienced some difficulties in the budget process. Can this be true for higher
education institutions?

Rubin (1968) suggests that the internal and external factors

affecting budget environments have placed a great effect on budgetary decision-making,
an analysis that appears to valid when considering the when considering the whole
endowment in which budget decision is made Lowery et al (1983).
During the budget process, a state develop plans on which priorities they need to
allocate taxpayers money. Thus, the process used to develop the state budget has important
implications on the outcome, with the mandates of and restrictions on the various players
influencing each state’s ability to address policy and funding objectives within the budget.
As the budget process in each state highlights key issues, it demonstrates the diversity in
state budgeting practices (NASBO, 2008). In addition, while allocating limited resources
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among competing interests is inherently difficult, these decisions are also vitally
important to the fiscal health and future sustainability of individual communities within the
state. However, most of the members of community pay little attention to the budget.
Addressing this issue by studying the impact of the budget process on a community will
assist policymakers in effective allocation of resources. Further, public officials’ awareness
have been increased with issues associated with budgetary recommendation and
appropriation. Despite these challenges, there is little research about the state budgetary
process that focuses on decision makers below the level of higher education authorities.
Tandberg (2009) found a relationship between education and non education interest group
and funding for higher education appropriation. Tandberg (2009) concluded that higher
education interest group increase funding while non higher education interest group
decrease funding for higher education. In another study, Tandberg (2013) concluded that
state higher education may want to increase their effort in lobbying as this pays off in the
end.
Beginning in the 1990s, states began pushing for stronger governance of their
systems of higher education. The governance structure has continued to evolve due to
response to public interest such as improving higher education infrastructure and
educational equity ( Fulton 2019). Higher education governance structure have been found
to be a critical factor in increasing funding for higher education. The legal structure of
higher education governance is different for each state. Some have systemwide co
ordinating or governing board and others may also have a statewide administrative agency.
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There are twenty states with single Statewide Coordinating Board/ Agency while
states with Single, Statewide Governing Board includes eight (Fulton, 2019). States
established the legal authority of higher education boards and agencies through
constitution, state statutes. provisions; and, in a limited number of cases, charters or
executive orders (Fulton, 2019). In a review conducted by Education Commission of the
States (2019), they found that the majority of higher education boards are established
through state statutes. There are thirty-six states which South Carolina that established the
legal authority of higher education boards and agencies through statutory authority.
There is an evidence that consolidated governing board and lobbying the
legislature is positively related. Tandberg (2013) studied the conditioning role of state
higher education governance structures. While controlling for legislative control and
professionalism, the result of Tandberg analysis reveal a positive relationship between
larger concentration of higher education interest groups and general fund appropriations.
McLendon (2014) found that state funding for higher education, depends in part
on the degree of centralization that may be present in the state. McLendon found a negative
relationship between a highly centralized governance structure and increase in higher
education appropriation and decrease in spending on merit-based aid programs In another
study, McLendon (2006) found that states without consolidated governing boards were
more likely to adopt performance-funding policies, whereas states with consolidated
boards were more likely to adopt performance-budgeting policies. Performance-based
funding is a way of allocating funds for state’s higher education which is based on
performance measures such as number of degrees awarded and percentage of students
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that completes their degree instead of using enrollment as the only indicator of
allocating funds while performance budget is a tool to allocate funding based on functions,
activities purposes and objectives where the costs involved are indicated.
In another study, Lowry (2001) also mentioned that the dynamics of the variation
in higher education funding cut could be explained by the presence of higher education
governance structure. Lowry concluded that governance structure affect the behavior of
budget official in universities. Nicholson-Crotty et al. (2003) and McLendon et al. (2001)
studied the relationship between higher education policy and governance structure but
there appears to be a mixed result. McLendon et al. (2001) found that political factors
influence higher education appropriation more than governance structure. In contrast
Nicholson-Crotty et al. ( 2003) found that governance structure matters and it mediates the
relationship between higher education funding and political factors. Even with mixed
results, state legislatures and governors often have the power to coordinate affairs of any
higher education boards since they often appoint board membership. As such, these boards
cannot be separated from the influence of state politics
In response to rising tuition costs and in light of the continuing decrease in
budgetary support from the state, South Carolina offers three scholarships and one grant
for its in-state students. These are described below. The information below was derived
from (SC Commission on Higher Education Statistical Abstract 2018).
The LIFE Scholarship Program is a merit-based scholarship established in 1998.
This scholarship is awarded annually to eligible students attending two- and four-year
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institutions in the state. Scholarship funds are awarded half in the fall term and half in the
spring and must be applied toward the cost of attendance (SC Commission on Higher
Education Statistical Abstract 2018).

Eligible institutions include: Four-Year Public

Senior Institutions, Two-Year USC Regional Campuses, Four-Year Independent Senior
Institutions and Two-Year Independent Institution
The Palmetto Fellows Scholarship is a merit-based program established in 1988
to recognize the most academically talented high school seniors and encourage these
students to attend college in the State. The Palmetto Fellows Scholarship Program is
administered by the South Carolina Commission on Higher Education. Palmetto Fellows
may receive up to $6,700 their freshman year and up to $7,500 for their sophomore, junior
and senior years. Half of the scholarship is awarded in the fall term and half in the spring
term. The Scholarship must be applied directly toward the cost of attendance, less any
other gift aid received. Assuming continued eligibility, Palmetto Fellows may receive
scholarship funding for a maximum of eight full‑time terms of study toward their first
bachelor’s degree at an eligible four-year institution in South Carolina.
The Palmetto Fellows Scholarship Enhancement was established in 2007 to
increase the number of students who major in mathematics and science in South Carolina.
Eligible students may receive up to $10,000 (combined funds from the Palmetto Fellows
Scholarship and the Scholarship Enhancement) per year beginning with their
second/sophomore year of college enrollment.

Students may receive Enhancement

funding for a maximum of six full-time terms of study toward their first bachelor's degree
at an eligible four-year institution (Public and independent) in South Carolina.
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The SC HOPE Scholarship is a merit-based scholarship program established under
the 2001 South Carolina Education Lottery Act and implemented in Fall 2002. The
scholarship was created to provide funding for students attending an eligible four-year
institution in South Carolina who did not qualify for the LIFE or Palmetto Fellows
Scholarships. Students may receive up to $2,500 plus a $300 book allowance (total award
not to exceed $2,800) for the first two consecutive terms of college enrollment. Scholarship
funds are applied toward the cost of attendance. To qualify, first-time entering freshman
must have earned a minimum 3.0 cumulative GPA based on the South Carolina Uniform
Grading Policy (UGP) at time of high school graduation. Funding for this program is
dependent upon lottery proceeds. South Carolina HOPE Scholarship recipients cannot be
recipients of the LIFE Scholarship, Palmetto Fellows Scholarship, or Lottery Tuition
Assistance in the same academic year (SC Commission on Higher Education Statistical
Abstract 2018).
In addition to these, South Carolina offers a Need-based Grant to eligible degreeseeking students attending public institutions. These students may receive up to $2,500
annually if enrolled full-time and up to $1,250 annually if enrolled part-time for up to two
academic terms each academic year, awarded in any combination of fall, spring, or summer
terms. The Need-based Grant is an annual award that must be applied toward the cost of
attendance and disbursed half in the first semester and half in the second semester (SC
Commission on Higher Education Statistical Abstract 2018).
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4.4

Contribution of This Study
The budget literature argues that budget competition is important for understanding

the tradeoffs in state higher education appropriation (Tandberg, 2010; Koshal, & Koshal,
2000). This study focuses on fiscal-budget competition factors, extending the work cited
here using a South Carolina institution as the unit of analysis. An increase in our
understanding of budget competition may enhance our understanding of the dramatic
reduction in state funding of higher education. This study investigates the variation in state
spending for research and public institution. This new perspective will give us a better
understanding of this important topic.
The variations in legislator and governor support for higher education
appropriations have implications on the cost of college, accessibility for lower-income
Americans, and the quality of public higher education (Weerts, & Ronca, 2006). As such,
this research will examine the variations in budget competition to help us understand the
variations in state support for higher education using data from South Carolina.

4.5

Methodology
This study used a time-series, or longitudinal analysis, a methodology suitable for

this research because of both the nature of the hypotheses and the methodological
advantages of this approach. It is assumed that the variables affecting higher education
institutions vary systematically with the environmental conditions, including political and
economic conditions, rather than remaining stable over time. While cross sectional analysis
is useful for controlling the effects of the organizational environment, it is not appropriate
for investigating the effects of the environment on public policy. One method for studying
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the effects of certain environmental conditions is by using time-series data. The
methodological advantages of time-series analysis have been widely discussed
(Bohrnstedt, 1969). In addition to permitting a study of environmental effects, this type of
analysis can help to separate systematic error from random error in prediction equations
(Coleman, 1968; Heise, 1970). Thus, it allows for measuring the proper time lags between
variables that do not affect each other instantaneously (Bohrnstedt, 1969), while providing
information on the directionality of effects between variables. (Bohrnstedt, 1969; Heise,
1970). According to Campbell and Stanley (I963), a longitudinal design can be used as a
quasi-experimental design that is subject to fewer problems than a static group comparison.
This advantage is especially important for studying the results of policy action when it is
not possible to set up an experimental design.
Longitudinal information can also be used to relate historical analysis to
quantitative studies. However, one problem with time-series analysis is that the data
acquired are subject to an insoluble sampling problem. One can conduct a systematic
sample across time for finite time segments (such as every year for a 20-year period), but
cyclic phenomena may introduce systematic bias in the sample. Events unique to the time
segment sampled may also have a biasing effect (Wooldridge 7th edition). However, it is
impossible to conduct a probability sample of the universe across time since most data are
only reported annually and sometimes not at all. This limitation primarily affects the
external validity of a study, meaning the research reported here cannot be generalized about
all U.S. state agencies for all time but can generalize about the agencies under study for the
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period involved. Furthermore, it can continue collecting data for other agencies
and extend the generalizability of the findings to an indefinite (but not infinite) degree.
This study analyzes a 28-year, time-series panel of budget data from 1990 to 2018
and other state spending priorities such as:, K-12 Education, Medicaid Corrections, Public
Safety. The multivariate technique used in this study was multiple regression analysis;
Regression allows for the description of the amount of variance in the dependent variable
explained by the presence of two or more independent variables, with model results
presented as the variance in a dependent variable explained by a combination of the
independent variables. Regression models describes how a dependent variable is related
to two or more independent variables, and while causality is not sought here, regression is
more useful in predicting relationships than correlation analysis (Wonnacott and
Wonnacott, 1970). Regression and correlation are closely related mathematically.
However, multicollinearity is a potential problem when using multiple regression analysis
when the independent variables are correlated, i.e., there is an inability to tell how much
variance in the dependent variable is due to any one independent variable. This problem is
exacerbated as the independent variables become more highly correlated.
.

Standardization of variables is critical for model interpretation. Long (1997)

discuss alternative ways of standardizing variables that may help with interpretation. There
are a number of different alternatives for standardization, which Long (1997) discuss at
length. With full standardization, both the X and the Y* variables are standardized to have
a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. An intermediate approach is to standardize only
the X variables. However, by standardizing only the Xs, we can see the relative importance
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of the Xs. The usual argument for using standardized coefficients is that they
provide a means for comparing the effects of variables measured in different metrics. For
this analysis we utilize Long (1997) spostado programs to standardize coefficients and
ensure that model coefficients allow for a more consistent interpretation. It is important to
be aware that, in OLS, while full standardization (both the X and the Y* variables are
standardized to have a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1) is frequently done, this
study used the X-Standardization (independent variables) alone as this is enough to achieve
the goal of comparing the effects of Xs measured in different metrics, and may be easier to
interpret since Y is left in its original metric (King 2007).
This research focuses analyzing state spending in higher education and other state
priorities. The research also attempt to find the relationship between scholarship programs
and education appropriation. And lastly, to determine the factors affecting scholarship
programs. Most of the higher education data used in this study were graciously shared by
the SC Commission of Higher Education. Over the

time period of the study, this

Commission published data on Full-Time Enrollment (FTE), degrees awarded and tuition.
Dependent variables
This study models are as follows: state spending on merit-based aid, state spending
on need-based aid and state appropriation to higher education. The dataset in this study is
comprised of a collection of variables describing the environment, political and economic
characteristics of the state of South Carolina for the years 1990 to 2018. The data were
drawn from a variety of sources, which are described in detail in Appendix 1. Descriptive
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statistics for each variable are presented in Table 1. State appropriations for higher
education, state spending on need-based aid and state spending on merit-based aid serve as
the dependent variables for this analysis.
Independent Variables
Data on total state revenues, which measure the size of the state's budget, came
from the South Carolina state appropriation book. This study derived data for a number of
the independent variables from a variety of reliable sources, including the SC Commission
on Higher Education and the South Carolina higher education tuition grant Commission.
Data for the indicators of state finance came from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, the
Bureau of Labor Statistics, and the U.S. Census Bureau.
The political variables include measures of party, legislative control, status of the
governor’s party in the legislative branch and the governor’s party. The first measure in
this cluster of variables was the proportion of Republicans and Democrats who held seats
in both state houses’; thereby underscoring that party control, varied throughout the time
period.

The governor’s political party (1. Governor is a Republican or Democratic

Governor 2. status of governor’s party. )
The economic/fiscal capacity of the state was measured using per capita income.
These data, which were a measure of the income of the residents of SC, came from the U.S.
Bureau of Economic Analysis. To test the policy attributes of a state's postsecondary
education system, the study included measures of a cluster of variables related to higher
education, including the number of full-time enrollments in different types of higher
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education institutions, tuition and the number of degrees awarded. This study
controlled for the enrollment of students in two different sectors: Research institutions and
public four-year institutions. These two were used because appropriation is not only based
on the overall number of data availability. The dataset includes information for SC state
institutions, research and public four-year institutions from 1990 to 2018, necessitating the
use of methods appropriate for panel data. All of the methods described in this section are
intended to recover unbiased parameter estimates, given the challenges of working with
panel or time-series cross sectional (TSCS) data.
The following table, 4.2, describes each variable, its definition and the source of
the variable.
Table 4.2. Definitions and Sources of the Variables
Variable

Description

Source

Total state revenue (in
thousands)

Sum of all taxes and other sources of
incomegenerated by a state in a year.

SC Revenue and Fiscal Affairs
Historical Report and
Appropriation Acts

Total state expenditure
(in thousands)

Sum of all expenses generated in a state
in a year.

SC Revenue and Fiscal Affairs
Historical Report and
Appropriation Acts

Higher-education
appropriations

state tax appropriations for higher
SC Revenue and Fiscal Affairs
education): The aggregate of higher
Historical Report and
education appropriations, calculated as
Appropriation Acts
the sum of all higher education funding in
the state in a year. I also calculated them
by institution.

Primary- and secondary- The total appropriation for K-12
education expenditure (in education.
thousands)

SC Revenue and Fiscal Affairs
Historical Report and
Appropriation Acts

FTE Enrollment (Fulltime equivalent
enrollment in public
institutions)

South Carolina Higher
Education Statistical Abstract
(https://www.che.sc.gov)

Calculated as fifteen (15) credit hours per
semester for an undergraduate student,
twelve (12) credit hours per semester for
a graduate student.
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Variable

Description

Source

SC HOPE Scholarship

The SC HOPE Scholarship is a meritbased scholarship established under the
2001 SC Education Lottery Act and
implemented in Fall 2002.

SC Revenue and Fiscal Affairs
and Education Lottery
Appropriations Report

The Palmetto Fellows
Scholarship

The Palmetto Fellows Scholarship is a
SC Revenue and Fiscal Affairs
merit-based scholarship established in
and Education Lottery
1988 to recognize and encourage the most Appropriations Report
academically talented high school seniors
to attend college in the state.

The Legislative
Incentives for Future
Excellence (LIFE)
Scholarship

The Legislative Incentives for Future
SC Revenue and Fiscal Affairs
Excellence (LIFE) Scholarship Program
and Education Lottery
is a merit-based scholarship established in Appropriations Report
1998. This scholarship is awarded
annually to eligible students attending
two- and four-year institutions in the
state. The scholarship total is calculated
as the portion of the State General Funds
generated from Education Lottery
revenues.

Tuition grants

Tuition grants are funded by the State
General Funds and Education Lottery
revenues. This program is managed by
the SC Tuition Grants Commission and
provides need-based grants to qualified
students attending SC’s independent
colleges and universities.

Need-Based Program
Public

The funds appropriated to students from
SC Revenue and Fiscal Affairs
low-income families attending Private
and Education Lottery
universities and colleges. The need-based Appropriations Report
grant total is calculated as a portion from
the State General Fund, a portion from
the Barnwell revenues, a portion from the
Education Lottery, and a portion from
other non-recurring fund

State Medicaid
expenditure

The total sum of money spent on
Medicaid in a year.

SC Revenue and Fiscal Affairs
and Education Lottery
Appropriations Report

Medicaid Recipient

The total number of Medicaid recipients
in a year.

SC Revenue and Fiscal Affairs
and Education Lottery
Appropriations Report
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SC Revenue and Fiscal Affairs
and Education Lottery
Appropriations Report

Variable

Description

Source

Tuition

Cost of tuition and required fees.

SC Revenue and Fiscal Affairs
and Education Lottery
Appropriations Report

Population

Total number of people in the state in a
year.

Bureau of Economic Analysis

State unemployment rate

Calculated annually as a percentage.

U.S. Department of Commerce/
Bureau of Economic Analysis/
Regional Income Division

Political Environment

The first measure in this cluster of
variables was the proportion of
Republicans and Democrats who held
seats in both state houses’; thereby
underscoring that party control, varied
throughout the time period. The
governor’s political party (i.e., a dummy
variable indicating a Republican or
Democratic governor) and party strength
in the state legislature (i.e., share of the
legislature that is Republican or
Democrat) measure the influence of
partisanship.

Council of State Governors

4.6

Results and Findings

Results for determinants of higher education appropriation
Table 4.3 below shows the descriptive results for the variables of interest in this
study, and Table 4.4 provides the results from the OLS regression models, examining the
relationship between higher education state appropriations and state financial aid; state
spending for Medicaid and other areas; and higher education characteristics at 4-year
public universities, research institutions, and technical colleges. This study is empirically
account for variables to explain higher education funding at three levels of analysis. The
research further distills and discusses the primary findings with respect to the sources of
influence on funding for higher education from 1990 through 2018.
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Table 4.5 shows the results for models examining the relationship between higher
education state appropriations, state financial aid, state spending on Medicaid, state
spending on other areas and higher education characteristics at 4-year public universities,
and Table 4.6 shows the results for models examining the relationship between higher
education state appropriations, state financial aid, state spending on Medicaid, state
spending on other areas and higher education characteristics at research institutions.
Finally, Tables 4.7 and 4.8 present the results addressing Research Question 3 on the
determinants of merit-based and need-based scholarships.
Table 4.3. Descriptive results for the variables of interest in this study
Variable

Obs

Mean

Year

116

2004

8.402898

1990

2018

Full-time enrollment

98

65220.69

45584.56

32688

205080

Degrees awarded

30

7266.967

2295.126

3810

10560

Tuition

71

5542.437

3529.123

672

13087

State appropriation

104

8.73E+09

4.92E+10

9.75E+07

4.40E+11

Need-based public

84

1.80E+07

4924535

9492300

2.54E+07

Life Program

84

1.30E+08

6.20E+07

0

2.22E+08

Palmetto Fellow

82

3.36E+07

1.92E+07

63927.3

6.20E+07

Hope Program

76

5497876

3505614

0

1.03E+07

Education lottery

64

2.91E+08

7.23E+07

8.07E+07

4.07E+08

State population

116

4261499

471841.5

3501155

5021410

Personal inc. (000)

108

1.17E+08

4.21E+07

5.61E+07

1.96E+08

Per capita income

108

27148

7091.45

16018

39517

Dept of Educ. app.

103

1.86E+09

4.68E+08

1.14E+09

2.91E+09

Dept of Educ. exp.

92

1.96E+09

4.23E+08

1.25E+09

2.91E+09

Total state revenue

108

5.35E+09

1.14E+09

3.31E+09

7.58E+09
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Std. Dev.

Min

Max

Variable

Obs

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

State total revenue

96

5.40E+09

1.15E+09

2.16E+09

7.65E+09

State total app

96

5.68E+09

1.04E+09

3.93E+09

7.95E+09

Health and Soc. rehab app.

92

1.37E+09

3.68E+08

8.49E+08

2.13E+09

Health and soc. rehab exp.

68

1.47E+09

3.14E+08

1.05E+09

2.03E+09

Correction app.

88

4.32E+08

6.59E+07

3.33E+08

5.71E+08

Correction exp.

68

4.45E+08

5.65E+07

3.63E+08

5.49E+08

State-wide medical
spending

84

4.31E+09

1.70E+09

6017874

7.10E+09

Need-based public

56

987183.6

109313.7

864565

1213606

Medicaid as a % of pop.

56

21.36857

1.344975

19.61

24.17

104

5.98E+08

1.06E+08

4.11E+08

7.81E+08

Medicaid as share of state
revenue

64

0.0990116

0.0086361

0.0810484

0.112017

Medicaid recipient

57

9.350877

4.185396

1

16

Higher Ed app.

Table 4.4 below presents the results for Primary Research Question 1: How does
state spending on Medicaid and other areas (Corrections, Public Safety, Health and Human
Services and K12 Education) of state spending affect higher education funding? First, this
study finds some degree of explanatory power in each of the categories of hypothesized
influences, although, financial aid, higher education climate, and certain policy attributes
of the state appear to be particularly important. The result of the analysis in table 4.4 detect
statistically significant relationships (p < .05) between higher education appropriation and
14 of the 25 variables that were tested.
As illustrated in table 4.4, the share of funding that higher education receives is not
reduced when all categories of Medicaid receive increased funding with some exception:
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Medicaid recipient as a percentage of population and statewide Medicaid
expenditure are the only categories that dampen higher education funding as this category
increases. Other categories of state spending on Medicaid as a share of state revenue and
the number of Medicaid recipients indicate an increase in spending for higher education.
The results in Table 4.4 also show that when the education budget for K-12 increases,
funding for higher education does decrease. The educational expenditures variable has a
beta coefficient of -3.02E-01, which suggests that for each additional dollar spent on K-12
education, state higher education appropriation will decrease approximately by $302 in
annual state appropriations. This finding is not surprising since K-12 education is often
viewed as competing directly with higher education for state tax dollars. The Health and
Human Service variable has a beta coefficient of -1.67E-01. This suggests that for each
additional dollar spent on Health and Human Service, state higher education appropriation
can expect to see a decrease of approximately $167 in annual state appropriations. This
finding is supported by evidence of a "crowding out" effect in state funding for higher
education, with increased state investments in Health and Human services and K-12
Education appearing to displace funding for higher education.
Total state tax revenue is statistically signiﬁcant with model results presented in
Table 4.4. The coefficient on tax revenue reveals that when a state experiences rapid
annual growth in total tax revenue, policymakers face less pressure to reduce spending for
higher education. Rizzo (2006) “emphasized that public universities are accustomed to
their state funding being at the mercy of economic cycles. In bad budget times, higher
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education typically bears a disproportionate burden of state funding cuts, with the
full expectation that it will be compensated during a recovery” (Rizzo 2006, p.1).
It is often expected that higher educational attainment and just generally a larger
population in a state would result in a more supportive environment for financing higher
education. However, this relationship is more complex than it appears. (Layzell & Lyddon,
1990) emphasized that state population, college age population, and school enrolment
affects appropriation for higher education..
The composition of the population in a state is also a factor that influences levels
of appropriations for colleges and universities. Amy (2017) asserts that a larger elderly
population (age 65+) is one of the state priorities that requires attention of legislatures.
Attention is given to this age group than college age population. as a result, the expenses
of Medicaid is incurred on elderly population. This state priority spending could lead to
trade-off in other state spending areas when state experience budget deficit.
Tandberg (2009) confirm a negative relationship between college-age residents
and education appropriation. This research finds a negative and statistically significant
relationship between South Carolina’s population aged 18-24 and those 65 and older and
higher education appropriations. These results support previous research but also highlight
important areas of future research around population policy preferences. . In addition to the
age of the population, other demographic factors such as the increase in the number of low
income or African American students, influence appropriation for higher education as state
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governments attempt to meet the needs of diverse state populations (Levy and
Zumeta 2011; Titus 2009).
The results in table 4.4 shows that the Palmetto Fellows Program appears to
influence state spending on education negatively.

This analysis indicates distinct

connections between the state policy climate and public spending on higher education.
Degrees awarded are not associated with lower levels of state appropriations. Some may
assume that higher tuition should be associated with higher education funding. This study
anticipated that higher tuition prices would likely to lead to cuts in higher education
funding. The tuition variable is negatively signiﬁcance in the Table 4.4 model. Past
research also suggests that tuition increases is related to linked to per-student
appropriations. Titus (2009) study the relationship between tuition and appropriation in
community colleges and public four-year university. The result concluded that changes in
tuition at community college and public four-year institution influenced each other. The
findings of Titus study also reveal a relationship between tuition and decline in education
assistance at public four-year colleges and universities.
The result in table 4.4 further demonstrates that an increase in full-time enrollment
influences higher education negatively. Medicaid spending as a percentage of

the

population results in a decrease in funding for higher education, but other categories of
Medicaid spending such as Medicaid as a share of state revenue and number of Medicaid
recipients have a positive effect on higher education appropriation. These findings also
indicate that the Education Lottery does not have a significant relationship with higher
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education funding, perhaps suggesting that the proceeds from this lottery mostly
fund need-based scholarships.
Table 4.4. Determinants of Higher Education Appropriation (Aggregate Result: All State
Institutions Combined)
p-value

bStdXY

SDofX

Coefficient

Full-time enrollment

0.024

-5.20E+07

8058.653

-6.45E+03

Degrees awarded

0.883

-3.30E+06

3201.695

-1.03E+03

Tuition

0.000

-4.10E+07

3153.188

-1.30E+04

Palmetto Fellows Program

0.000

-2.30E+08

1.60E+07

-1.44E+01

Education lottery deposit

0.123

2.10E+07

7.20E+07

2.92E-01

Hope Program

0.550

4.40E+06

1.70E+06

2.59E+00

Life Program

0.000

5.20E+07

4.998

1.04E+07

Need Based public

0.001

6.60E+07

4.30E+06

1.53E+01

Need Based private

0.000

5.40E+07

4.871

1.11E+07

Population 18 to 24

0.034

-6.20E+07

3.10E+04

-2.00E+03

Population 65

0.039

-1.40E+07

5.70E+04

-2.46E+02

Per capita personal income

0.178

2.10E+07

3105.033

6.76E+03

Medicaid as share of state rev

0.000

6.50E+07

0.009

7.22E+09

Statewide Medicaid Expenditures

0.459

-6.80E+06

1.60E+09

-4.25E-03

Medicaid as % of Pop

0.000

-1.20E+08

1.177

-1.02E+08

Medicaid Recipient

0.014

3.40E+07

4.031

8.43E+06

Technical and Comprehensive
Education

0.000

5.00E+07

2.00E+07

2.50E+00

Social Services

0.723

2.30E+06

1.80E+07

1.28E-01

Higher Education Tuition Grant

0.420

-1.40E+07

2.60E+06

-5.38E+00

Public Safety

0.140

1.60E+07

3.80E+07

4.21E-01

Mental Health

0.000

7.40E+07

2.20E+07

3.36E+00

Health and Human Services

0.011

-5.50E+07

3.30E+08

-1.67E-01

Department of Education

0.000

-1.30E+08

4.30E+08

-3.02E-01

Corrections

0.093

2.50E+07

4.90E+07

5.10E-01

CHE

0.002

2.10E+07

4.30E+07

4.88E-01
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p-value

bStdXY

SDofX

Coefficient

EIA

0.000

1.00E+08

1.10E+08

9.09E-01

Total State Revenue

0.000

-1.90E+08

9.30E+08

-2.04E-01

State Total Expenditure

0.000

1.90E+08

9.50E+08

2.00E-01

State Total Appropriation

0.139

-4.80E+07

9.50E+08

-5.05E-02

* Significant at less than .01, ** Significant at less than .05

Tables 4.5 and 4.6 below present the results for Research Question 2: What explains
variation in state funding for research institution (Clemson and USC Columbia) and 4year public universities ( The Citadel, Coastal Carolina, College of Charleston, Francis
Marion, Lander, SC State, USC Aiken, USC Beaufort, USC Upstate, Winthrop) in the state
of South Carolina. The findings show that state spending for research institutions appears
to be influenced by a variety of state-level conditions, economic variables and the higher
education climate, which are distinct from conditions that influence public four-year
institutions. This analysis found statistically significant effects for state spending for these
institutional variables studied; however, the magnitude of those effects were in an opposite
direction for public, four-year and research institutions.
While state spending in other critical areas such as Corrections, Health and
Medicaid compete for state spending for higher education appropriations, expenditure for
K-12 education serves as a determining factor for increases in higher education funding
for research institutions. The educational appropriation variable has a beta coefficient of
3.64E+02. This suggests that for each additional dollar spent on K-12 education, Public
Four-Year Institutions can expect to receive approximately $364 additional dollars in
annual state appropriations. This finding is somewhat surprising since K-12 education is
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often viewed as competing directly with higher education for state tax dollars. However,
the finding may also be interpreted to suggest that state support for Public Four-Year
Institutions is aligned with overall support for education in a state.
As seen in table 4.5, the share of funding that higher education receives is not
reduced when all categories of Medicaid shares receive increased. The Medicaid variables
is not significant with higher education appropriation. Again, this finding is surprising
given that health care is a growing expenditure that is putting a financial pressure on higher
education. Conventional wisdom is that the state budgeting process is viewed as a "zero
sum game" with winners and losers (Weerts 2006)
The tax revenue variable has (total state actual revenue) a non signiﬁcance level of
p < 0.774 in the model reported in Table 4.5. However, the result is not as expected that
when a state experiences rapid annual growth in total tax revenue, policymakers face less
pressure to reduce spending for higher education. While the expectation was that higher
educational attainment and just generally a larger population in a state would result in a
more supportive environment for financing higher education. The analysis here does not
find a significant effect of population on state spending for higher education in public four
years institution. McLendon et al. (2009) and Tandberg (2009), found a negative
relationship between college-age residents and education appropriation. The composition
of the population in a state is also a factor that influences levels of appropriations for
colleges and universities.
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Table 4.5 presents the results of determinants of higher education appropriation
results for public four-year institutions. Based on model results, it does not appear that the
Palmetto Fellows Program influences state spending on public four-year institutions.
However, this analysis indicates distinct connections between the state policy climate and
public spending on higher education. Degrees awarded are associated with higher levels of
state appropriations. A key variable for consideration in this model is the tuition variable;
it is not significant in this analysis. There is some anecdotal evidence that higher tuition
could resulting cuts to higher education funding. Past research also suggests that tuition
increases at four-year public institutions are inversely linked to per-student appropriations.
For example, Cheslock and Hughes (2011) and Titus (2009) have suggested that public
colleges respond to decreased state funding by raising tuition and fees.

High tuition,

however, may create unwanted noise by taxpayer and this may prompt the legislatures to
be sensitive to changes (Amy, 2017).
The result in table 4.5 further demonstrates that an increase in full-time enrollment
influences higher education negatively. Medicaid spending such as Medicaid as a share of
state revenue, Medicaid spending as a percentage of the population and number of
Medicaid recipients does not have effect on higher education appropriation. These findings
also indicate that the Education Lottery have a significant relationship with higher
education funding.
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Table 4.5. Determinants of Higher Education Appropriation (Results for Public FourYear Institutions)
p-value

bStdXY

SDofX

Coefficient

Full-time enrollment

0.000

-1.00E+11

5303.679

-1.89E+07

Degrees awarded

0.002

1.20E+11

1383.651

8.67E+07

Tuition

0.546

1.40E+10

2923.004

4.79E+06

Palmetto Fellows Program

0.087

-1.20E+11

1.60E+07

-7.50E+03

Education lottery Deposit

0.004

1.50E+11

7.40E+07

2.03E+03

Hope Program

0.417

1.80E+10

1.80E+06

1.00E+04

Life Program

0.004

1.10E+11

5.121

2.15E+10

Need Based Public

0.106

6.50E+10

4.99E+00

1.30E+10

Need Based Private

0.554

-3.50E+10

4.40E+06

-7.95E+03

Pop 18 to 24

0.970

1.60E+09

3.20E+04

5.00E+04

Pop 45 to 64

0.206

5.40E+10

5.30E+06

1.02E+04

Pop 65+

0.944

1.20E+09

5.80E+04

2.07E+04

Per Capita Personal Income

0.204

1.30E+10

3209.142

4.05E+06

Medicaid as Share of State Revenue

0.304

9.00E+09

0.009

1.00E+12

Statewide Medicaid Expenditures

0.603

2.90E+09

1.60E+09

1.81E+00

Medicaid as % of Pop

0.111

1.80E+10

1.217

1.48E+10

Medicaid Recipient

0.437

6.50E+09

4.166

1.56E+09

Technical and Comprehensive Education

0.027

-3.90E+10

2.10E+07

-1.86E+03

Social Services

0.421

9.20E+09

1.80E+07

5.11E+02

Higher Education Tuition Grant

0.026

7.70E+10

2.60E+06

2.96E+04

Public Safety

0.022

4.80E+10

3.80E+07

1.26E+03

Mental Health

0.617

1.10E+10

2.20E+07

5.00E+02

Health and Human Services

0.078

-7.20E+10

3.40E+08

-2.12E+02

Department of Education

0.013

1.60E+11

4.40E+08

3.64E+02

Corrections

0.078

-4.90E+10

5.00E+07

-9.80E+02

Higher Education State Appropriation

0.768

-6.20E+09

1.10E+08

-5.64E+01

CHE1

0.000

-7.40E+10

4.40E+07

-1.68E+03

EIA1

0.214

3.50E+10

1.20E+08

2.92E+02

Total state revenue

0.774

1.50E+10

9.40E+08

1.60E+01

State Total Expenditure

0.668

-2.50E+10

9.60E+08

-2.60E+01
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p-value
State Total Appropriation

0.327

bStdXY

SDofX

8.00E+10

9.60E+08

Coefficient
8.33E+01

* Significant at less than .01, ** Significant at less than .05

The state expenditure variable in Table 4.6 has a beta coefficient of 9.48E-02. This
suggests that for each additional dollar spent on K-12 education, Research Institution can
expect to receive approximately $948 additional dollars in annual state appropriations. This
finding is somewhat surprising since K-12 education is often viewed as competing directly
with higher education for state tax dollars. However, the finding may also be interpreted to
suggest that state support for Research Institution is aligned with overall support for
education in a state. This finding is supported by evidence of a “crowding out” effect in
state funding for higher education, with state investments in correction appearing to
displace funding in higher education.
The tax revenue variable has (total state actual revenue) is not signiﬁcance in the
model reported in Table 4.6. However, the result is not as expected that when a state
experiences rapid annual growth in total tax revenue, policymakers face less pressure to
reduce spending for higher education. While the expectation was that higher educational
attainment and just generally a larger population in a state would result in a more supportive
environment for financing higher education. The analysis here found a negative significant
effect of population on state spending for higher education in research instruction. The
relationship between state population (population 80+) and higher education funding is as
expected that the composition of a state’s population may impact higher education
spending negatively. This finding supports McLendon et al. (2009) and Tandberg (2009),
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who also found a negative relationship between college-age residents and education
appropriation.
Amy (2017) asserts that a larger elderly population (age 65+) signiﬁes more
demand for programs such as Medicare and state ofﬁcials may cater to this particular
constituency, placing higher education at greater risk for substantial reductions. In addition
to the age of the population, other demographic factors such as the growth of the number
of minority students, affect state budgeting for higher education as state governments
attempt to meet the needs of these populations (Levy and Zumeta 2011; Titus 2009).
The results in Table 4.6 shows that the Palmetto Fellows Program appears to
influence state spending on education negatively. This analysis indicates distinct
connections between the state policy climate and public spending on higher education.
Degrees awarded are not associated with higher levels of state appropriations. Some may
assume that higher tuition should be associated with higher education funding. This study
anticipated that higher tuition prices would likely to lead to cuts in higher education
funding. However, the tuition variable is positively signiﬁcance in the Table 4.6 model.
Past research also suggests that tuition increases at Research Institution are related to
education per student funding. For example, Cheslock and Hughes (2011) and Titus (2009)
have suggested that public colleges respond to decreased state funding by raising tuition
and fees. High tuition, however, may be unacceptable to the public and attract negative
attention to policymakers, who may be less willing to pass costs on to students (Amy,
2017).

148

The result in Table 4.6 further demonstrates that an increase in full-time enrollment
does not influence higher education. Medicaid spending such as Medicaid spending as a
percentage of the population have a negative effect on higher education appropriation.
These findings also indicate that the Education Lottery does not have a significant
relationship with higher education funding.
Table 4.6. Determinants of Higher Education Appropriation (Research Institution
Results)
p-value

bStdXY

SDofX

Coefficient

Full-time Enrollment

0.421

-3.00E+07

5096.451

-5.89E+03

Degrees Awarded

0.001

-8.80E+07

1078.706

-8.16E+04

Tuition

0.000

1.30E+08

3280.861

3.96E+04

Palmetto Fellows Program

0.000

-1.50E+08

1.60E+07

-9.38E+00

Education Lottery Deposit

0.099

2.20E+07

7.40E+07

2.97E-01

Hope Program

0.330

6.80E+06

1.80E+06

3.78E+00

Life Program

0.008

3.20E+07

5.121

6.25E+06

Need Based Public

0.021

3.20E+07

4.992

6.41E+06

Need Based Private

0.040

4.20E+07

4.40E+06

9.55E+00

Pop 45 to 64

0.564

4.00E+06

5.30E+06

7.55E-01

Pop 80

0.000

-6.10E+07

5.80E+04

-1.05E+03

Per Capita Personal Income

0.912

2.60E+06

3209.142

8.10E+02

Statewide Medicaid Expenditures

0.771

-4.10E+06

1.60E+09

-2.56E-03

Medicaid as % of pop

0.053

-6.00E+07

1.217

-4.93E+07

Medicaid Recipient

0.303

2.20E+07

4.166

5.28E+06

Technical and Comprehensive Education

0.042

2.60E+07

2.10E+07

1.24E+00

Social Services

0.622

-4.20E+06

1.80E+07

-2.33E-01

Higher Education Tuition Grant

0.577

1.30E+07

2.60E+06

5.00E+00

Public Safety

0.898

-1.80E+06

3.80E+07

-4.74E-02

Mental Health

0.550

-9.60E+06

2.20E+07

-4.36E-01

Health and Human Services

0.089

5.10E+07

3.40E+08

1.50E-01
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p-value

bStdXY

SDofX

Coefficient

Department of Education

0.566

2.30E+07

4.40E+08

5.23E-02

Corrections

0.002

-7.30E+07

5.00E+07

-1.46E+00

CHE

0.102

2.70E+07

1.10E+08

2.45E-01

EIA

0.149

1.30E+07

4.40E+07

2.95E-01

Technical and Comprehensive Education

0.445

1.60E+07

1.20E+08

1.33E-01

Total State Revenue

0.772

-1.20E+07

9.40E+08

-1.28E-02

State Total Expenditure

0.055

9.10E+07

9.60E+08

9.48E-02

State Total Appropriation

0.363

-5.70E+07

9.60E+08

-5.94E-02

* Significant at less than .01, ** Significant at less than .05

Tables 4.7 and 4.8 below present the results for Research Question 3: Determinants
of need-based and merit-based scholarships. These results suggest that state spending for
need-based programs is influenced by a variety of state-level conditions distinct from
conditions that influence merit-based aid programs.
The research examines the relationship between tuition and state funding on
need/merit-based aid. With respect to tuition, the study finds (Tables 4.7 and 4.8) that
tuition is positively related to state funding for need-based aid programs. This study
anticipates that high tuition to less likely lead to cuts in state need and merit-based funding.
The tuition variable is signiﬁcant in the models reported in Tables 4.8 For need-based
funding, an increase in higher education tuition increases need-based funding, while an
increase in higher education tuition does not impact merit-based funding. Other studies
(Cheslock and Hughes 2011; Titus 2009) have suggested that public colleges respond to
decreased state funding by raising tuition and fees. However, high tuition costs may be
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unacceptable to the public and, thus, attract unwanted and negative attention to
policymakers, who may be less willing to pass these costs on to the student (Amy, 2017).
An increase in need-based funding allocated in a previous year shows a positive
relationship with state appropriation. Also, the relationship between merit-based programs
and state appropriation is significant. There is no evidence of a crowding out effect in South
Carolina state funding for higher education. The magnitude of the coefficient for need and
merit-based funding appears to move in a positive direction, with the need-based
magnitude is higher than merit based.
This finding also includes the relationships between the state’s economic factors
and merit need-based funding behaviors over time. As expected, this research finds higher
levels of per-capita income to be positively associated with higher spending for need-based
student aid, but it does not appear to influence state spending on merit-based aid. This latter
result is unexpected in that greater income inequality tends to reduce the likelihood of a
funding cut. These results are consistent with Amy’s (2017) findings on the explanatory
variables that explain dramatic declines in higher education appropriations. Amy’s (2017
findings suggest that, on average, widening wage inequalities are probably less likely to
result in cuts to appropriations. Tandberg (2009) also found that states with greater income
inequality allocate more to higher education, perhaps as a strategy to promote educational
opportunities among poorer residents.
As expected, an increase in the money from this lottery fund leads to an increase in
funding for the merit-based Program. As expected, the result in Table 4.7 shows that an
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increase in the need-based program for private institutions also increases needbased appropriations for public institutions.
In the case of need-based aid, increased revenue collection should lead to more
spending, and vice versa, while an increase in funding from the Education Lottery should
increase appropriations for merit-based programs, even though not all merit-based
programs are sponsored by the lottery. Medicaid as a share of state revenue tends to
negatively impact funding for need-based programs. In contrary, Medicaid as a share of
state revenue does not impact funding for merit-based programs. Tables 4.7 and 4.8 shows
that Education lottery deposit positively impact both need-based and merit-based
programs.
Table 4.7. Determinants of the Merit-Based (Palmetto Fellows) Program in South
Carolina
p-value

bStdXY

SDofX

Coefficient

Degrees Awarded

0.138

8.20E+05

7657.304

1.07E+02

Tuition

0.363

-5.00E+05

3082.498

-1.62E+02

Palmetto Fellows Program

0.510

1.60E+05

3227.219

4.96E+01

Education Lottery Deposit

0.006

2.60E+06

1.70E+06

1.53E+00

Life Program

0.000

1.10E+07

7.20E+07

1.53E-01

Need Based Private

0.000

2.60E+06

4.998

1.60E+06

Need Based Public

0.006

1.60E+06

4.30E+06

3.72E-01

Pop 18t o 24

0.068

-6.90E+05

4.871

-1.42E+05

Pop 45 to 64

0.000

3.20E+06

3.40E+04

9.41E+01

Pop 65

0.000

-3.20E+06

5.70E+06

-5.61E-01

Per Capita Personal Income

0.154

-3.00E+05

5.40E+04

-5.56E+00

Medicaid as Share of State Revenue

0.680

-1.80E+05

3105.033

-5.80E+01

Statewide Medicaid Expenditures

0.872

6.30E+04

4.031

1.56E+04

Medicaid as % of Pop

0.844

-5.20E+04

1.60E+09

-3.25E-05
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p-value

bStdXY

SDofX

Coefficient

Medicaid Recipient

0.265

5.50E+05

1.177

4.67E+05

Technical and Comprehensive Education

0.872

6.30E+04

4.031

1.56E+04

Social Services

0.003

-1.20E+06

2.10E+07

-5.71E-02

Higher Education Tuition Grant

0.003

1.20E+06

2.00E+07

6.00E-02

Public Safety

0.096

-8.70E+05

1.80E+06

-4.83E-01

Mental Health

0.042

-9.60E+05

3.40E+07

-2.82E-02

Health and Human Services

0.003

-1.90E+06

2.40E+07

-7.92E-02

Department of Education

0.201

9.30E+05

2.70E+08

3.44E-03

Corrections

0.000

4.30E+06

3.40E+08

1.26E-02

CHE

0.004

-1.60E+06

3.90E+07

-4.10E-02

EIA

0.250

-2.50E+05

3.20E+07

-7.81E-03

Total State Revenue

0.000

-3.80E+06

8.40E+07

-4.52E-02

State Total Expenditure

0.702

-1.70E+05

8.30E+08

-2.05E-04

State Total Appropriation

0.016

-1.70E+06

8.60E+08

-1.98E-03

Degrees Awarded

0.000

1.80E+06

8.00E+08

2.25E-03

* Significant at less than .01, ** Significant at less than .05

Table 4.8. Determinants of Need-based Program (Need-based for Public) in South
Carolina
p-value

bStdXY

SDofX

Coefficient

Full-time enrollment

0.000

3.80E+06

7776.706

4.89E+02

Degrees Awarded

0.076

-1.20E+06

3157.312

-3.80E+02

Tuition

0.000

2.40E+06

3232.705

7.42E+02

Palmetto Fellows Program

0.001

2.00E+06

1.60E+07

1.25E-01

Education Lottery Deposit

0.000

1.30E+06

7.20E+07

1.81E-02

Life Program

0.966

-1.30E+04

4.998

-2.60E+03

Need Based Private

0.002

1.10E+06

4.871

2.26E+05

Need Based Public

0.002

1.10E+06

4.871

2.26E+05

Pop 18 to 24

0.098

2.80E+06

3.40E+04

8.24E+01

Pop 45 to 64

0.356

1.60E+06

5.70E+06

2.81E-01

Pop 65

0.003

-1.50E+06

5.40E+04

-2.78E+01
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p-value

bStdXY

SDofX

Coefficient

Per Capita Personal Income

0.000

2.50E+06

3105.033

8.05E+02

Medicaid as Share of State Revenue

0.000

-1.50E+06

9.00E-03

-1.67E+08

Statewide Medicaid Expenditures

0.874

-3.20E+04

1.60E+09

-2.00E-05

Medicaid as % of Pop

0.751

-1.20E+05

1.177

-1.02E+05

Medicaid Recipient

0.496

-2.00E+05

4.031

-4.96E+04

Technical and Comprehensive Education

0.000

-1.80E+06

2.10E+07

-8.57E-02

Social Services

0.000

1.70E+06

2.00E+07

8.50E-02

Higher Education Tuition Grant

0.002

-1.60E+06

1.90E+06

-8.42E-01

Public Safety

0.447

-3.20E+05

3.50E+07

-9.14E-03

Mental Health

0.463

3.80E+05

2.30E+07

1.65E-02

Health and Human Services

0.000

4.60E+06

2.80E+08

1.64E-02

Department of Education

0.028

2.20E+06

3.60E+08

6.11E-03

Corrections

0.000

-1.80E+06

3.90E+07

-4.62E-02

CHE

0.339

-2.00E+05

3.40E+07

-5.88E-03

EIA

0.001

-2.10E+06

8.70E+07

-2.41E-02

Total State Revenue

0.000

5.50E+06

8.40E+08

6.55E-03

State Total Expenditure

0.000

-5.60E+06

8.60E+08

-6.51E-03

State Total Appropriation

0.000

4.20E+06

8.20E+08

5.12E-03

* Significant at less than .01, ** Significant at less than .05

4.7

Conclusion
Other studies have concluded that as Medicaid spending contribute to the reduction

in higher education’s share of the state budget. However, this study showed that higher
education’s share is not getting smaller, at least in part, because all categories of Medicaid
shares are getting larger. Medicaid as a percentage of the population is the only category
that reduces higher education funding. Other categories of state spending on Medicaid such
as statewide Medicaid expenditures, Medicaid as a share of state revenue and Medicaid
recipients result in an increase for higher education when Medicaid expands in these
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measures. However, spending on Medicaid, specifically Medicaid as a share of state
revenue, does impact funding for merit-based programs. Consistent with other studies,
(Blumenstyk, 1988; Layzell & Lyddon 1990) This study finds that an increase in state
population decreases funding for higher education.
Given the results of this study, there are programs such as Medicaid that have
displaced need-based programs, but the concerns about the effect of merit-based aid on
other forms of Medicaid are not supported based on the findings of this study. The overall
share of funding that higher education receives is not reduced when all categories of
Medicaid shares receive increased funding with one exception: Medicaid recipient as a
percentage of population is the only category that dampens higher education funding as
this category increases. Other categories of state spending on Medicaid such as statewide
Medicaid expenditures, Medicaid as a share of state revenue and the number of Medicaid
recipients indicate an increase in spending for higher education. Given this, it may be useful
to reconceive how these tradeoffs are considered between the two types of aid and higher
education appropriation.
In addition, past research, using case studies, has suggested that merit-based aid
programs affect student awareness of financial aid; however, these results have not been
verified through systematic evaluation (Turner et al. 2004). The question becomes what the
alternatives for funding merit-based programs are if lottery funds no longer exist. The longterm financial viability of merit-based programs is another issue that has thus far received
little study. For example, if lottery funds were not available, would the state of South
Carolina be willing to fund both need and merit-based programs from the general revenues?
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There is no evidence from this research to support the idea that merit- and need based
programs compete with each other for funding. Rather, each type of program ought to be
designed to maximize enrollment among those who could benefit from higher education.
Given the diverse influences on higher education appropriations, a re-examination of state
financial aid opportunities, financial viability and recipient allocation may be needed (Heller
2002).
In contrast to other results, annual gains in merit-based aid are associated with an
increase in need-based student aid and vice versa. An increase in need-based aid for those
attending private institutions, the Palmetto Fellow’s Program and the LIFE Program are
associated with an increase in need-based aid for those attending public institution.
Future research should use qualitative or interpretive studies to gain a deeper
understanding of state budgetary dynamics in higher education. A more robust research
project combining the use of an appropriate framework, theory and model would be helpful
for developing a model and theory of public university behavior that identifies the
circumstances and interests that influence how an institution (research universities,
technical colleges and public or private universities) with particular characteristics will
respond to an increase or a decrease in state appropriations. Such a model and theory, with
appropriate empirical support, would provide a logical way of explaining the variation
across institutions and over time.
Several different types of conditions can impact the ways in which states finance
post-secondary institutions. This study suggest that future studies to investigate the
decisions to finance need-based/merit-based aid if they are inherently political or not.
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Future studies should examine the influence of the status of the governor’s party in
the legislature and the governor’s party affiliation on merit/need-based aid.
Overall, this research finds that state spending for research institutions( Clemson
University and USC Columbia) appears to be influenced by a variety of state-level
conditions, economic variables and the higher education climate which are distinct from
conditions that influence public four-year institutions (The Citadel, Coastal Carolina,
College of Charleston, Francis Marion, Lander, SC State, USC Aiken, USC Beaufort, USC
Upstate, Winthrop). Also, state spending in other critical areas such as Corrections, Health
and Medicaid compete for state spending for higher education appropriations. Further,
expenditure for K-12 education serves as a determining factor for increases in higher
education funding for research institutions. State spending in other areas such as Health
and Social Rehabilitation, Medicaid spending as a percentage of the population, and
Correctional appropriations leads to a decrease in higher education funding for research
institutions.
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Chapter Five: CONCLUSION
This study examined the budget behavior and relationship patterns of 36 agencies
in South Carolina, with the purpose of assessing the degree of stability and change in the
state’s budget process and extending this analysis to include variables suggested by the
budgeting and policy literature. Research paper one examines the impact of the
relationships among the governor’s recommendations and agencies’ political environment,
type, method of head selection, agency size and agency age on legislative appropriations.
Research paper two is a qualitative analysis of budget success, strategies and outcomes
Finally, research paper three examines the determinants of higher education funding and
the need/ merit-based program. A brief conclusion for each paper is presented below,
followed by recommendations and suggestion for future research.

5.1

Paper One Conclusion
Paper one provides new perspectives on the state of South Carolina’s budgeting

process. More specifically, this study compares the behavior of multiple agencies
systematically, concluding that administrators do not uniformly seek to obtain as many
resources as they can from the governor and the legislature. Agencies do not use the same
strategy of requesting small increase in the budgetary process. Variations in the patterns of
gubernatorial recommendations suggest that in some cases acquisitive behavior is
manifested both in the short term and long-term budget success. This recognition and
verification of variations in the budgeting strategies of different agencies is an important
contribution to the current thinking about budgeting and politics. In addition, the discovery
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of differences among agency strategies suggests potential differences in the
postures that legislative committees assume vis-a-vis different agency administrators.
Numerous issues impact the budget process, with two of the most important ones
being dealing with differences among governmental entities (including agency size and
legislative processes) and addressing organizational structure with regard to the budget
process. Failure to address these issues is an impediment to improving the general welfare
of the citizens. Moreover, they could have a more severe, adverse impact on the budget
process and the quality of the budget outcome. This research has shown that it is beneficial
to question why some government agencies are more stable than the other. Political and
socio-economic factors among others were the traditional answers to this question. Budgets
may also be used as a means of control. However, these differences in structure may affect
individual behavior within organizations in such a way that their budget-related behavior
may differ depending on their structural strategy.
The budget process in South Carolina was changed in 2014; prior to that date, the
governor played a minor role in the budgeting process, with the allocation decisions being
made by legislative committee rather than the executive branch of the state government.
In 2014, Nikki Haley, the Governor, dissolved the state Budget and Control Board, which
had been responsible for preparing the budget. Among its members were the governor, the
chairman of the senate finance committee and the state treasurer. Currently, the Budget
Office is under the control of the governor of the state. Similar to the past, agencies still
request significant increases (average request is 7.9%, maximum request is 25.715% and
minimum request is 1.785%) every year, and the legislature still appropriates
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approximately what the governor recommends. Legislative appropriation is on
average .01 to 2.5% more than the governor’s recommendation; however, legislatures also
cut a governor’s recommendation from .01 to 17 percent of the time over the period studied
here.

The, the difference between the governor’s recommendation and legislative

appropriation in the short and long-term budget is .052% and .065% respectively on an
annual average.
Previous studies (Sharkansky et al. 1969) report that a governor’s recommendation
is the prerequisite for legislative appropriation. However, this research highlights a
different set of possibilities to describe and explain the relationship between the governor
and the legislature. First, agencies are apparently more assertive than previous research
suggests, with agencies requesting on average a 7 to 56 percent increase over current
expenditures. Two, this research found that the legislature sometimes deviates from
gubernatorial recommendations.
Despite the assertion of incrementalism theory, this study conclude that it does not
mean that budget officials do not sometimes focus on budget size. While there is no fixed
formula for arriving at an incremental budget, total budget size is used to aid in incremental
budgeting decisions. Sharkansky et al. (1969) assume a fixation of budget reviewers on the
incremental requests of agencies along with the size of request, meaning they consider both
a request for a budget increase and the agency’s current appropriation. This study concludes
that budget analysts do not always fixate on the increments that are sought but also consider
the size of the budget request in proportion to new requests and the agency’s base. This
finding suggests that examining budget size may also provide information for assessing
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how effectively agencies anticipate program needs and ensure the most efficient
and effective use of resources. Legislators may be interested in examining the budget size
of an agency to understand the issues and trends affecting it to establish the most
appropriate goals.
This consideration may occur when there is a need for the governor to announce an
“across the board cut.” In this situation budget reviewers may also be interested in how
much of an agency’s budget from the current fiscal year will be allowed to carry over to
the next fiscal year. The total amount carried forward may suggest to the reviewers that an
agency with a large request coupled with a large amount carried forward may not need as
much revenue as it received in the past. Agencies usually avoid having their budget cuts in
this situation by engaging in last-minute spending. If this is suspected, an agency’s public
reputation may be affected as it can be perceived as it has a lack of public concern for the
overall economy.
This study also found that while frequently legislatures do not appropriate the exact
amount the governor recommends, they appropriate close this recommendation.
Legislative appropriation is on average.01 to 2.5% more than the governor’s
recommendation; however, legislatures also cut the governor’s recommendation from .01
to 17% of the time over the period studied here. Previous results report that a governor’s
recommendation is the prerequisite for legislative appropriation. This research highlights
a different set of possibilities for the relationship between the governor and the legislature.
Over the time period of this study, 1990-2018, agencies apparently were more acquisitive
than previous research suggests, with agencies requesting on average a 7 to 56 percent
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increase over current expenditures. Results support the idea that legislatures deviate
from gubernatorial recommendations. In 21 of the 36 agencies, the legislature appropriated
a larger amount than the governor’s recommendation This variation in budget trends may
be the result of various different factors: general economic growth, inflation, the overall
ability of the legislature to increase agency budgets, or perhaps some combination of these
variables. The findings also suggest some willingness on the part of legislatures to restore
severe cuts in agency requests when they were a result of a governor’s recommendation.
When looking at long-term budget growth, the legislature appears to be the most crucial
budget actor, a result consistent with other research that has found legislatures tend to
support to budget expansion (Lauth 1984).
In South Carolina, the governor has strong appointive power but weak budget
power because he or she does not have sole responsibility for preparing the budget.
Legislative budget control has also been enhanced by the establishment of budget
preparation policies by the Office of Revenue and Fiscal Affairs (RFA). South Carolina
legislators receive information provided by the RFA, which also reviews the agency
budgets. As a result, it is argued that legislators are more informed about agency requests
and, are therefore, in a stronger position to influence their degree of budgetary success. In
contrast, the governors of Georgia have strong budget powers, primarily because they are
responsible for preparing the budget, a power shared only with persons appointed directly
by them (Schlesinger, 1971). Barrilleaux and Berkman (2003) found that Governors with
greater control over the budgetary process are rewarded with an increased emphasis on
spending that confers statewide benefits.
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According to Wildasky’s theory of the budget process, a limited tenure imposes
additional restrictions on the governor’s power. For example, governors with only one term
in office have not had sufficient time to become acquainted with the budget, to determine
how to direct the process and to convince the administration and legislators to implement
their preferences. Further, governors with limited tenure are not likely to initiate, for
example, a tax increase because it is uncertain whether their administrations will benefit
from it. Tax increases have a policy lag associated with them and a governor’s term may
have ended before the additional revenue is realized to allow for an increase in spending.
When asked about the impact of a governor’s tenure on budget requests, one South
Carolina budget official responded that politics is part of the budget process. Gubernatorial
budget success depends on the course of action chosen , the formal powers of the office,
the structure of the administration and the party composition of the legislature. This study
suggests that governors should focus on a balanced and well researched financial/fiscal
policy ( such as policy to allocate, increase or decrease revenue and expenditure )as this is
the most important variable since this, in large part, determines the extent to which the
governor is able to use their formal powers
The governor plays an important role in short-term budget decisions, while
legislatures play a dominant role in agency budget expansion over time. In South Carolina,
the weak budgetary power of the governor and the amount of budget information held by
legislatures have contributed to this phenomenon. This study suggests the need to
understand agency budget justifications and utilize evidence as a guide in budget
development. Policymakers in both the executive and legislative branches can make more
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informed decisions by incorporating rigorous evidence into the budget process, one
key step being the requirement of agencies to justify budget requests with rigorous
research. This action can help ensure that funding is directed toward programs that are most
likely to achieve desired outcomes. According to VanLandingham et al. (2016), one of the
issues with the budget rules and processes is that legislators require agencies to justify the
amount of funding requested rather than the results their program would achieve. As such,
budget justification is required to distinguish knowledge from year over year estimates that
may or may not be accurate. In general, a justified budget is one supported by evidence
and provides additional proof that tax payer’s dollars will be spent well.
The assumption that legislatures rely on governor’s recommendation is further
investigated by examining the correlation and regression between the governor and
legislative appropriations in the short and long term. From these findings, we can conclude
that a governor’s support appears to be a critical ingredient for short-term agency budget
success. The governor’s recommendation does not appear to support agency budget
expansion in moderately acquisitive agencies, a result found for other categories of
assertiveness as well. The results confirm that agencies requesting the greatest incremental
change in budget will receive the largest percentage growth over their current budget, while
agencies requesting little or no incremental change will receive little to no growth in their
budget.
Correlations between legislative and gubernatorial short-term support were
significant across all agencies, but correlations between the governor’s and legislative
appropriation in the long-term were significant only for 22 of 36 agencies, while agency
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acquisitiveness and the governor’s short-term support were significant in 19 of 36
agencies. The magnitude of the correlations between legislative and gubernatorial shortterm support is greater, on average, than those between support for budget expansion and
acquisitiveness in most agencies. However, in terms of long-term budgeting support, the
results from the model highlight the importance of agency acquisitiveness over
gubernatorial support. The study concludes that legislative appropriation in the long-term
strongly influences spending by agencies in South Carolina, suggesting that legislative
appropriation to agencies may drive or determine agency spending priorities, agency
expansion and the extent to which they can carry out their programs.
This study confirms the partisanship hypothesis that the relationship between the
governor and legislative appropriations depends on the majority-minority status of the
governor’s party. When legislative control is in the hands of the Democrats and the status
of the governor’s party is in the minority, a one unit increase in the governor’s budget
recommendation increases agency appropriations by 1.00563 percent. Short-term and
long-term success of agency appropriations are higher when legislative control is
Democratic rather than Republican. While there is insufficient evidence to claim that state
Democrats are spenders and Republicans are more conservative in their spending, the
results of model reveal a relationship that provides some support for this idea. Beland et al.
(2015) investigates whether the party affiliation of governors (Democrat or Republican)
has an impact on the allocation of state expenditures. They found that Democratic
governors allocate a larger share of their budget to health/hospitals and education sectors
than their Republican counterparts. Most importantly, this study provides evidence to
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suggest that partisanship is an important consideration in the agency-gubernatoriallegislative budgetary relationship, results consistent with previous findings. While this
relationship may seem obvious, it is important confirmation of the “budgeting game” in
practice based on a research lens.
This study provides no evidence to support a conclusion that cabinet agencies are
more successful than executive departments in circumventing the governor and dealing
directly with the legislature on budgetary matters. However, appointed agencies do appear
to fare better than elected agencies in their ability to acquire funding from the legislature
when they are unable to acquire it from the governor. The reason may be that appointed
agencies work hard to build clients, have the support of their clientele, and maintain good
relationships with the authorizing and appropriations committees. Leloup (1978) concludes
that agencies feel secure in asking for more when they know they have the backing of
Congress. Lauth (1984) concluded that cabinet agencies are not more independent of the
governor in budgetary matters than executive departments. Analysis of the budget
experience of South Carolina agencies suggests that agency type does not make much
difference insofar as budget success is concerned. Strong gubernatorial budget powers
appear to be offset by strong appointive powers at least when it comes to budgetary
outcome.

5.2

Paper Two Conclusion
One important variable determining the behavior of participants in the budget

process is the adequacy of revenues as confirmed by one of the state’s budget officials
during the qualitative interviews. The state budget must be balanced, and when revenue
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increases at a slower rate than expenditures, budgeting usually becomes a form of
revenue seeking behavior. The primary concern of professional budget managers during
deficit periods is finding resources to fund programs while at the same time curbing an
increase in spending. During surplus periods, governors and budget reviewers are
concerned about opportunities to expand spending. The budget officials interviewed
explained the relationship between revenue and expenditure using two scenarios. First,
raising revenue could lead to more expenditures: one could argue that any expenditure in
a budget must be expanded in line with revenue changes and, therefore, expenditure must
follow revenue. Hence, cutting expenditures addresses reducing budget deficits and vice versa. Second, changes in government expenditure could cause changes in revenue: one
could argue that any disturbance in the broader economy, such as unstable political
conditions or natural disasters, leads to an increase in government spending.
When revenue grows faster than expenditures, the governor’s options expand,
meaning he has more possibilities to choose from: He may become an advocate of lower
taxation, or he may join the rank of those arguing for an expansion of state services. One
budget official responded that the governors who know how to use social media are the
ones successful in the 21st century. This respondent added that a “…governor should have
goals. A clear goal will make a good governor. A governor who can articulate their goals.
A governor has a good plan. A governor who knows how to relate X and Y.”
One key variable of interest is identifying and understanding the mission of each
agency and how it plays a role in an administrator maximizing his/her response to the
internal and external budget environment. It is essential for an agency administrator to
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know how to engage in the budget environment, especially how to increase new
requests over the previous ones, which is critical to maximizing agency budget increases.
This research reveals that agencies have two primary budget goals: one focuses on agency
growth and expansion and the other on agency stability. Agencies interested in expansion
may focus on budget growth, i.e. a large percentage increase in appropriation, while
agencies interested in stability may focus on achieving a larger percentage of the current
request appropriated. In summary, agencies the mission of an agency will dictate its success
in the budget appropriation process. Agency size and age, among many other factors,
impact its choice of budget strategies. Seeking public attention and support from the
governor and legislators, increasing agency size, minimizing agency controversy and
working hard to retain employees are all strategies that can assist an agency administrator
in maximizing agency budget requests.
This research also confirms that the budgeting process is complex and influenced
by many variables (Wildavsky 1974). Overall, the findings on the perceptions of agency
budget success implies that agencies should have enough fund to meet program needs and
also to have flexibility in use of fund.
Budget official reported that gaining support from the governor provides an avenue
for program expansion, implying that budget officials are not just concerned about higher
appropriation alone. The disadvantage of a strong relationship with the governor may mean
his support for an agency could increase its level of assertiveness in the budgetary process.
Other factors have been suggested as challenges to the incremental perspective on
budgeting in the literature on policy and budgeting (LeLoup and Moreland, 1978). These
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diverse perspectives, however, have not been systematically integrated into a
potentially competing paradigm. To move in this direction, to move in this direction, future
research could use the variables and classifications identified in this research to test
scenarios of state budgets in other states. For example, the assertiveness categories
developed in this study may help to describe the assertive behavior that may be manifested
by higher education institution during all stages of the budget process. A comparison of
assertive behaviors in research and public four-year institutions or studying assertive
behavior that may manifest in other types of institutions could provide opportunities for
additional analyses and a more robust understanding of the higher education budgeting
process.
One question of importance for further research is to determine if the governance
structure in a state leads to assertive behavior in a particular or type of institution. Longer
time series of budget data with more states would allow for a much more expansive
analyses of these processes. Such analyses should assess the impact of partisan conflict,
election outcome and year, the soft skills of governors, and the nature of executivelegislative relations in budget matters. Future research could also examine how state
spending on Medicaid and other areas affect a particular agency and its programs. Further
information will allow us to examine if agency success in long- or short-term budget
expansion is associated with state spending on Medicaid and other policy areas such as
mental health and correction.
Additional research investigating the impact of loss of revenue on particular
programs and agencies would also be of value. For example, how would potential changes

169

to the personal income tax system affect agency size and the overall state economy?
Research in this area would help us to understand more fully the potential benefits and
disadvantages of loss of state revenue on the long-term economic growth of the state.
The relationship between an agency and the governor is assumed to be important
but understanding the linearity and duality of this relationship is an important area for
future research. For example, does the governor need the cooperation of agencies and if so,
under what circumstance or in what situations? A critical future research question could
focus on whether this type of cooperation is needed during deficit or surplus budget
periods.
Another important area of future research is the inclusion of more states, more
agencies and different time periods to discover if results found here are generalizable to a
larger set of states and agencies. Reconceptualizing variables could also be of value in
clarifying these relationships. For example, agencies could be grouped based on identified
typologies and compared based on policy and program area. For example, little is known
about how state support for state agencies may vary among policy area (regulatory,
distributive, market-oriented and redistributive).
Examining the relationships between the decision environments of different
agencies (executive and legislative arm) and the roles of other budget ofﬁces and actors,
are additional areas for research exploration. There has been considerable research in this
area at the federal level; however, the research focused on state budget actors and their
decision strategies is limited. Investigating the relationship among the budget decision
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making process, public opinion and appropriation is critical for researchers,
policymakers and politicians.
Applications of new concepts from other fields of research, such as social capital,
are worth exploring as well. For example, while many factors have been studied as they
relate to budgeting, little is known about the mediating and moderating effect of norms,
trust and cooperation on agency budget outcomes. More research is needed to study the
conditions necessary to build trust among participants in the budget process and for
developing social organization capital constructs to allow scholars to appropriately
measure the effect of trust and cooperation on agency budget success. Organizational
behavior research would benefit from empirical evidence on how political agencies
develop strategies to achieve their mission. This study suggests that future investigation
should focus on other disciplinary lens such as using organization concepts to explain
variations in the budgeting process and outcome.

5.3

Paper Three Conclusion
This study examine how South Carolina budgets for higher education and which

factors best predict changes in state appropriations. It has been argued that Medicaid
spending has contributed to the overall decline in higher education’s share of the state
budgetary pie. This study found that the increase in Medicaid spending only partially
explains the reduction in education spending. Medicaid as a percentage of population is the
only category that reduces higher education funding. Other categories of state spending on
Medicaid such as statewide Medicaid expenditures, Medicaid as share of state revenue and
state’s Medicaid recipient indicated an increase for higher education.
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However, Medicaid as a share of state revenue crowds out funding for merit-based
and need-based higher education support. “Increases in Medicaid expenditure during the
1980s and early 1990s appeared to have played an important role in the failure of higher
education appropriations to rise significantly during the 1990s boom” (Kane et al. 2003).
Kane, Orszag, and Gunter (2003) demonstrated how, within a budget of a given size, if
spending on Medicaid increases because of federal mandates or incentives, funding for
other budgetary entities is reduced, and “higher education spending is one such
component” (Archibald and Feldman 2006). Many policy makers argue that higher
education funding should be a priority. Other studies (Cheslock and Hughes 2011; Titus
2009) have suggested that public colleges respond to decreased state funding by raising
tuition and fees. This study found no evidence that higher tuition leads to a decline in
education funding.
This study also reveal elements of crowding out effect where state spending in other
state priorities (Correction and Health categories) appears to displace funding in higher
education. Previous years appropriation also correlated with current appropriation and this
led us to believe that in some cases lawmakers used incremental approach in their decisionmaking process.
Rizzo (2006) “emphasized that public universities are accustomed to their state
funding being at the mercy of economic cycles, whereby in bad budget times, higher
education typically bears a disproportionate burden of state funding cuts, with the full
expectation that it will be compensated during a recovery (Rizzo, 2006 p. 3)”.
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Several conditions can impact the ways in which states finance post-secondary
institutions. This study found that the decisions to finance need-based aid are inherently
not political but the same cannot be said of merit-based aid. The status of the governor’s
party in the legislature seems to influence merit-based aid. In contrast to other findings,
increase in funding merit-based aid are associated with increases in need-based funding.
An increase in need-based scholarships to private institutions, Palmetto Fellows and the
LIFE Program are associated with increases in need-based scholarships to public
universities. When budget environment is unfavorable, balance wheel theory proposed that
the state will cut higher education appropriation. In the case of need/merit based
scholarship program, increased tax revenue leads to more spending, and vice versa.

Overall, this research finds that state spending for South Carolina research
institutions (Clemson University and USC Columbia) appears to be influenced by a variety
of state-level conditions, economic variables and the higher education climate, all of which
are distinct from conditions that influence public four-year institutions ( The Citadel,
Coastal Carolina, College of Charleston, Francis Marion, Lander, SC State, USC Aiken,
USC Beaufort, USC Upstate, Winthrop). In addition, state spending in other critical areas
such as Corrections, Health and Medicaid compete for state spending for higher education
appropriations. Further, expenditure for K-12 education serves as a determining factor for
increases in higher education funding for research institutions. State spending in other areas
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such as Health and Social Rehabilitation, Medicaid spending as a percentage of the
population, and Correctional appropriations leads to a decrease in higher education funding
for research institutions.

5.4

Policy Recommendations
Agency budget success is an important concept because it deals with what

administrative officials want to accomplish during the budget process and provides insights
into their budget roles. when the budget process is improved, it may mean an overall
success of the state. Obtaining enough funds and Gaining flexibility to meet agency needs
and maintain agency programs at current operating levels means effective program
administration and service delivery, resulting in increased favorable feedback from
clientele and other groups.
A better understanding of the dynamics of budget competition may help researchers
and legislators to understand the variations in state support for higher education.
Additionally, the variations in legislative and gubernatorial support for higher education
appropriation impact tuition, accessibility to disadvantaged Americans, and the quality of
public higher education. This study finds that an increase in state population decreases
funding for higher education. It is critical that the state should align their planning with the
increase in the demographic characteristics of the state.
Policymakers need to determine how state fund to be used in funding state
scholarship. How does the scholarship benefit low income family is a question of priority
that state needs to provide answer? The adverse trade off suffered by higher education
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during appropriation should be mitigated if the goal of the state is to provide or
increase opportunity in higher education.
What is the alternatives for funding scholarship programs are if lottery funds no
longer exist? The long-term financial viability of scholarship programs funded by lottery
is another issue that has thus far received little study. For example, if lottery funds were
not available, would the state of South Carolina be willing to fund both need and meritbased programs from the general revenues?
Participatory Budgeting (PB) is a democratic process in which community
members directly decide how to spend part of a public budget. Greensboro is the first city
in the south to implement a participatory budgeting process. In October 2014, Greensboro
passed a resolution in which it committed $500,000 annually to PB, allowing citizens to
develop and vote on budget proposals (Afonso Whitney 2017). There is considerable
evidence that participatory budgeting helps to promote good governance and it could
increase the civic responsibility of citizens if practiced well. To avoid this pitfall of
participatory budgeting , citizens needs to be empowered to use their voices by
participating in civic life. Also, citizens should embrace a commitment to process integrity.
This means operating with consistency, discipline, transparency, and accountability.
In the budgeting relationship the principal could be defined as the governor or the
legislator and the agent as the agency and department. From the principal-agent
perspective, the information managed by both is focused on advancing their own selfinterest or maximizing their own utilities. The information is exchanged so that both sets
of participants might adapt to a dynamic, yet resource-constrained environment (Forrester

175

and Adams, 1987). A major limitation in the budgetary and political environment
is the imperfect information provided by both the principals and agents or, worse, the
asymmetric information held by either of them.
Where there is an asymmetry of information, it is expected that the consequent
budgetary solution will be suboptimal, with unexpected results. With insufficient or biased
information, the decision makers cannot estimate the effects of their decisions with a high
degree of certainty. Asymmetry information creates an imbalance of power between the
agent and principal and this could make the agreement made to go awry. Budget success
also depend on quality of information shared between the agency and legislative arm
otherwise it will be dictated by political trade off .
The Principal-Agent model can be used to enhance our understanding of the
relationships between actors in the budget decision making process. Applying the
Principal-Agent theory and using it as a framework to explore the budgeting process may
provide an additional lens for understanding the complexities of the budget process.
Relationships between the participants in the budget process can be more productive and
achieve better budget results when organizational social capital (trust) is enhanced.
One important conclusion from this research is that final appropriations for
agencies are dependent on critical factors other than addition and subtraction to the base
funding level. The findings from this study will help agencies that are poor (in terms of
appropriation) and small (in terms of total number of employees) to improve their position
by taking into consideration factors like their structure and the overall budget environment.
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Understanding key factors such as size, age and democratic strength has provided evidence
that rich and large agencies are favored over small and poor agencies.
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Appendix A

Model 1: Relationship between agency request and legislative appropriation
Panes

Line

Coefficients

Row

Column

p-value

ARTS COMMISSION

App

0.592045 Request

0.048495

intercept

3.52E+06

0.543146 Request

-0.14659

intercept

4.54E+06

0.694506 Request

0.083879

intercept

1.85E+06

0.085754 Request

-3.2995

intercept

3.98E+06

0.678278 Request

0.058258

intercept

3.57E+06

0.247569 Request

0.280799

intercept

1.76E+07

0.592211 Request

0.842643

intercept

3.20E+08

0.114071 Request

-2.73683

intercept

3.43E+09

0.390857 Request

-1.50145

intercept

6.47E+06

0.067167 Request

0.170108

intercept

5.48E+06

0.652416 Request

-0.13384

intercept

1.11E+07

0.043466 Request

1.00452

COMMISSION FOR THE BLIND

App

COMMISSION ON HUMAN AFFAIRS

App

CONSUMER AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT

App

DEPARTMENT OF ARCHIVES AND HISTORY

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

App

App

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS

App

DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION

App

DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE

App

DEPT OF AGRICULTURE

App

DEPT OF ALCOHOL & OTHER DRUG ABUSE SVCS App

DEPT OF HEALTH & ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL App

191

Term

Value

Panes

Line

Row

Column

DEPT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SVCS

App

DEPT OF JUVENILE JUSTICE

App

DEPT OF LABOR, LICENSING & REGULATION

DEPT OF MENTAL HEALTH

App

App

DEPT OF NATURAL RESOURCES

App

DEPT OF PARKS,RECREATION & TOURISM

App

DEPT OF PROBATION,PAROLE & PARDON

App

DEPT OF PUBLIC SAFETY

App

DEPT OF REVENUE

App

EDUCATIONAL TELEVISION COMMISSION

App

FORESTRY COMMISSION

App

HIGHER EDUCATION TUITION GRANTS

App

MUSEUM COMMISSION

App

192

p-value

Coefficients
Term

Value

intercept

1.03E+08

0.690161 Request

0.160707

intercept

7.29E+08

0.163584 Request

-0.81551

intercept

9.03E+07

0.234669 Request

-2.15989

intercept

8.18E+06

0.218181 Request

-1.38876

intercept

2.79E+08

0.918024 Request

-0.03049

intercept

2.78E+07

0.113719 Request

0.604946

intercept

2.65E+07

0.88177 Request

-0.09681

intercept

2.43E+07

0.779041 Request

0.416713

intercept

9.73E+07

0.543729 Request

-0.11087

intercept

4.37E+07

0.135585 Request

0.370239

intercept

1.28E+07

0.623024 Request

-0.06844

intercept

1.84E+07

0.26453 Request

0.621869

intercept

2.15E+07

0.843356 Request

0.011515

intercept

4.44E+06

Panes

Line

Coefficients

Row

Column

p-value

SCHOOL FOR THE DEAF AND THE BLIND

App

0.003077 Request

0.363018

intercept

1.12E+07

0.52879 Request

-0.21411

intercept

675709

0.919501 Request

0.041536

intercept

1.32E+08

0.626536 Request

0.066101

intercept

1.48E+08

0.400405 Request

0.215113

intercept

9.43E+06

0.145348 Request

-1.59482

intercept

1.95E+07

0.250698 Request

-0.40802

intercept

4.15E+06

0.308826 Request

0.180439

intercept

3.04E+06

SEA GRANT CONSORTIUM

App

SOCIAL SERVICES

App

ST BD FOR TECHNICAL & COMPREHENSIVE ED

STATE LIBRARY

App

App

VOCATIONAL REHABILITATION

App

WIL LOU GRAY OPPORTUNITY SCHOOL

App

WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION

App
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Term

Value

Appendix B
Model 2: Relationship between Agency Request and Governor recommendation:
Row
ARTS COMMISSION

App

0.590638 Govrecmd
intercept

COMMISSION FOR THE BLIND

App

0.087049 Govrecmd
intercept

COMMISSION ON HUMAN AFFAIRS

App

0.303409 Govrecmd
intercept

CONSUMER AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT

App

0.206412 Govrecmd
intercept

DEPARTMENT OF ARCHIVES AND HISTORY

App

0.021447 Govrecmd
intercept

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

App

0.039178 Govrecmd
intercept

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS

App

0.498044 Govrecmd
intercept

DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION

App

0.344 Govrecmd
intercept

DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE

App

0.113355 Govrecmd
intercept

DEPT OF AGRICULTURE

App

0.021283 Govrecmd
intercept

DEPT OF ALCOHOL & OTHER DRUG ABUSE SVCS

App

0.114945 Govrecmd
intercept

DEPT OF HEALTH & ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL

App

0.113544 Govrecmd
intercept

DEPT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SVCS

App
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0.012117 Govrecmd

0.429958
3.54E+06
0.754467
2.30E+06
1.65766
1.58E+06
1.79624
387510
2.04101
-1.50E+06
0.657651
1.03E+07
0.605271
3.15E+08
0.903361
1.35E+09
0.524911
3.97E+06
1.51145
1.95E+06
1.84253
-798532
5.42979
-2.64E+08
0.438543

Row
intercept
DEPT OF JUVENILE JUSTICE

App

0.055274 Govrecmd
intercept

DEPT OF LABOR, LICENSING & REGULATION

App

0.006305 Govrecmd
intercept

DEPT OF MENTAL HEALTH

App

0.468278 Govrecmd
intercept

DEPT OF NATURAL RESOURCES

App

0.192631 Govrecmd
intercept

DEPT OF PARKS,RECREATION & TOURISM

App

0.012641 Govrecmd
intercept

DEPT OF PROBATION,PAROLE & PARDON

App

0.96782 Govrecmd
intercept

DEPT OF PUBLIC SAFETY

App

0.054172 Govrecmd
intercept

DEPT OF REVENUE

App

0.632676 Govrecmd
intercept

EDUCATIONAL TELEVISION COMMISSION

App

0.119555 Govrecmd
intercept

FORESTRY COMMISSION

App

0.015034 Govrecmd
intercept

HIGHER EDUCATION TUITION GRANTS

App

0.840469 Govrecmd
intercept

MUSEUM COMMISSION

App

0.075721 Govrecmd
intercept

SCHOOL FOR THE DEAF AND THE BLIND

App

0.406702 Govrecmd
intercept

SEA GRANT CONSORTIUM

App
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< 0.0001

Govrecmd

4.08E+08
1.23124
1.86E+07
0.251767
3.27E+06
1.51988
2.38E+08
2.46568
-1.21E+07
1.56057
7.40E+06
-0.05762
3.81E+07
1.01021
2.80E+07
-0.28174
7.80E+07
3.66672
-1.33E+07
4.87744
-3.10E+07
-0.85856
7.77E+07
1.81676
-1.52E+06
-4.17143
1.03E+08
0.7367

Row
intercept
SOCIAL SERVICES

App

0.789274 Govrecmd
intercept

ST BD FOR TECHNICAL & COMPREHENSIVE ED

App

0.807112 Govrecmd
intercept

STATE LIBRARY

App

0.012489 Govrecmd
intercept

VOCATIONAL REHABILITATION

App

0.037801 Govrecmd
intercept

WIL LOU GRAY OPPORTUNITY SCHOOL

App

0.853017 Govrecmd
intercept

WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION

App

0.014056 Govrecmd
intercept
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153164
-1.97533
6.83E+08
0.600129
2.93E+08
2.19143
-4.39E+06
5.9358
-3.87E+07
0.100446
5.22E+06
1.60862
-341796

Appendix C

Model 3: Relationship between legislative appropriation and Governor recommendation:
Panes

Line

Row

Column

ARTS COMMISSION

Govrecmd

COMMISSION FOR THE BLIND

Govrecmd

COMMISSION ON HUMAN AFFAIRS

Govrecmd

CONSUMER AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT

Govrecmd

DEPARTMENT OF ARCHIVES AND HISTORY

Govrecmd

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

Govrecmd

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS

Govrecmd

DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION

Govrecmd

DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE

Govrecmd

DEPT OF AGRICULTURE

Govrecmd

DEPT OF ALCOHOL & OTHER DRUG ABUSE SVCS

Govrecmd

DEPT OF HEALTH & ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL

Govrecmd
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p-value

Coefficients
Term

Value

0.065043 Request

0.110801

intercept

3.50E+06

0.000712 Request

-0.3627

intercept

3.51E+06

0.322618 Request

-0.26111

intercept

1.87E+06

0.958399 Request

0.0283

intercept

1.49E+06

0.856534 Request

0.026399

intercept

3.48E+06

0.14019 Request

0.343577

intercept

1.53E+07

0.801325 Request

-0.18413

intercept

3.00E+08

0.708758 Request

0.26869

intercept

1.85E+09

0.041005 Request

-1.06847

intercept

4.87E+06

0.273582 Request

0.087721

intercept

4.89E+06

0.20263 Request

0.169358

intercept

8.18E+06

0.020266 Request

0.577075

Panes

Line

Row

Column

DEPT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SVCS

Govrecmd

DEPT OF JUVENILE JUSTICE

Govrecmd

DEPT OF LABOR, LICENSING & REGULATION

Govrecmd

DEPT OF MENTAL HEALTH

Govrecmd

DEPT OF NATURAL RESOURCES

Govrecmd

DEPT OF PARKS,RECREATION & TOURISM

Govrecmd

DEPT OF PROBATION,PAROLE & PARDON

Govrecmd

DEPT OF PUBLIC SAFETY

Govrecmd

DEPT OF REVENUE

Govrecmd

EDUCATIONAL TELEVISION COMMISSION

Govrecmd

FORESTRY COMMISSION

Govrecmd

HIGHER EDUCATION TUITION GRANTS

Govrecmd

MUSEUM COMMISSION

Govrecmd
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p-value

Coefficients
Term

Value

intercept

9.39E+07

Request

0.84619

intercept

3.96E+08

0.087361 Request

-1.34498

intercept

8.44E+07

0.197555 Request

-0.9542

intercept

5.23E+06

0.168314 Request

0.518577

intercept

1.55E+08

0.877241 Request

-0.02007

intercept

2.31E+07

0.673752 Request

0.144122

intercept

2.55E+07

0.193035 Request

0.378899

intercept

1.92E+07

0.151402 Request

0.649921

intercept

7.19E+07

0.015162 Request

-0.56149

intercept

4.65E+07

0.146682 Request

0.406891

intercept

1.16E+07

0.002927 Request

-0.25294

intercept

1.72E+07

0.730048 Request

0.080928

intercept

2.08E+07

0.971827 Request

0.002382

intercept

4.34E+06

< 0.0001

Panes

Line

Row

Column

SCHOOL FOR THE DEAF AND THE BLIND

Govrecmd

SEA GRANT CONSORTIUM

Govrecmd

SOCIAL SERVICES

Govrecmd

ST BD FOR TECHNICAL & COMPREHENSIVE ED

Govrecmd

STATE LIBRARY

Govrecmd

VOCATIONAL REHABILITATION

Govrecmd

WIL LOU GRAY OPPORTUNITY SCHOOL

Govrecmd

WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION

Govrecmd
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p-value

Coefficients
Term

Value

0.323229 Request

0.094609

intercept

1.17E+07

0.941588 Request

0.010159

intercept

522920

0.041169 Request

0.304915

intercept

1.11E+08

0.438989 Request

0.054615

intercept

1.34E+08

0.015926 Request

0.277174

intercept

7.61E+06

0.036394 Request

-1.09087

intercept

1.60E+07

0.123241 Request

-0.61523

intercept

4.05E+06

0.763473 Request

-0.04452

intercept

3.16E+06

